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Srikant Devaraj 
SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF THE PRICE RESPONSIVENESS OF 
ALCOHOL DEMAND: A POLICY ANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE 
 Accurate estimation of alcohol price elasticity is important for policy analysis – 
e.g.., determining optimal taxes and projecting revenues generated from proposed tax 
changes.  Several approaches to specifying and estimating the price elasticity of demand 
for alcohol can be found in the literature.  There are two keys to policy-relevant 
specification and estimation of alcohol price elasticity.  First, the underlying demand 
model should take account of alcohol consumption decisions at the extensive margin – 
i.e., individuals’ decisions to drink or not – because the price of alcohol may impact the 
drinking initiation decision and one’s decision to drink is likely to be structurally 
different from how much they drink if they decide to do so (the intensive margin).  
Secondly, the modeling of alcohol demand elasticity should yield both theoretical and 
empirical results that are causally interpretable.  
The elasticity estimates obtained from the existing two-part model takes into 
account the extensive margin, but are not causally interpretable.  The elasticity estimates 
obtained using aggregate-level models, however, are causally interpretable, but do not 
explicitly take into account the extensive margin.  There currently exists no specification 
and estimation method for alcohol price elasticity that both accommodates the extensive 
margin and is causally interpretable.  I explore additional sources of bias in the extant 
approaches to elasticity specification and estimation:  1) the use of logged (vs. nominal) 
alcohol prices; and 2) implementation of unnecessarily restrictive assumptions underlying 
the conventional two-part model.  I propose a new approach to elasticity specification and 
vii 
estimation that covers the two key requirements for policy relevance and remedies all 
such biases.  I find evidence of substantial divergence between the new and extant 
methods using both simulated and the real data.  Such differences are profound when 
placed in the context of alcohol tax revenue generation. 
 
Joseph V. Terza, PhD, Chair 
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Chapter 1.   
Background and Significance 
1.  Introduction 
 From principles of economics, the quantity demanded of any product is linked to 
its price.   In the context of alcohol, an increase in alcohol prices would result in a 
decrease in alcohol consumption.  Alcohol pricing policies are used to stem negative 
externalities associated with alcohol use and abuse (Elder et al., 2010; Leung & Phelps, 
1993).  Some example of such negative externalities include increases in: traffic fatalities 
resulting from drunk driving (Chaloupka, Saffer, & Grossman, 1993; Kenkel, 1993; 
Mullahy and Sindelar, 1994; Ruhm, 1996; Sloan, Reilly, & Schenzler, 1994); underage 
drinking (Grossman, Chaloupka, Saffer, & Laixuthai, 1994); utilization of publicly 
financed healthcare programs (Manning, Keeler, Newhouse, Sloss, & Wasserman, 1989); 
alcohol consumption among pregnant women (Patra et al., 2011); alcohol-related crime 
and domestic violence (Cook & Moore, 1993, 2002; Markowitz & Grossman, 1998, 
2000); the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases (Chesson, Harrison, & Kassler, 
2000); cirrhosis of the liver (Sloan, Reilly, & Schenzler, 1994); and adverse labor market 
outcomes (Mullahy & Sindelar, 1996; Terza, 2002).   
 Several state legislatures in the US have imposed, or are considering increasing, 
sumptuary taxes (often referred to as “sin taxes” or Pigouvian taxes) predominantly on 
alcohol and tobacco to reduce negative externalities.  Studies have shown that such taxes 
increase the prices of alcohol, decrease the demand for alcohol, and thus lead to lower 
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negative externalities (Byrnes, Shakeshaft, Petrie, & Doran, 2013; Cook & Durrance, 
2013).  
 There also has been growing interest in raising alcohol excise taxes to increase 
government revenues so as to reduce budget deficits or to fund various state and federal 
programs such as:  alcohol and substance abuse treatment programs; drug courts; family 
court services; early childhood education programs; law enforcement; and health care.  
The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) estimated the federal excise tax 
revenues from alcohol to be $13.9 billion in 2014.  State and local government revenues 
from alcoholic beverages sales taxes amounted to $6.2 billion in 2014.1   
 The federal government increased excise taxes on all alcoholic beverages in 1991.  
Since then, the Congressional Budget Office has proposed additional increases in excise 
taxes on alcohol as a means of reducing budget deficits (Congressional Budget Office, 
2013).  States also levy additional taxes on alcoholic beverages.  For example most states, 
in addition to general sale tax rates, levy alcohol excise taxes per gallon at the wholesale 
or retail level separately.  A few states also levy ad valorem taxes on each alcohol type 
expressed as a percentage of its retail price.2  Such ad valorem tax rates differ in on- and 
off-premise sales of alcohol.  Any change in alcohol taxes would impact the revenues 
generated by the state/federal government as a result of it.   
 To summarize, one reason to raise alcohol taxes is to increase the government 
revenues to reduce budget deficits or fund various governmental programs.  Another 
                                                 
1
 See http://ttb.gov/statistics/final15.pdf for details on federal excise tax revenues and 
http://www2.census.gov/govs/statetax/G14-STC-Final.pdf for details on state and local 
sale tax revenues. 
2
 Some states that levy ad valorem taxes do not apply general sales tax on alcoholic 
products.  
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reason to raise alcohol taxes is to alleviate the negative consequences of alcohol use and 
abuse.  Such Pigouvian taxes will have an impact on the quantity of alcohol consumed as 
a result of price increase.  Elasticity is a pertinent measure that captures the change in 
consumption as a result of change in prices through taxes.  Existing models that forecast 
revenue generation from an increase in alcohol taxes incorporate the price elasticity of 
alcohol demand in their models along with changes in alcohol taxes, the price of alcohol 
and current alcohol consumption (Alcohol Justice, 2014).   
 The alcohol price elasticity can also be used to study the effect of a varied set of 
proposed tax rates for curbing alcohol consumption to a certain level and, hence, impact 
public health issues (for example: reducing alcohol abuse among pregnant women, 
reducing a specific percentage of alcohol-related traffic accidents, bringing down under-
age drinking, reducing crime and violence due to alcohol consumption, decreasing the 
number of sexually transmitted disease incidences, or achieving other policy goals).  
Furthermore, aside from the applications on the demand side, knowing the alcohol price 
elasticities is also valuable to the alcohol industry or the supply side.  It could help the 
industry determine the changes in its sales and profits as a result of change in prices from 
tax changes and from government imposed policies (such as minimum legal drinking age, 
monetary penalties for underage drinking, blood alcohol concentration limits for driving, 
etc.).   
 Therefore, accurate estimation of the alcohol price elasticity is important for 
policymakers to forecast tax revenues from increases in alcohol taxes, and evaluate the 
optimal level of alcohol taxes intended to maximize revenues from taxes or restrict the 
growth in alcohol consumption for social welfare.  It is also an equally essential measure 
4 
for the alcohol industry to estimate the effect of new (or proposed) federal and state taxes 
on the industry’s sales and profits.   
 
2.  Role of Elasticity to Inform Alcohol Pricing Policy through Revenue Generation 
 Elasticities also play a key role in determining the direction of tax revenue 
changes due to tax rate changes.  Ornstein (1980) and Levy and Sheflin (1985) show that 
if alcohol demand is inelastic, an increase in alcohol excise taxes will have a trivial 
shrinking effect on consumption; increase tax revenues; and increase disposable income 
spent on alcohol by consumers.  Alternatively, when alcohol demand is elastic, an 
increase in excise taxes decreases consumption by a relatively larger amount and leads to 
a decline in tax revenues.  Leung and Phelps (1993) extend the Ornstein (1980) model by 
relaxing some of the restrictions on the magnitude of the relevant demand elasticities.  
They show that revenues are maximized by setting the tax rates in such a way that the 
equilibrium alcohol consumption level is in the elastic part of the demand curve.   
 Alcohol Justice is an organization that monitors the alcohol industry and also 
leads campaigns for increasing alcohol taxes at a national and state-level to fund 
government programs on alcohol prevention and treatment.  They derived a simple model 
to estimate revenue generation through alcohol tax increases (Alcohol Justice, 2014).  
The model incorporates the elasticity of alcohol demand, changes in alcohol taxes, the 
price of alcohol and current alcohol consumption.  Their model shows that the more 
elastic is demand, the smaller the change in revenues.  Also, different own price 
elasticities of alcohol demand yield different revenue generation values.  As in the 
published studies cited above, when the price responsiveness of alcohol or any product is 
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elastic, increases in prices will reduce revenues.  Alternatively, when demand is inelastic, 
tax revenues will be higher with increases in prices.  In chapter 2 (section 5), I discuss the 
Alcohol Justice (2014) model in detail and demonstrate how different specifications of, 
and estimation methods for, the price elasticity of alcohol demand can lead to divergent 
revenue generation policies.   
 
3. Existing Approaches to Alcohol Elasticity Specification and Estimation 
 Many different approaches to specifying and estimating the price elasticity of 
demand for alcohol can be found in the literature.  Elder et al. (2010) does a systematic 
review of thirty-eight studies on alcohol elasticity.  Gallet (2007) performs a meta-
analysis of 132 studies that estimate the price elasticity of alcohol demand.  Nelson 
(2014) meta-analyze 114 studies of beer elasticities.  Wagenaar et al. (2009) find 112 
studies that estimate the relationship between alcohol price/taxes and consumption.  The 
studies found in these reviews implement different specifications, estimation methods 
and datasets.  Approaches to alcohol demand regression modeling found in the literature 
include the: double-log, semi-log, Tobit, two-part, three-stage budgeting, and finite 
mixture.  The systematic reviews, however, do not give attention to the methodological 
aspects of elasticity.  Unfortunately, nearly all (if not all) extant estimates of alcohol price 
elasticity [including almost all of the studies meta analyzed by Elder et al. (2010), Gallet 
(2007), Nelson (2014), and Wagenaar et al. (2009)] and are of limited usefulness in the 
context of empirical policy analysis because they are subject to bias from one or more of 
a number of sources.   
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4. Exploring sources of bias in extant alcohol elasticity specification and estimation 
 As discussed in the section 2, accurate estimation of alcohol price elasticity is 
important for policy analysis.  A complicating factor in the specification and estimation 
of the own price elasticity of alcohol demand is the typical abundance of zeros among the 
observed alcohol consumption values, which is the first source of bias.  Such zero values 
present a challenge in econometric modeling and estimation because one’s decision to 
drink [extensive margin] may be structurally different from his choice as to how much to 
drink (if he decides to drink) [intensive margin].  According to the American Medical 
Association, alcoholism is classified as illness.  Alcohol consumption has negative effects 
with potential risk of addiction and alcohol abuse.  Even light or moderate drinkers may 
show signs of slight dependency, which could be revealed by a strong craving to drink at 
certain occasions.  The addictive and abusive potential of alcohol drinking takes a toll on 
a drinker’s own health, inability to make rational decisions, impacts public health, and 
reduces the disposable income of drinkers.  Individuals, who foresee these adverse effects 
of alcoholism or due to their cultural norms, may restrain from drinking.   
 Furthermore, it is quite plausible that the price of alcohol differentially impacts 
these two margins of the consumer’s alcohol demand decision.  Studies have shown that 
the drinking initiation decisions are negatively responsive to prices of alcohol (Chaloupka 
& Laixuthai, 1997; Cameron and Williams, 2001; Farrell et al., 2003; Manning et al., 
1995; Ruhm et al., 2012).  Youth when faced with higher alcohol prices were highly 
unlikely to switch from being abstainers to moderate drinkers (Williams, Chaloupka, & 
Wechsler, 2005).  Therefore, it is essential to allow for this distinction in the specification 
and estimation of the price elasticity of alcohol demand.  The two-part model developed 
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by Manning et al. (1995) [MBM henceforth] to estimate the own price elasticity of 
alcohol demand is indeed designed to account for the structural difference between the 
extensive and intensive margins.  Of all the alcohol elasticity studies we surveyed, only 
three alcohol elasticity studies take explicit account of the extensive margin by 
implementing the MBM approach (Farrell et al., 2003; Manning et al., 1995; Ruhm et al., 
2012). 
 The second source of bias in extant alcohol elasticity literature stems from the fact 
that the modeling of alcohol demand elasticity should yield both theoretical and empirical 
results that are causally interpretable and, therefore, useful for the analysis of potential 
changes in alcohol consumption that would result from exogenous (and ceteris paribus) 
changes in the price of alcohol (e.g., a change in tax policy).  Terza, Jones, Devaraj et al. 
(2015) [TJD et al. henceforth], show that the elasticity measure suggested by MBM is not 
causally interpretable.  Therefore, although the three aforementioned studies take explicit 
account of the extensive margin, they do not produce elasticity estimates that are causally 
interpretable.  On the other hand, the remaining studies that we surveyed (the 
overwhelming majority of all studies surveyed) are designed to produce causally 
interpretable results.3  Unfortunately, nearly all of these studies are based on aggregate-
level (e.g. state-level) models and data and are, therefore, incapable of taking explicit 
account of individual alcohol demand decisions at the extensive margin.  Most of these 
studies implement a log-log demand specification and use aggregate data (e.g., Goel & 
Morey, 1995; Lee & Tremblay, 1992; Levy & Sheflin, 1983; Wilkinson, 1987; Nelson, 
1990; Young & Bielinska-Kwapisz, 2003).  There are also a few studies that use 
                                                 
3
 See TJD et al. (2015) for details. 
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individual data to estimate alcohol elasticity, but do not allow for structural differences in 
the modeling of the extensive margin (Ayyagari, Deb, Fletcher, Gallo, & Sindelar, 2013; 
Kenkel, 1996).  TJD et al. suggest an alternative elasticity specification (estimator) for 
the two-part context that is causally interpretable.   
 The third source of bias, among the studies that explicitly account for the 
extensive margin (Manning et al., 1995; Farrell et al., 2003; Ruhm et al., 2012; TJD et 
al.), is the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the two-part model underlying 
elasticity specification and estimation.  Such restrictions make simple ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimation of the parameters of the intensive margin possible. This ease in 
estimation comes, however, at the cost of potential misspecification bias. Moreover, these 
restrictions are unnecessary because equally simple nonlinear least squares (NLS) 
estimators can be implemented.   . 
 Nearly all of the conceptual and empirical treatments of alcohol demand elasticity 
found in the literature use log-price rather than nominal price.  The origin of this practice 
traces to the convenience it affords via applying the ordinary least squares (OLS) method 
to a linear demand model with log consumption as the dependent variable and log price 
and other demand determinants as the independent variables.  There is, however, no 
substantive reason for using log-price vs. nominal price and imposing this restriction on 
the model may lead to fourth source of bias.   
 In summary, there currently exist no specification and estimation method for 
alcohol price elasticity that accommodates the extensive margin, is causally interpretable, 
is less restrictive and uses the nominal price of alcohol.  One of the primary goals of this 
dissertation is to detail and evaluate a new approach to the specification and estimation of 
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alcohol price elasticity [UPO henceforth] that takes into account these key aspects for 
policy relevance.  Using simulated and real data, I compare the elasticities obtained using 
UPO to extant (biased) approaches.  I also evaluate such differences in the context of 
revenue generation. 
 
5. Goals of the Dissertation 
 The first objective of this dissertation is to develop a specification and estimation 
method for the own-price elasticity of alcohol demand that takes explicit treatment of the 
extensive margin in modeling and causal interpretability.  In this chapter of the 
dissertation, I will first discuss the importance of accounting for the extensive margin in 
model specification.  I will then detail the TJD et al. two-part model that is designed for 
this purpose.  I will also address why the MBM model is not causally interpretable.  
Finally, I will detail the causally interpretable two-part-model-based alcohol elasticity 
specification and estimation approach of TJD et al. 
 The second objective of the dissertation is to compare the TJD et al. elasticity 
specification and estimation method to the extant approach that accounts for the extensive 
margin but is not causally interpretable (the MBM approach).  I will compare the 
elasticities obtained by MBM and the TJD et al. with simulated and real data.  I also 
demonstrate how the raw elasticity differences (TJD et al. vs. MBM approach) translate 
to policy differences in the revenue generation context.  Such policy differences will be 
evaluated in an empirical context using data from the Ruhm et al. (2012) study.   
  The third objective of this dissertation is to develop a new elasticity specification 
and estimation method that take into account the extensive margin; is causally 
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interpretable; uses nominal prices of alcohol instead of logged price; and relaxes the 
unnecessarily restrictive assumptions underlying the conventional two-part model   (the 
UPO approach). 
 The fourth objective of dissertation is to compare the UPO elasticity specification 
and estimation method to the aggregated log-log demand based approach which yields 
causally interpretable theoretical and empirical results but does not (cannot) account for 
individual drinking decisions at the extensive margin.  First, I will create a state-level 
database by artificially aggregating data from the Ruhm et al. (2012) study.  Secondly, I 
estimate alcohol price elasticities by applying the conventional log-log model to the 
artificially aggregated database.  Third, I compare this aggregated elasticity estimate with 
that obtained using the UPO method.  Finally, I will discuss how the raw elasticity 
differences obtained in this comparison translate to policy differences in the revenue 
generation contexts. 
  The final objective of this dissertation is to compare the elasticities obtained by 
using a version of the unrestricted causally interpretable two-part model with logged 
prices [UPOL henceforth] and UPO methods using simulated and real dataset.  I will then 
evaluate how differences in elasticity estimates translate to differences in revenue 
generation.  
 
6. Overview of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation will be organized as follows.  The first and second objectives 
presented in section 5 of this chapter will be discussed in chapter 2 of the dissertation.  
The third and fourth objectives will be discussed in chapter 3 of this dissertation.  Finally, 
11 
the last objective will be discussed in chapter 4 of this dissertation.  Chapter 5 will 
provide a summary and discussion of the results obtained in the main chapters of the 
dissertation.  
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Chapter 2.   
Specification and Estimation of Alcohol Price Elasticity in  
Individual-Level Demand Models with Zero-Valued Consumption Outcomes 
1.  Introduction 
 Numerous studies have estimated the own-price elasticity of alcohol demand 
using different data and methods (Elder et al., 2010; Gallet, 2007; Nelson, 2014; 
Wagenaar et al., 2009).4  Previous studies have applied different models to estimate the 
alcohol demand elasticity using utility maximization theory, where consumers allocate 
their limited income towards activities and goods that maximize their utility (Ayyagari et 
al., 2013; Blake and Nied, 1997; Coate & Grossman, 1988; Farrell et al., 2003; Kenkel, 
1996, 1993; Laixuthai & Chaloupka, 1993; Manning, Blumberg, & Moulton, 1995; 
Mullahy, 1998).  
 A complicating factor in the specification and estimation of the own price 
elasticity of alcohol demand is the typical abundance of zeros among the observed 
alcohol consumption values.  According to the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention’s (CDC) National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), 51.6% of adults aged 18 
and above were current regular drinkers in the year 2012.5  Amongst the remaining share, 
21.3% of adults were life-time abstainers, 12.8% adults were current infrequent drinkers, 
                                                 
4
 Elder et al. (2010) conduct a systematic review of 38 studies that specifically estimate 
price elasticities of alcohol demand. Gallet (2007) performs meta-analysis of 132 studies 
on alcohol demand elasticity. Wagenaar, Salois, and Komro (2009) find 112 studies that 
estimate the relationship between alcohol price/tax and consumption.  Nelson (2014) 
conduct meta-analysis on 191 estimates of beer elasticities. 
5
 Refer to page 75 of CDC’s National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) report on 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_10/sr10_260.pdf.   
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8.0% adults were former infrequent drinkers and 5.9% adults were former regular 
drinkers.  Such zero values present a challenge in econometric modeling and estimation 
because one’s decision to drink [extensive margin] may be structurally different from his 
choice as to how much to drink (if he decides to drink) [intensive margin].  According to 
the American Medical Association, alcoholism is classified as illness.  Alcohol 
consumption, like cigarettes, substance use and illicit drugs, has negative effects with 
potential risk of addiction and alcohol abuse.  Even light or moderate drinkers may show 
signs of slight dependency, which could be revealed by a strong craving to drink at 
certain occasions (for example: to overcome stress, excessive drinking during social 
events, etc.).  The addictive and abusive potential of alcohol drinking takes a toll on a 
drinker’s own health, inability to make rational decisions, impacts public health, and 
reduces the disposable income of drinkers.  It is quite plausible that individuals, who 
foresee these adverse effects of alcoholism or due to their cultural norms, may restrain 
from drinking.   
 In particular, the price of alcohol may differentially impact these two margins of 
the consumer’s alcohol demand decision.6  Several empirical studies have shown that the 
drinking initiation decisions are negatively responsive to prices of alcohol (Manning et 
al., 1995; Chaloupka & Laixuthai, 1997; Cameron & Williams, 2001; Farrell et al., 2003; 
Ruhm et al., 2012).  Also, youth when faced with higher alcohol prices were highly 
                                                 
6
 A total of 35.2% adults [i.e., 21.3% life-time abstainers + 8.0% former infrequent 
drinkers + 5.9% former regular drinkers] did not consume alcohol in 2012.  Life-time 
abstainers had fewer than 12 drinks in his/her lifetime.  The former (current) infrequent 
drinkers had at least 12 drinks in his/her lifetime and no drinks (fewer than 12 drinks) 
during the last year of NHIS survey period.  The former regular drinkers had at least 12 
drinks in his/her lifetime/1 year and had no drinks in the past year. 
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unlikely to switch from being abstainers to moderate drinkers (Williams, et al., 2005).  
Therefore, it is essential to allow for this distinction in the specification and estimation of 
the price elasticity of alcohol demand.   
 To date, only three studies (Farrell et al., 2003; Manning et al., 1995; Ruhm et al. 
2012) have accounted for this important and essential two-part modeling aspect (i.e., 
differentiating extensive and intensive margins) of alcohol demand.   Manning et al.  
(1995) [henceforth MBM] was the first study to suggest and apply a two-part-modeling-
based estimator to account for the systematic difference between the extensive and 
intensive margins.  This approach has also been applied by Farrell et al. (2003) and Ruhm 
et al. (2012).  However, Terza, Jones, Devaraj et al. (2015) [henceforth TJD et al.] argue 
that the MBM approach produces elasticity results that are not causally interpretable 
because they are not founded in a potential outcomes framework that is causally 
interpretable.7  They derive an elasticity measure and estimator that follow from well-
defined potential outcomes based framework placed in the two-part modeling context and 
argue, therefore, that their approach does indeed produce causally interpretable elasticity 
estimates. 
 In order to assess whether the lack of causal interpretability of the MBM approach 
has empirical consequences (e.g. potential bias), in the present chapter I perform 
simulation analysis, re-estimate the Ruhm et al. (2012) model using the method of TJD et 
al. [henceforth, the potential outcomes (PO) method] and compare the resultant elasticity 
                                                 
7
 Refer TJD et al.; Pages 13 to 15 and pages 52 to 59 of Angrist & Pischke (2009); and 
Terza (2014). Health Policy Analysis from a Potential Outcomes Perspective: Smoking 
During Pregnancy and Birth Weight. Unpublished manuscript, Department of 
Economics, Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis.  
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estimates to the those obtained via the MBM method. I replicate the study by Ruhm et al. 
(2012) using the consumption data from the second wave of National Epidemiological 
Survey of Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC) survey and price data from 
Uniform Product Code (UPC) barcode scanners collected by AC Nielsen.  I find 
substantively different elasticity estimates from the MBM method vs. the PO method 
using both the simulated and real data.  
 The elasticity of alcohol demand is used in forecasting the changes in total tax 
revenues that may result from changes in the tax rate (Alcohol Justice, 2014; Leung & 
Phelps, 1993; Ornstein, 1980; Levy & Sheflin, 1985).  Therefore, in this chapter, I will 
also evaluate how differences in the elasticity estimates (MBM vs. PO) translate to 
differences in empirical policy measures in the contexts of sin tax revenue generation.   
 Overall, applying the PO method of TJD et al. to the samples used in Ruhm et al. 
(2012) study, I find substantial divergence between the estimates of alcohol price 
elasticity.  These differences in the raw elasticity estimates become even more evident 
when placed in the policy making (tax revenue generation) context.  The discussion in 
TJD et al. supporting the PO approach, combined with the present comparison results, 
favor the use of the PO elasticity estimator. 
 This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I will outline the two-
part model of alcohol demand, the elasticity measures proposed by MBM and TJD et al. 
(the PO specification), and the MBM and PO elasticity estimators.8  In section 3, I will 
compare both MBM and PO estimates using simulated and real data from Ruhm et al. 
                                                 
8
  For details of these modeling aspects, see TJD et al.  
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(2012) study.  I also discuss the data and results in detail.  The comparison of elasticity 
estimates in the context of a change in beer tax revenues are given in the same section.  
The final section summarizes and concludes the chapter. 
 
2.  The Two-Part Model of Alcohol Demand and Relevant Elasticity Estimators  
 A complicating factor in the specification and estimation of the own price 
elasticity of alcohol demand is the typical abundance of zeros among the observed 
alcohol consumption values.  Such zero values present a challenge in econometric 
modeling and estimation because one’s decision to drink may be structurally different 
from his choice as to how much to drink (if he decides to drink).  In particular, it is quite 
plausible that the price of alcohol differentially impacts these two margins of the 
consumer’s alcohol demand decision.  Therefore, it is essential to allow for this 
distinction in the specification and estimation of the price elasticity of alcohol demand.  
In this section, I detail the extant approaches that take into account the extensive and 
intensive margins (MBM and TJD et al.), and I also identify additional sources of bias in 
these and other extant approaches to the specification and estimation of the price 
elasticity of alcohol demand. 
 
2.1 The MBM Elasticity Measure and Estimator 
 MBM was the first study to suggest and apply a two-part-modeling-based 
elasticity measure ( MBMη ) and estimator ( MBMηˆ ) to account for the systematic difference 
between the extensive and intensive margins.  They model the extensive margin as 
 
    A > 0 iff EMP1 X1I(Pβ Xβ ε 0)+ + >       (2-1) 
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where A denotes the level of alcohol consumption, P is log-price, X is a vector of 
regression controls, EM(ε | P, X) is a logistically distributed random error term, 
1 P1 X1β = [β β ]′ ′  is the vector of parameters to be estimated and I(C) denotes the indicator 
function whose value is 1 if condition C holds and 0 if not.  The intensive margin is 
modeled as 
 
 
IM
P2 X2(A | A 0) exp(Pβ Xβ ε )> = + +      (2-2) 
    
where IM(ε | P, X)  is the random error term, with unspecified distribution, defined such 
that IME[ε | P, X] 0=  with IME[exp(ε ) | P, X] ψ=  (a constant); and  2 P2 X2β = [β β ]′ ′  
is the vector of parameters to be estimated. Consistent estimates of 1β  and 2β  are 
obtained using the following two-part protocol. 
 
Part 1:  Estimate 1β  by applying maximum likelihood logistic regression based on (1) to 
the full sample with I(A > 0) as the dependent variable and [P     X] as the vector of 
regressors. 
Part 2:   Estimate 2β  by applying OLS to 
 
    
IM
P2 X2ln(A | A > 0) = Pβ Xβ + ε+          (2-3) 
    
using the subsample of observations for whom A  >  0. 
 
 
In this modeling context, MBM define the own price elasticity of alcohol demand to be 
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    ( )MBM P1 X1 P1 P2η 1 E[Λ(Pβ Xβ )] β β= − + +      (2-4) 
    
with corresponding consistent estimator 
 
 
    
n
i P1 i X1
MBM i 1
P1 P2
ˆ ˆΛ(Pβ X β )
ˆ ˆηˆ 1 β β
n
=
∑
  +   = − +    
.        (2-5) 
    
where Λ( ) denotes the logistic cumulative distribution function (cdf), iP  and iX  are the 
observed values of P and X for the ith sampled individual (i = 1, ..., n), and the ˆβ s are the 
parameter estimates from the above two-part protocol.  The correct asymptotic standard 
error of (2-5) is derived in Appendix A. 
 
2.2 The PO-based Elasticity Measure and Estimator of TJD et al. 
 TJD et al. argue that the MBM approach produces elasticity results that are not 
causally interpretable because they are not founded in a potential outcomes framework 
that is causally interpretable.  They propose the following elasticity measure and 
estimator which follow from a well-defined PO framework placed in the two-part 
modeling context 
 
    [PO P1 X1 P2 X 2 P1η E λ(Pβ Xβ ) exp(Pβ Xβ )β= + +      
 
       ]P1 X1 P2 X2 P2Λ(Pβ Xβ ) exp(Pβ Xβ )β+ + +        
  
        
exog exog
P1 X1 P2 X2
1
E Λ(P β Xβ ) exp(P β Xβ )
×
 + + 
   (2-6) 
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and 
 
    {nPO i P1 i X1 i P2 i X2 P1
i 1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆηˆ λ(Pβ X β ) exp(Pβ X β )β
n=
∑= + +      
 
      }i P1 i X1 i P2 i X2 P2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆΛ(Pβ X β ) exp(Pβ X β )β+ + +      
       
n
i P1 i X1 i P2 i X2
i 1
1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆΛ(Pβ X β ) exp(Pβ X β )
n=
∑
 
 
×  
 + +
 
 .     (2-7) 
 
 
where λ(  ) denotes the logistic probability density function (pdf); and 1 P1 X1ˆ ˆ ˆβ = [β β ]′ ′ ′  
and 2 P2 X2ˆ ˆβ = [β β ]′ ′ ′  are the two-part estimates described above.9  The correct 
asymptotic standard error of (2-7) is derived in Appendix B. 
 
2.3 Causal Interpretability   
 TJD et al. argue that POη  and POηˆ  are causally interpretable because they can be 
derived within a coherent potential outcomes framework.  Because there is no apparent 
potential outcomes framework primitive for MBMη  (and, therefore, MBMηˆ ) TJD et al. 
conclude that it (and the MBM estimator) is not causally interpretable.  As a result, they 
are not useful for empirical policy analysis. 
 
3. Bias from using the MBM instead of TJD et al. 
 In the present section, as a follow-up to this conceptual argument favoring the PO 
specification and estimator [(2-6) and (2-7)] over the MBM approach [(2-4) and (2-5)], I 
                                                 
9
 See TJD et al. for details. 
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examine potential divergence between the two approaches in the two-part modeling 
context from both theoretical and practical perspectives. 
 
3.1  A Simulation Study of the Bias 
 In Appendix C, I show that the difference between MBMη  and POη   (the bias from 
implementing MBMηˆ  instead of the causally interpretable POηˆ ) can be formally expressed 
as 
 
 
MBM PO
P1
ω
η η β ζ
ν
 
− = − 
 
       (2-8) 
 
where 
 1 2ν E[Λ(Wβ )exp(Wβ )]≡  
 1ζ E[Λ(Wβ )]≡  
 
2
1 2ω E[Λ(Wβ ) exp(Wβ )]≡  
 
 W [P X]=  
 
and the expected values are with respect to W.  To get a sense of the range of (2-8) and 
the extent of the influences of various factors on it, I simulated values of ν, ζ and ω using 
the following population design 
 
 P ~ U{.5, .5}  
 X [U{.5, .5} 1]=  
 2 P2 X2 C2β [β β β ]′=  
 1 P2 X1 C1β [h β β β ]′= ×        (2-9) 
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where 2U{µ, σ }  denotes the uniform random variable with mean µ and variance 2σ , P2β  
is the coefficient of price in the second part of the model (intensive margin), Xjβ  and Ciβ  
(j = 1 [extensive], 2 [intensive]) are the coefficient of the control variable and the 
constant term, respectively, for each of the parts of the model, and h is a factor 
representing the relative influence of log price on the extensive margin vs. the intensive 
margin (0  ≤  h  ≤  ∞).  The bigger is h, the greater the relative influence of log price on 
the extensive vs. the intensive margin.  The “true” values of ν, ζ and ω for this simulated 
population design were obtained by generating a “super sample” of 2 million values for 
W based on (2-9) and then evaluating 
 
 { }T t 1 t 2
t 1
1
ν Λ(W β ) exp(W β )
T=
∑≡  
 
T
t 1
t 1
1
ζ Λ(W β )
T=
∑≡  
 { }T 2t 1 t 2
t 1
1
ω Λ(W β ) exp(W β )
T=
∑≡ . 
 
 To investigate the nature of the bias, I varied h and C1β  with P2β , X2β  and X1β  all 
set equal to -1; and C2β 1= .  By increasing h, I increase the relative influence of log 
price on the extensive margin (vis-a-vis the intensive margin).  Ceteris paribus increases 
in C1β  correspond to increases in the fraction of drinkers in the population.  The values of 
the nominal bias (2-8) corresponding to the various (h, C1β ) pairs are given in Table 2.1 
along with the bias as a percentage of POη  (in parentheses) -- a measure of relative bias.  
In each cell I also report the fraction of drinkers in the population [in brackets].  
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 I first note that the nominal values of the bias in Table 2.1 are uniformly negative.  
This follows from the law of demand as it applies to the extensive margin (i.e., the 
negativity of P1β )  and the apparent positivity of the bias factor 
ω
ζ
ν
 
− 
 
 in (2-8).  It is 
also clear from Table 2.1 that for any given value of C1β  (i.e., for a population with a 
given fraction of drinkers) the absolute values of both nominal and percentage bias 
monotonically increase as h increases (i.e., as log alcohol price becomes relatively more 
influential at the extensive margin).  We can also see from Table 2.1 that for a given 
value of h, the bias appears to peak when the fraction of drinkers is in the low to mid-
level range (i.e., from about 15% to 50%).  Note that the bias can get quite large even for 
reasonable levels of h and the population proportion of drinkers – e.g. at h=3 and ζ = 
62.66% ( C1β 3= ) the bias is 67.64%. 
 
3.2  Evaluating and Testing the Bias in a Real Data Context 
 As part of their examination of how estimates of the price elasticity of the demand 
for alcohol can vary depending on the researcher’s choice of alcohol pricing database, 
Ruhm et al. (2012) consider a two-part model of alcohol demand in which 
 A = average daily volume of ethanol consumption from beer in ounces during the  
  past year 
 P = log of price of beer in $ per ounce of ethanol 
 X = [gender, marital status, age, race, family size, education, census region, and  
  occupation (blue collar, white collar, and service), household income] 
where 
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 gender = 1 if female, 0 otherwise  
 marital status = 1 if married, 0 otherwise 
 age = log of age 
 race = 1 if black, 0 otherwise; 1 if Hispanic origin, 0 otherwise; and 1 if other 
race,  
  0 otherwise  
 familysize = log of family size 
 education = 1 if no high school, 0 otherwise; 1 if some college, 0 otherwise; and 1  
   if completed college, 0 otherwise  
 region of residence = 1 if Midwest, 0 otherwise; 1 if Southern, 0 otherwise; and 1  
    if Western, 0 otherwise 
 occupation = 1 if blue collar, 0 otherwise; 1 if white collar, 0 otherwise; and 1 if  
   service occupation, 0 otherwise 
and 
 household income = log of household income. 
  
 The analysis sample for this model is drawn from the Uniform Product Code 
(UPC) barcode scanner dataset collected by AC Nielsen in grocery stores from 51 
markets in the U.S.  The UPC data contains accurate information on alcohol prices by 
type of beverage and packaging size.  Ruhm et al. (2012) compared elasticity estimates 
obtained using UPC prices with those obtained via the commonly used American 
Chamber of Commerce Research Association (ACCRA) [now, Council for Community 
and Economic Research (C2ER)] prices.  They were able to obtain both UPC and 
24 
ACCRA beer prices for only 35 states.10  Data on beer consumption and the control 
variables comprising the vector X were drawn from the second wave of the National 
Epidemiological Survey of Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC) conducted in 
2004-2005.  The NESARC is a longitudinal survey that elicited information from 
respondents regarding alcohol consumption, alcohol use disorders and treatment services.  
The summary statistics of the Ruhm et al. (2012) analysis sample (size n = 23,743) are 
shown in Table 2.2. 
 As did Ruhm et al. (2012), I applied the conventional two-part estimation protocol 
culminating in (2-3) and obtained the estimates of 1β  and 2β  given in Table 2.3.  Using 
these parameter estimates I calculated the price elasticity of demand for alcohol using 
both the causally interpretable PO-based estimator POηˆ  in (2-7) and the MBM estimator 
MBMηˆ  in (2-5) proposed by MBM and implemented by Ruhm et al. (2012).  The latter is 
not causally interpretable.  The results are given in Table 2.4.  Both estimates are 
statistically significant.  The elasticity estimate of MBM is 0.089 higher in absolute value 
than POηˆ  and the difference is statistically significant.11  In this case, estimated alcohol 
demand would be seen as price elastic if MBMη  and MBMηˆ  were taken as the relevant 
measure and estimator.  Whereas, using the causally interpretable POη  and POηˆ  the 
opposite inference would be drawn. 
                                                 
10The 35 states from which the price data were taken are AL, AR, AZ, CA, CT, DC, FL, 
GA, ID, IL, IN, IA, KY, LA, MD, MA, MI, MS, MO, NE, NV, NH, NM, NC, NY,OH, 
OR, SC, VA, TN, TX WA, WV, WI, and WY.  
11
 The correct asymptotic standard error of the difference is derived in Appendix D. 
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 It is interesting that the results in the present real data example correspond closely 
with the case for the simulated population depicted in the first column, fifth row of Table 
2.1 (cell 1-5).  In that cell, h = 0.5 (measuring the relative influence of price in the 
extensive vs. the intensive margin) and the % of the population who are drinkers is 34%.  
As can be seen in Table 2.4, in the present real world example, the estimated value of h (
ˆh ) is .726 and the percentage of drinkers in the sample is 36%.  Therefore, cell 1-5 in 
Table 2.1 is most closely relevant.  For the hypothetical population represented therein, 
the model predicts an 8% bias from using the MBMηˆ .  The estimated bias as a percentage 
of POηˆ  is about 9%. 
 
3.3 Revenue Generation from Tax Changes 
 Elasticities play a role in determining the revenues generated from taxes.  Alcohol 
Justice is an organization that monitors the alcohol industry and also leads campaigns for 
increasing alcohol taxes at a national and state-level to fund government programs on 
alcohol prevention and treatment.  They derive a simple model to estimate revenue 
generation through alcohol tax increases.  The model incorporates the elasticity of 
alcohol demand, changes in alcohol taxes, the price of alcohol and current alcohol 
consumption.  Their model shows that the more elastic is demand, the smaller the change 
in revenues.  Alternatively, when demand is inelastic, tax revenues will be higher with 
increases in prices.  Also, different own price elasticities of alcohol demand yield 
different revenue generation values. 
 Following Alcohol Justice (2014), the change in tax revenues as a result of the 
alcohol tax changes can be expressed as follows: 
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    ( ) [ ]1 1δ∆Rev t δ 1 η A t A   = + × + × − ×   
   P
          (2-10) 
 
where  ∆Rev  is change in tax revenues due to change in the alcohol taxes; t is the current 
alcohol tax rate; δ  is the change (increase or decrease) in the alcohol tax rate or the 
change (increase or decrease) in price of alcohol due to change in the alcohol tax rate 
(assuming 100% pass-through of excise tax rates to the retail price); A1 is the current 
alcohol consumption; P is the current nominal price of alcohol and η  is elasticity of 
alcohol demand.12  
 In order assess the substantive consequences of an estimation bias of this size, I 
placed it in the context of a $0.8533 per gallon increase in the federal excise tax on all 
alcoholic beverages that has been proposed by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).13  
Using the calculator developed by Alcohol Justice (2014) [AJ], I projected the implied 
corresponding change in tax revenue based on each of the elasticity estimates (
PO 0.983ηˆ −=  and MBM 1.073ηˆ −= ).  Aside from the elasticity value and the size of the 
                                                 
12
 When the excise tax is increased, the price of alcohol is also more likely to increase at 
least to the level of the tax increase.  Studies have shown that the increase in the excise 
tax rate for each alcohol-type is more than fully passed-through to the price of the 
relevant alcohol-type.  For a detailed discussion of alcohol tax pass-throughs see 
(Congressional Budget Office, 1990; Kenkel, 2005; Young and Bielińska-Kwapisz, 
2002). 
13
 With the aim of reducing the federal debt, the CBO frequently offers a number policy 
options.  During the fiscal years 2014 and 2015, as one of many options suggested as 
means of raising revenues, was a proposed an increase in excise taxes on all alcoholic 
beverages (Congressional Budget Office, 2013 – see Option 32: 
https://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/2013/44854; Congressional Budget Office, 2014  – 
see  Option 71: https://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/2014/49653). 
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proposed tax change, the AJ revenue calculator requires the following, which I held fixed 
for this example 
 current excise tax rate of beer = $0.5867 per gallon14 
 total U.S. consumption of beer in 2011 = 6.303 billion gallons15 
 U.S. national average beer price in 2011 = $15.20 per gallon.16 
 We also assume, for this illustration, that the tax increase is fully passed through 
to the retail price.17  The estimated changes in tax revenue from the proposed tax change 
are $4.9380 billion using POηˆ  and $4.8920 billion using MBMηˆ .  The latter falls short of 
the former by $46.082 million. To place this shortfall in perspective, I note that it is equal 
to 10.2% of the budget for National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA) 
for Fiscal Year 2015 (NIAAA, 2015).18   
 
4.  Summary and Conclusion 
 MBM propose and implement an estimator of the own-price elasticity of the 
demand for alcohol that is based on a conventional two-part model of alcohol 
consumption.  This estimator has been implemented by Farrell et al. (2003) and Ruhm et 
al. (2012).  Although the two-part modeling approach to alcohol demand is reasonable, 
TJD et al. argue that the elasticity estimator suggested by MBM, and its corresponding 
                                                 
14 Obtained from Congressional Budget Office (2013), (https://www.cbo.gov/budget-
options/2013/44854) 
15
 Obtained from Brewers Almanac (Beer Institute, 2013) 
16
 Obtained from ACCRA (C2ER-COLI, 2015)  
17
 For discussion of tax pass-through rates see Congressional Budget Office (1990), 
Kenkel, (2005) and Young and Bielińska-Kwapisz (2002)  
18
 National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA) has an annual budget of 
$447.4 million (in FY2015). See http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/grant-funding/management-
reporting/financial-management-plan 
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implied elasticity measure, have no causal interpretation because they cannot be cast in a 
potential outcomes framework that is causally interpretable.  TJD et al. develop an 
alternative elasticity specification [estimator] for the two-part context, which is causally 
interpretable (the PO approach).   
 To examine the determinants and extent of the divergence (bias) between MBM’s 
stylized elasticity specification (and estimator) vs.  PO approach, I conducted a 
simulation study in which I varied: 1) the level of the relative price influence at the 
extensive vs. intensive margins; and 2) the fraction of the population who are drinkers.  I 
found that the former has a positive and monotonic effect on the bias, while the influence 
of the latter peaks when the fraction of drinkers is in the low to mid-level range. 
 As a follow-up to the conceptual discussion favoring the PO-based approach, and 
as a complement to the simulation study, I applied both methods to one of the models 
considered by Ruhm et al. (2012) using the same dataset as was analyzed by them.  I 
found the elasticity estimates to be statistically significant from zero and from each other 
( MBM POˆ ˆη η 0.089− = − ; p-value = .0286).  To place this difference in a policy-relevant 
context, for each of the two elasticity estimates, I calculated the projected tax revenue 
change that would result from a proposed change in the federal excise tax on alcohol.  I 
found the difference in tax revenue projections to be substantial; amounting to more than 
10% of the yearly budget of the NIAAA.  The discussion in TJD et al. supporting their 
potential outcomes framework approach, combined with the present comparison results, 
favor the use of the PO elasticity estimator. 
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Table 2.1:  Simulation Analysis of the Bias 
 
 
h 
0.5 1 2 3 5 10 
C1β  
-10 -0.00 
(0.00%) 
[0.00%] 
-0.00 
(0.00%) 
[0.00%] 
-0.00 
(0.01%) 
[0.00%] 
-0.00 
(0.02%) 
[0.00%] 
-0.01 
(0.10%) 
[0.01%] 
-0.41 
(3.83%) 
[0.19%] 
-5 -0.00 
(0.20%) 
[0.43%] 
-0.01 
(0.44%) 
[0.40%] 
-0.04 
(1.25%) 
[0.44%] 
-0.11 
(2.89%) 
[0.60%] 
-0.64 
(12.18%) 
[1.40%] 
-5.70 
(126.41%) 
[7.91%] 
-3 -0.02 
(1.31%) 
[3.02%] 
-0.06 
(2.92%) 
[2.78%] 
-0.22 
(7.90%) 
[2.97%] 
-0.55 
(16.52%) 
[3.76%] 
-1.89 
(49.94%) 
[6.66%] 
-6.51 
(220.38%) 
[15.41%] 
-1 -0.08 
(5.72%) 
[17.40%] 
-0.20 
(12.39%) 
[15.63%] 
-0.62 
(29.52%) 
[14.68%] 
-1.21 
(51.68%) 
[15.49%] 
-2.66 
(109.58%) 
[18.45%] 
-6.45 
(292.24%) 
[23.47%] 
0 -0.10 
(7.99%) 
[34.14%] 
-0.25 
(17.65%) 
[30.45%] 
-0.72 
(41.35%) 
[26.57%] 
-1.33 
(69.34%) 
[25.51%] 
-2.70 
(134.23%) 
[25.93%] 
-6.26 
(316.13%) 
[27.54%] 
1 -0.09 
(7.76%) 
[55.43%] 
-0.23 
(18.50%) 
[50.00%] 
-0.69 
(46.49%) 
[41.78%] 
-1.27 
(79.16%) 
[37.35%] 
-2.58 
(149.49%) 
[33.83%] 
-6.03 
(332.32%) 
[31.62%] 
3 -0.03 
(2.77%) 
[88.31%] 
-0.09 
(8.50%) 
[84.37%] 
-0.37 
(31.71%) 
[73.43%] 
-0.86 
(67.64%) 
[62.66%] 
-2.10 
(149.36%) 
[50.01%] 
-5.44 
(344.20%) 
[39.79%] 
5 -0.01 
(0.47%) 
[98.13%] 
-0.02 
(1.68%) 
[97.22%] 
-0.10 
(9.84%) 
[92.98%] 
-0.37 
(33.18%) 
[84.51%] 
-1.45 
(117.41%) 
[66.18%] 
-4.77 
(333.50%) 
[47.96%] 
10 -0.00 
(0.00%) 
[99.99%] 
-0.00 
(0.01%) 
[99.98%] 
-0.00 
(0.09%) 
[99.94%] 
-0.01 
(0.53%) 
[99.78%] 
-0.14 
(13.12%) 
[96.74%] 
-2.94 
(240.20%) 
[68.39%] 
%-bias in parentheses, % of population for whom I(A > 0)=1in square brackets. 
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Table 2.2:  Descriptive Statistics of Ruhm et al. (2012) Sample 
Variable Name Description Mean N=23,743 Std.Dev 
Extensive Margin 
(Drinker/Non-Drinker) 
Beer drinker during the past 
year 0.36 0.48 
Intensive Margin (Alcohol 
Consumption if Drinker) 
Daily ethanol from beer in 
ounces during the past year 0.42 1.11 
Intensive Margin (log of 
Alcohol Consumption if 
Drinker) 
Log of oz of daily ethanol from 
beer during the past year -2.64 2.08 
  
  
  
X Variables 
lnbeer 
Logged price of beer per oz of 
ethanol from UPC barcode data 0.22 0.08 
female Female gender (1=yes) 0.58 0.49 
married Currently married (1=yes) 0.50 0.50 
lnage Ln(age) 3.82 0.36 
black Black race (1=yes) 0.21 0.40 
hispanic Hispanic origin (1=yes) 0.22 0.41 
other Other race (1=yes) 0.04 0.21 
lnfamsize ln(Family size) 0.82 0.58 
nohs No high school (1=yes) 0.16 0.36 
somecllg 
Some college attendance 
(1=yes) 0.32 0.47 
college Completed college (1=yes) 0.27 0.45 
midwest Midwest region 0.22 0.41 
south Southern region 0.39 0.49 
west Western region 0.25 0.43 
bluecllr Blue-collar occupation 0.15 0.36 
whitcllr White-collar occupation 0.54 0.50 
servwrkr Service occupation 0.15 0.36 
lnincome ln(household income) 10.58 0.92 
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Table 2.3:  Two-part Model Parameter Estimates for Ruhm et al. (2012) 
 
 Extensive Margin Intensive Margin 
Independent 
Variable 
MLE Logit for 2ˆβ  
Dep. Variable: I(A > 0)  
OLS for 2ˆβ    
Dep. Variable: (ln(A) | A > 0) 
   
lnbeer -0.532** -0.733** 
 (-2.20) (-2.15) 
female -1.091*** -1.258*** 
 (-35.73) (-28.29) 
married -0.166*** -0.276*** 
 (-4.66) (-5.28) 
lnage -0.780*** -1.132*** 
 (-16.33) (-15.99) 
black -0.497*** -0.00949 
 (-12.09) (-0.15) 
hispanic -0.186*** -0.329*** 
 (-4.63) (-5.78) 
other -0.508*** -0.249** 
 (-6.89) (-2.29) 
lnincome 0.219*** -0.0411 
 (10.86) (-1.43) 
lnfamsize -0.0503 -0.150*** 
 (-1.56) (-3.24) 
nohs -0.109** 0.0797 
 (-2.12) (1.03) 
somecllg 0.0530 -0.238*** 
 (1.33) (-4.14) 
college 0.194*** -0.387*** 
 (4.46) (-6.20) 
midwest 0.0275 0.172** 
 (0.45) (2.01) 
south -0.0867* 0.271*** 
 (-1.79) (3.90) 
west 0.123** 0.182*** 
 (2.56) (2.66) 
bluecllr 0.490*** 0.425*** 
 (8.18) (4.55) 
whitcllr 0.458*** 0.0855 
 (8.73) (1.01) 
servwrkr 0.435*** 0.192** 
 (7.24) (2.01) 
_cons 0.598** 2.914*** 
 (2.04) (6.87) 
sample size  23743 8543 
t statistics in parentheses;  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table 2.4: Causal and Non-Causal Elasticity Estimates 
 
POηˆ  MBMηˆ  
Difference 
MBM PO
ˆ ˆη η−
 
%-Difference 
MBM PO
PO
ˆ ˆη η 100%
ηˆ
−
×
 
P1 P2
ˆ ˆ ˆh β / β=  
% of 
Sample 
I(A > 0)  
= 1 
-.983*** 
(-4.195) 
-1.073*** 
(-4.181) 
-.089** 
(-2.188) 9.1% 0.726 36% 
T-statistics in parentheses; ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Chapter 3.   
Specification and Estimation of Alcohol Price Elasticity in Aggregate-Level Demand 
Models: Consequences of Ignoring the Extensive Margin 
 
1.  Introduction 
 Recall, in Chapters 2, I discuss two of four keys to accurate estimation of 
elasticity:  1) accounting for the extensive margin; and 2) causal interpretability.  In 
Chapter 2, I noted that the two-part modeling-based estimator of Manning et al. (1995) 
[the MBM method] accounts for the extensive margin, but is not causally interpretable.  
Therein, I also discuss the elasticity specification and estimator proposed by Terza, Jones, 
Devaraj et al. (2015) [henceforth TJD et al.]  (the PO method) that both takes account of 
the extensive margin and produces causally interpretable estimates.  Moreover, I produce 
evidence of potential bias that may result from applying the MBM method (which is not 
causally interpretable) by comparing it to the PO method in simulated and real data 
settings.  
 To complement the analysis in Chapter 2, in the present chapter I will consider 
the most common approach to elasticity specification and estimation – viz. the log-log 
demand model with aggregated data [henceforth the aggregated log-log (AGG-LOG) 
method].  The discussion here will complement the analysis in Chapter 2.  As TJD et al. 
show, the AGG-LOG method produces simple elasticity estimates which can be cast in a 
potential outcomes framework that is causally interpretable.  For obvious reasons, 
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however, aggregation precludes the modeling of individual consumption decisions at the 
extensive margin.19   
 In the present chapter I explore the following additional sources of bias in extant 
approaches to elasticity specification and estimation:  1) data aggregation; 2) the use of 
logged (vs. nominal) alcohol prices; and 3) implementation of an unnecessarily restrictive 
version of the two-part model.  I introduce a new approach to elasticity specification and 
estimation that remedies all such biases [UPO method henceforth].   
 This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I will detail the three 
aforementioned sources of bias.   In section 3, I will introduce a new approach to alcohol 
demand elasticity specification and estimation that is free of these biases and, using 
simulated and real data, compare it to extant (biased) approaches.  In section 4, I will 
compare the most commonly used extant method (AGG-LOG) with the newly proposed 
UPO methods using simulated data and a real analysis sample from the Ruhm et al. 
(2012) study.  I also discuss the data and results in detail.  The comparison of elasticity 
estimates in the context of a change in beer tax revenues are also given therein.  The final 
section summarizes and concludes the chapter. 
 
 
                                                 
19
 There are other individual-level approaches that produce elasticity estimates that are 
causally interpretable – viz. Kenkel (1996) [who implements a Tobit model] and 
Ayyagari et al. (2013) [who use a finite mixture specification].  Neither of these modeling 
approaches explicitly allows for systematic differences in demand decisions made at the 
extensive margin.  Therefore, we expect that they, like the AGG-LOG method, are 
subject to potential bias when used to evaluate individual-level responsiveness to price.  
Empirical evaluation of the extent of this bias is, however, beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.   
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2.  Additional Sources of Bias in Elasticity Estimation  
 Correct specification and accurate estimation of the own price elasticity of 
demand lies at the heart of effective formulation and evaluation of alcohol pricing policy.  
Policy analytic goals such as the determination of optimal alcohol taxes (Kenkel, 1996; 
Pogue & Sgontz, 1989) and the projection of revenues from alcohol tax changes (Alcohol 
Justice, 2014) are cases in point. Unfortunately, nearly all (if not all) extant estimates of 
alcohol price elasticity [including almost all of the studies meta analyzed by Gallet 
(2007), Wagenaar et al. (2009), Nelson (2014)] and are of limited usefulness in the 
context of empirical policy analysis because they are subject to bias from one or more of 
a number of sources.   
 Among all of the studies I surveyed, only three take explicit account of the fact 
that for many individuals in the population, their utility maximizing consumption bundles 
include zero alcohol use.20  Aside from these three studies, the vast literature on this 
subject ignores the likely possibility that an individual’s decision to drink at all [the 
extensive margin] and his decision regarding how much to drink (if one chooses to drink) 
[the intensive margin] structurally differ (from both behavioral and econometric 
modeling perspectives).  Failure to incorporate this distinction in any model of alcohol 
demand will likely lead to a biased elasticity estimate.  The three studies that do draw this 
distinction all implement the two-part modeling approach to elasticity estimation 
suggested by Manning et al. (1995) [henceforth MBM]. 
                                                 
20
 These studies are: Manning et al. (1995) [henceforth MBM]; Farrell et al. (2003); and 
Ruhm et al (2012). 
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 TJD et al. however, argue that the three aforementioned studies are themselves 
subject to bias because, although the MBM elasticity measure takes explicit account of 
both the extensive and intensive margins, it is not informative for alcohol pricing policy.  
This lack of policy relevance of the MBM approach follows from the fact that it cannot 
be placed in a potential outcomes framework and, as such, cannot be interpreted as 
representing the causal relationship between price and alcohol consumption.  TJD et al. 
suggest an alternative elasticity specification (estimator) for the two-part context that is 
derived within a potential outcomes framework that is causally interpretable. 
 In this section, I identify and detail additional sources of bias in TJD et al. (PO 
method) and other extant approaches using two-part model (MBM method) to the 
specification and estimation of the price elasticity of alcohol demand: 1) implementing a 
restricted version of the two-part model (TJD et al.); 2)  data aggregation that ignores the 
extensive margin (AGG-LOG); and 3) the use of logged (vs. nominal) alcohol prices as a 
matter of convenience (TJD et al. and AGG-LOG). 
 
2.1 Restrictive Nature of TJD et al. 
 Recall from Chapter 2 that the MBM approach and the PO method of TJD et al. 
are based on the two-part model specified in equations (2-1) and (2-2).  Specifically, they 
model the intensive margin as  
 
 
IM
P2 X2(A | A 0) exp(Pβ Xβ ε )> = + +      (3-1) 
 
 
where A denotes the level of alcohol consumption, P is log-price, X is a vector of 
regression controls, IM(ε | P, X)  is the random error term, with unspecified distribution, 
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defined such that IME[ε | P, X] 0=  with IME[exp(ε ) | P, X] ψ=  (a constant); and  
2 P2 X2β = [β β ]′ ′  is the vector of parameters to be estimated. Consistent estimates of 1β  
and 2β  are obtained using the following two-part protocol. 
 The intensive margin as given in (3-1) is, however, unnecessarily restrictive.  
Neither the explicit inclusion of IMε  therein nor its accompanying conditional mean 
assumptions are necessary.  They are imposed merely as a matter of convenience – so 
that the regression parameters P Xβ [β β ]′ ′=  can be estimated via OLS.  Instead, we 
need only assume that 
 
 [ ] P2 X2E A | P, X, A > 0 exp(Pβ Xβ )= + .     (3-2) 
 
 
and the relevant regression parameters can still be estimated by applying the nonlinear 
least squares (NLS) estimation method directly to (3-2).  
 This difference in assumptions is not trivial. Assumption (3-2) encompasses a 
broader class of models than the conventional intensive margin specification given in (3-
1).  Therefore, the conventional two-part model may be subject to misspecification bias.  
As a result, in general, causal effect estimators cast in the conventional two-part 
modeling framework, POηˆ  in particular, may be biased. 
 
2.2 Log-Linear Models with Aggregated Data:  Ignoring the Extensive Margin 
 The most widely implemented approach to estimation of the own-price elasticity 
of the demand for alcohol is applying the ordinary least squares (OLS) method to a linear 
demand model to an aggregated level dataset with log consumption as the dependent 
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variable and log price and other demand determinants as the independent variables 
(henceforth the aggregate LOG method [AGG-LOG]).  This includes a majority of the 
aggregate-level studies covered by the meta analyses by Wagenaar et al. (2009), Nelson 
(2014) and Gallet (2007).21  Here the OLS estimate of the regression coefficient of log 
price is taken as the elasticity estimate.  Its popularity notwithstanding, I argue that AGG-
LOG is potentially biased for analyzing pricing policies aimed at modifying alcohol 
demand behavior at the individual level because it ignores individual alcohol demand 
decisions at the extensive margin.  The AGG-LOG model of the demand for alcohol is 
expressed as     
 
    P XA exp(Ppi Xpi ξ)= + + .         (3-3)  
 
where A  denotes the observed level of alcohol consumption, P  is logged alcohol price, 
and X  is a vector of other alcohol demand determinants (controls); all of which are 
measured at an aggregated level (e.g. averages at the level of the county, state, etc.).  The 
vector of regression parameters to be estimated is P Xpi [pi pi ]′ ′=  and ξ is the random 
term defined such that E ξ | P, X 0  =  .  In this case, it is easy to show that own-price 
elasticity of alcohol demand is Ppi  -- the coefficient of P in (3-3) [ AL Pη pi= ].  Under 
these assumptions Ppi  can be easily estimated by applying the OLS estimator to the 
following log-log version of (3-3) 
                                                 
21
 Almost all aggregate-level studies in Wagenaar et al. (2009) meta-analysis, at least 169 
out of 191 beer elasticity estimates from meta-analysis by Nelson (2014), and 974 out of 
1,172 alcohol elasticity estimates meta-analyzed by Gallet (2007) uses either Double-Log 
or System (Almost Ideal Demand System, Rotterdam) models, which ignore the 
extensive margins. 
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    p Xln(A) Ppi Xpi ξ= + + .          (3-4)  
 
 
 Owing to its simplicity, this approach is widely implemented and results obtained 
from it are often used to analyze pricing policies aimed at modifying alcohol demand 
behavior at the individual level.  If, however, the population from which the aggregated 
quantities A , P  and X  are drawn includes a nontrivial proportion of non-drinkers, and 
the distinction between the extensive and intensive margins is important, in which case 
individual level demand behavior may be more accurately characterized by a two-part 
model, then this AGG-LOG approach is likely to be biased because it ignores this 
distinction.   
 
2.3 Using Log vs. Nominal Prices 
 Nearly all of the conceptual and empirical treatments of alcohol demand elasticity 
found in the literature use log-price rather than nominal price.  This is also true of TJD et 
al. in the development of their causally interpretable elasticity measure, POηˆ .22  The 
origin of this practice traces to the convenience it affords via the log-log OLS (AGG-
LOG) model discussed in the previous section.  There is, however, no substantive reason 
for using log-price vs. nominal price and imposing this restriction on the model may lead 
to bias.   
 
 
                                                 
22
 TJD et al. specified their model using log price to conform to the extant literature. 
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3.  An Alternative Elasticity Specification and Estimator 
 In the previous section I point out the lack of causal interpretability of the MBM 
approach to elasticity specification and estimation (discussed in detail in TJD et al.) and 
identify three additional potential sources of bias in extant elasticity measures and 
estimators (including TJD et al.):  1) data aggregation that ignores the extensive margin 
(AGG-LOG); 2)  implementing a restricted version of the two-part model (TJD et al.); 
and 3) the use of logged (vs. nominal) alcohol prices as a matter of convenience (TJD et 
al. and AGG-LOG). In this section, I introduce a new approach to alcohol demand 
elasticity specification and estimation that extends the PO model of TJD et al. so as to 
avoid the three aforementioned biases.    Table 3.1 summarizes various extant alcohol 
elasticity estimators used by empirical researchers in the published literature and the 
potential bias arising from each of them.  An overwhelming majority of the extant 
literature meta-analyzed by Wagenaar et al. (2009) [81.4% elasticity estimates], Nelson 
(2014) [88.5% elasticity estimates] and Gallet (2007) [86.35% elasticity estimates] uses 
the AGG-LOG model to estimate the price elasticity of alcohol demand in aggregated 
data settings.23  Unfortunately, the extensive margin is ignored in all of these studies; 
therefore, the policies implemented using these AGG-LOG elasticity estimates are 
subject to bias.      
                                                 
23
 These AGG-LOG elasticity estimates from the extant literature include double-log 
model and system models (such as the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) and 
Rotterdam modeling approaches) when applied to aggregated data. The studies using 
system models allocate consumer expenditure from disposable income to different 
categories (such as alcohol, cigarettes, food, etc.) or its sub-categories.  Using the 
aggregate data, the (log of) share of the expenditure on alcohol relative to total 
expenditure is then regressed on the log of a retail price index and other covariates to 
compute the (semi-) elasticity of alcohol.  
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 I begin by specifying the following unrestricted version of the two part model 
given in (1) and (2).  This unrestricted model is cast in terms of nominal rather that log 
prices: 
 
 
Extensive Margin 
 
    A > 0 iff EMNOM1 X1I( a Xa e 0)+ + >PP      (3-5) 
    
where P is nominal price, EMNOM(e | , X)P  is a logistically distributed random error term 
and 1 1 X1a = [a a ]′ ′P  is the vector of parameters to be estimated. 
 
Intensive Margin 
 
 
IMNOM
2 X2(A | A 0) exp( a Xa e )> = + +PP      (3-6) 
 
where 2 2 X2a = [a a ]′ ′P  is the vector of parameters to be estimated and IMNOM(e | , X)P  
is the random error term, with unspecified distribution, defined such that 
 
 [ ] 2 X2E A | , X, A > 0 exp( a Xa )= +PP P .     (3-7) 
 
Consistent estimates of 1a  and 2a  are obtained using the following unrestricted two-part 
protocol. 
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Part 1:  Estimate 1a  by applying maximum likelihood logistic regression based on (3-5) 
to the full sample, with I(A > 0) as the dependent variable and [P     X] as the vector of 
regressors. 
 
Part 2:  Estimate 2a  by applying NLS to 
 
    
NOM
2 X2A = exp( a Xa ) + e+PP           (3-8) 
 
using the subsample of observations for whom A  >  0. 
 
Following the logic of TJD et al. in their derivation of the elasticity of alcohol demand in 
terms of log price, based on (3-5) through (3-7), I can express the unrestricted elasticity 
measure and estimator in terms of nominal price [henceforth, unrestricted PO (UPO)] as: 
 
    [UPO 1 X1 2 X 2 1η E λ( a Xa ) exp( a Xa )a= + +P P PP P     
      ]1 X1 2 X2 2Λ( a Xa ) exp( a Xa )a+ + +P P PP P     
       
[ ]
[ ]1 X1 2 X2
E
E Λ( a Xa ) exp( a Xa )× + +P P
P
P P
    (3-9)  
and 
 
 
    {nUPO i 1 i X1 i 2 i X2 1
i 1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆη λ(  a X a )exp(  a X a )a
n=
∑= + +P P PP P     
      }i 1 i X1 i 2 i X2 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆΛ(  a X a )exp(  a X a )a+ + +P P PP P       
       
n
i
i 1
n
i 1 i X1 i 2 i X2
i 1
1
n
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆΛ(  a X a ) exp(  a X a )
n
=
=
∑
∑
 
 
×  
 + +
 
P P
P
P P
   (3-10)  
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where 1 1 X1ˆ ˆ ˆa = [a a ]′ ′P  and 2 2 X2ˆ ˆ ˆa = [a a ]′ ′P  are the unrestricted two-part estimates 
described above. The correct asymptotic standard error of (3-10) is derived in Appendix 
E.  Similar to the PO elasticity specification and estimator, UPOη  and UPOηˆ  are founded 
in a potential outcomes framework that is causally interpretable (see TJD et al.).  
Therefore, (3-10) produces elasticity estimates that are causally interpretable and, as 
such, are useful for policy analysis.  In the section 4, I use simulated and real data, to 
compare results obtained using UPOηˆ  (our preferred estimator) to those from the most 
commonly used extant method discussed in section 2, viz., AGG-LOG ( ALηˆ ). 
 
4. Bias from using AGG-LOG method Ignoring the Extensive Margin and the UPO 
 In Appendix F, I show that the difference between ALη  and UPOη (the bias from 
implementing ALηˆ  instead of the UPOηˆ ) can be expressed as: 
 
 
AL UPO
P 1
u
η η pi 1 a a m
v
  
− = − − +  
  
P P2 P        (3-11) 
 
where24 
 
 1 2v E[Λ(Wa )exp(Wa )]≡        (3-12) 
 
2
1 2u E[Λ(Wa ) exp(Wa )]≡        (3-13) 
                                                 
24
 The expected values are with respect to W .   
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 [ ]W     X= P   
 [ ]m E≡P P             (3-14) 
 
P is the nominal price of alcohol; 1aP and 2aP  are the coefficients of nominal prices in 
the extensive and intensive margins, respectively, in the unrestricted two-part model with 
nominal prices defined in (3-5) and (3-6); and Ppi  is the coefficient of average log price 
of alcohol ( P ) in the AGG-LOG demand model in (3-4).  
 
 
4.1 A Simulation-Based Study of the Bias Between ALηˆ  and UPOηˆ  
 Similar to the approach taken in section 3.1 of chapter 2, I focus on two factors in 
my simulation study of the divergence of ALηˆ  and UPOηˆ  as given in (3-11):  the relative 
influence of nominal price at the extensive margin; and the fraction of drinkers in the 
population. To get a sense of the range of (3-11) and the extent of the influences of these 
two important factors on it, I simulated values of u
 
and v  using the following pseudo 
population design: 
 
 ~ U{.5, .5}P  
 X [U{.5, .5} 1]=  
 2 2 X2 C2a [a a a ]′= P  
 1 2 X1 C1a [h a a a ]′= × P  
 
IMNOM *
1 X1(A | , X) I( a Xa e 0) A= + + > ×PP P  
 
IMNOMe is logistically distributed 
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*
2 X2(A | , X) ~ gamma(exp( a Xa ),1)+PP P      (3-15) 
 
where U{m, v} denotes the uniform random variable with mean m and variance v, 
gamma(sh,sc) denotes the gamma random variable with shape parameter sh and scale 
parameter sc, 2aP  is the coefficient of nominal price in the second part of the unrestricted 
two-part model (intensive margin), Xja  and Cja  (j = 1 [extensive], 2 [intensive]) are the 
coefficient of the control variable and the constant term, respectively, for each of the 
parts of the model, and h is a factor representing the relative influence of nominal price 
on the extensive margin vs. the intensive margin (0  ≤  h  ≤  ∞).  A is assumed to be  a 
gamma random variable so that it does not conform to the restrictions imposed by the 
restricted two-part model.  The bigger is h, the greater the relative influence of nominal 
price on the extensive vs. the intensive margin.  The “true” values of v , u  and mP  for 
this simulated population design were obtained by generating a “super sample” of 2 
million values (n* = 2000K) for W and A based on the sampling design in (3-15) and 
then evaluating 
  
 { }n* i* 1 i* 2
i* 1
1
v Λ(W a )exp(W a )
n *=
∑≡  
 
 { }n* 2i* 1 i* 2
i* 1
1
u Λ(W a ) exp(W a )
n *=
∑≡  
 
and 
 { }n* i
i* 1
1
m )
n *=
∑≡P P   
 
 
respectively.  To get the true value of Ppi  I first equally split the super sample into 50 
arbitrary states. I then aggregate the simulated data at to the state-level by taking the 
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means of A and X, represented by A  and X  respectively. The nominal prices, P are first 
averaged across states and that mean is logged to get P .  OLS is then applied to (3-4) 
using the super sample and the estimated coefficient of P ( Ppˆi ) is taken as the true value 
of Ppi  because 
 
  P Pˆpi plim(pi )= .25 
 
 To investigate the nature of the bias, I varied h and C1a  with 2aP , X2a  and X1a  all 
set equal to -1; and C2a  is set equal to 1. By increasing h, I increased the relative 
influence of nominal price at the extensive margin (vis-a-vis the intensive margin).  
Ceteris paribus increases in C1a  correspond to increases in the fraction of drinkers in the 
population.  The values of the nominal bias (3-11) corresponding to a variety of (h, C1a ) 
pairs are given in Table 3.2 along with the bias as a percentage of UPOη  (in parentheses) -
- a measure of relative bias.  In each cell I also report the fraction of drinkers in the 
population [in brackets].  
 I first note that the nominal values of bias in Table 3.2 are uniformly positive for 
almost all combinations of h and C1a .  It is also evident from the Table 3.2 that for any 
given value of C1a  the absolute values of both nominal and percentage bias 
monotonically increases as h increases.  Also, for a given value of h, the absolute values 
of bias vary upwards and then downwards when the fraction of drinkers increases.  Note 
                                                 
25
 plim is short for “probability limit” which is a large sample (n approaches infinity) 
desirable statistical property of an estimator analogous to unbiasedness, the desirable 
small  (or finite) sample property.  
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that the bias can get quite large even for reasonable levels of h and the population 
proportion of drinkers – e.g. at h=1 and proportion of drinkers=58.53% ( C1a 3= ) the bias 
is 30.54%.  
 
4.2 Comparison of ALηˆ  and UPOηˆ  with Real Data  
 As a means of demonstrating the potential empirical consequences of ignoring the 
extensive margin, I estimate own price elasticity by applying both the ALηˆ  and the UPOηˆ  
estimation protocols to the following demand specification  
 A = average daily volume of ethanol consumption from beer in ounces during the  
  past year 
 P = Nominal price of beer in $ per ounce of ethanol 
 X = [gender, marital status, age, race, household income, family size, education,  
  region of residence, and occupation] 
where variables and datasets are defined in section 3.2 of Chapter 2. 
 I then construct the artificially aggregated data by first taking the mean of the 
dependent variable (average daily volume of ethanol from beer in ounces) and the 
observable confounders (such as gender, marital status, age, race, household income, 
family size, and education) across all observations in each state.  The UPC price data was 
already available at a state-level, measured in weighted price per ounce of ethanol.  The 
mean of nominal price and actual consumption across observations at the state level were 
then logged as a precursor to the implementation of the AGG-LOG method.  This 
artificial state-level aggregated database was then used to estimate the price elasticity of 
alcohol demand using the AGG-LOG method detailed in the section 2.2 of this chapter.  
48 
The summary statistics of this artificially aggregated state-level database are presented in 
Table 3.3.    
 Our focus here is on the size and statistical significance of ALηˆ ,  UPOηˆ  and their 
difference AL UPOˆ ˆη η− .  The standard error of UPOηˆ is derived in Appendix E and that of 
the difference statistic for the bias, AL UPOˆ ˆη η− , is derived in Appendix G.  Table 3.4 
shows the comparison of the AGG-LOG and UPO elasticity estimators for the price of 
beer.  The first column presents the elasticity estimate ALηˆ , obtained using the parameter 
estimation protocol in equation (3-4).  The second column of Table 3.4 shows UPOηˆ , the 
elasticity estimate in equation (3-10) obtained using the two-part protocol culminating in 
equation (3-8).  For the demand specification with all controls, I find the AGG-LOG 
elasticity estimate is -0.7136 and insignificant, but the UPO estimate was -0.5057 and 
statistically significant at 5% level.  The difference between AGG-LOG and UPO was -
0.2079 and statistically insignificant for the demand specification with all controls.  
However, for an alternate demand specification without the region of residence and 
occupation as controls, I find the AGG-LOG estimate for beer is -0.8966 and was 
insignificant, whereas the UPO estimate is -0.4902 and was significant at 1% level.  The 
difference between the AGG-LOG and the UPO estimates is -0.4064 and significant at 
5% level.  It should be noted that the elasticity estimate obtained using the UPO model is 
statistically significant in both demand specifications, implying that it is imperative to 
take into account the extensive margins, which AGG-LOG ignores.  The percentage 
discrepancy between the AGG-LOG and UPO elasticity estimates is 82.91%.   
 In both the simulation and real data analyses, I find strong evidence of biased 
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estimates from ignoring the extensive margin in price elasticity of alcohol demand.  In 
the following, I examine how such differences may translate to the assessment of 
potential revenue generation from changes in alcohol taxes. 
 
4.3 Revenue Generation from Tax Changes 
 As discussed in section 3.3 of Chapter 2, alcohol elasticities can also be used to 
estimate the potential change in revenues that would result from an increase in taxes.  
Therein, I also detail the simple revenue generation model developed by Alcohol Justice 
(2014), an organization that leads campaigns for raising alcohol taxes to fund government 
programs.  Combining the Alcohol Justice model with the elasticities obtained by 
applying the AGG-LOG method to the artificially aggregated version of the data from 
Ruhm et al. (2012), I forecast the change in revenue that would result from a proposal to 
increase the Federal excise tax on alcohol by Congressional Budget Office (CBO) [See 
section 3.3 of Chapter 2 for details].  Table 3.5 shows the results for the revenue 
generation forecasts based on both the AGG-LOG and the UPO elasticity estimates 
obtained in section 4.3 (viz., UPOηˆ 0.4902= −  and ALηˆ 0.8966= − ).  The difference is 
substantial, amounting to a $207.1 million per year shortfall for the former. Such 
forecasting mistakes could result in serious errors in budget appropriation.  In this 
example, the discrepancy is equal to 46.3% of the budget for the National Institute of 
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA) in Fiscal Year 2015. 
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5.  Summary and Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I introduced a specification of the price elasticity of alcohol 
demand [ UPOη in equation (3-9)] and its corresponding consistent estimator [ UPOηˆ in 
equation (3-10)] that takes into account the extensive margin, is founded in a potential 
outcomes framework that is causally interpretable, uses nominal prices of alcohol instead 
of logged price and relaxes the unnecessarily restrictive assumptions underlying the 
conventional two-part model.  To examine the extent of the bias between the widely used 
AGG-LOG method vs. the UPO method, I performed a simulation study, where I varied 
the relative influence of nominal price at the extensive margin and the fraction of drinkers 
in the population.  I found uniformly positive and substantial bias for almost all 
combinations and for a given level of former, as latter increases the bias monotonically 
increases.  I also applied both methods to the dataset analyzed by Ruhm et al. (2012) and 
found the elasticity estimates to be statistically different from each other (
AL UPO
ˆ ˆη η 0.4064− = − ; p-value=0.0277) for a particular demand specification.  Such 
differences are profound when placed in the context of revenue generation.  The 
difference between the approaches in terms of projected revenue for a recently proposed 
federal excise tax increase for beer was $207.1 million per year, which is 46.3% of the 
yearly budget of the NIAAA. 
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Table 3.1: Summary of extant alcohol elasticity estimators and additional biases  
Econometric 
Models 
Accounts 
for 
extensive 
margin 
Studies 
using 
Nominal 
prices 
instead of 
Log 
Unrestricted 
version of the 
two-part model 
Causally 
Interpretable 
Percentage 
or # of 
elasticity 
studies 
 
AGG-LOG 
Models No Mixed NA Yes 
W=81.40% 
N=88.47% 
G=86.36% 
Tobit No No NA Maybe 1 study 
Finite Mixture 
Models No No NA Maybe 2 studies 
2PM – MBM Yes No No No 3 studies 
2PM –  
TJD et al. Yes No No Yes 1 study 
2PM –  
This paper Yes Yes Yes Yes - 
NA =Not applicable 
Wagenaar et al. (2009) [W], Nelson (2014) [N], Gallet (2007) [G] 
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Table 3.2:  Simulation Analysis of the Bias: ALηˆ  vs. UPOηˆ  
 
 
h 
0.5 1 2 3 5 10 
C1a  
-10 -336.873 
(10727.96%) 
[0.00%] 
-518.345 
(12380.32%) 
[0.00%] 
-126.565 
(-
2015.27%) 
[0.00%] 
-109.704 
(-1310.09%) 
[0.00%] 
† 
 
† 
 
-5 7.326 
(-233.77%) 
[0.23%] 
13.016 
(-311.55%) 
[0.12%] 
-2.730 
(43.53%) 
[0.05%] 
2.986 
(-35.69%) 
 [0.02%] 
-17.351 
(138.19%) 
[0.01%] 
-157.021 
(681.90%) 
[0.00%] 
-3 3.395 
(-109.66%) 
[1.59%] 
4.521 
(-109.65%) 
[0.89%] 
8.261 
(-133.06%) 
[0.36%] 
14.652 
(-176.32%) 
[0.17%] 
-5.458 
(43.58%) 
[0.04%] 
-30.161 
(131.01%) 
[0.00%] 
-1 1.464 
(-50.56%) 
[10.02%] 
1.459 
(-38.27%) 
[5.75%] 
3.883 
(-66.72%) 
[2.43%] 
8.546 
(-107.56%) 
[1.17%] 
21.846 
(-177.76%) 
[0.32%] 
-25.452 
(110.75%) 
[0.02%] 
0 1.309 
(-48.66%) 
[21.57%] 
2.372 
 (-68.69%) 
[13.04%] 
3.343 
(-63.18%) 
[5.86%] 
4.608 
(-62.40%) 
[2.93%] 
15.278 
(-128.68%) 
[0.82%] 
19.018 
(-83.04%) 
[0.04%] 
1 1.093 
(-44.24%) 
[39.19%] 
1.806 
(-59.74%) 
[25.34%] 
2.976 
(-65.78%) 
[12.51%] 
5.312 
(-82.62%) 
[6.71%] 
8.972 
(-81.75%) 
[2.05%] 
20.111 
(-88.63%) 
[0.12%] 
3 0.555 
 (-25.34%) 
[77.11%] 
0.728 
(-30.54%) 
[58.53%] 
1.574 
(-51.03%) 
[35.20%] 
 2.785 
(-66.59%) 
[22.57%] 
 5.725 
(-75.44%) 
[9.42%] 
21.639  
(-1.035%) 
[0.79%] 
5 0.607 
(-28.75%) 
[95.25%] 
0.529 
(-24.58%) 
[84.21%] 
0.691 
(-28.87%) 
[58.72%] 
1.084 
(-37.85%) 
[42.90%] 
2.983 
(-65.16%) 
[23.87%] 
14.458 
(-95.13%) 
[4.12%] 
10 0.571 
(-27.29%) 
[99.96%] 
0.575 
(-27.46%) 
[99.76%] 
0.554 
(-26.30%) 
[91.58%] 
0.568 
(-26.37%) 
[75.68%] 
0.645 
(-26.52%) 
[54.86%] 
2.632 
(-58.23%) 
[26.67%] 
%-bias in parentheses, % of population for whom I(A > 0)=1 in square brackets. 
†Insufficient observations for the AGG-OLS simulation 
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Table 3.3:  Summary Statistics of Artificially Aggregated Data  
Variable Name Description Mean N=35 Std.Dev 
Average Alcohol 
Consumption if Drinker 
Average Daily ethanol from beer 
in ounces 0.1639 0.0430 
log of Average Alcohol 
Consumption 
Log of Average oz of daily ethanol 
from beer -1.8418 0.2647 
Price 
Logged price of beer per oz of 
ethanol from UPC barcode data 0.1877 0.0808 
   
X Variables 
female Average share of females 0.5775 0.0282 
married 
Share of sample who are currently 
married 0.5043 0.0563 
lnage Log of (average age) 3.8117 0.0565 
black 
Share of Black population in the 
sample 0.2226 0.1705 
hispanic 
Share of sample who are Hispanic 
origin 0.1430 0.1397 
other Share of sample with other race 0.0395 0.0246 
lnincome 
Log of (average household 
income) 10.5434 0.1525 
lnfamsize Log of (Average Family size) 0.7953 0.0570 
nohs 
Share of sample with no high 
school 0.1447 0.0375 
somecllg 
Share of sample with some college 
attendance 0.3157 0.0374 
college 
Share of sample who have 
completed college 0.2748 0.0650 
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Table 3.4: Comparing  ALηˆ  vs. UPOηˆ Method Using Real Data 
 
Demand 
Specification 
ALηˆ
 
UPOηˆ
 
Difference, 
AL UPO
ˆ ˆη η−
 
% Difference 
AL UPO
UPO
ˆ ˆη η 100%
ηˆ
−
×
 
With all 
controls 
-0.7136 
(-0.7623) 
-0.5057** 
(-2.1309) 
-0.2079 
(-0.8663) 
41.11% 
Without 
region of 
residence and 
occupation as 
controls 
-0.8966 
(-1.0934) 
-0.4902*** 
(-2.6907) 
-0.4064** 
(-2.2017) 
82.91% 
T-statistics in parenthesis. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3.5: Results of Changes in Tax Revenues from Federal Excise Tax Increase 
Description 
Change in tax 
revenues using 
AL
ˆη η=  
(a) 
 
Change in tax 
revenues using 
UPO
ˆη η=  
(b) 
 
Difference 
(a) – (b) 
nominal dollars 
 
Additional revenues 
from “proposed” 
federal excise tax 
increase 
$4.921 billion $5.128 billion -$207.064 million 
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Chapter 4.   
Specification and Estimation of Alcohol Price Elasticity in Individual-Level Demand 
Models Using Nominal vs. Log Prices  
1.  Introduction 
 Chapters 2 and 3, respectively, assess possible empirical consequences (bias) 
from implementing elasticity specifications and estimators that are not causally 
interpretable; or do not take account of individual alcohol demand decisions made at the 
extensive margin; or implements unnecessarily restrictive version of the two-part model.  
The results demonstrate that these modeling deficiencies can lead to substantial 
divergence from elasticity estimates obtained via an approach that is both causally 
interpretable, explicitly models the extensive margin, are least restrictive and uses 
nominal prices of alcohol.  Moreover, the prior chapters show that these differences can 
translate to nontrivial differences in associated policy recommendations in the context of 
revenue generation.  To remain consistent with existing literature, however, in Chapter 2, 
I cast the elasticity specifications, estimators, and comparisons thereof, in terms of log of 
prices instead of nominal prices.  Recall that in Chapter 3, I develop the UPO approach to 
alcohol demand elasticity specification and estimation which is free of biases including 
the use of nominal prices.  Majority of the extant literature on alcohol elasticity uses 
logged prices of alcohol instead of nominal prices.  Other than the need to conform to 
extant literature, there is no clear reason to formulate alcohol demand models and their 
corresponding elasticity measures in terms of log vs. nominal prices.   
 In the present chapter, to investigate the empirical consequences of modeling 
alcohol demand in terms of log vs. nominal prices, I develop a version of the UPO 
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method for elasticity specification and estimation (detailed in Chapter 3) that is cast in 
terms of logged prices.  I will henceforth refer to this approach as the UPOL method.  
Using simulated and real data from Ruhm et al. (2012), I apply the UPOL method and 
compare the results with the corresponding elasticity estimates obtained using the UPO 
method and reported in Chapters 3.  I then evaluate how differences in the elasticity 
estimates (UPOL vs. UPO) translate to differences in revenue generation.  I find 
reasonable differences in estimates of alcohol price elasticity.  These differences are more 
pronounced when placed in the revenue generation policy making contexts.  
 This chapter is structured as follows. The next section will detail the UPOL 
method for elasticity specification and estimation.  In section 3, I will compare the UPOL 
with the UPO methods using simulated data and a real analysis sample from the Ruhm et 
al. (2012) study.  I also discuss the data and results in detail.  The comparison of elasticity 
estimates in the context of a change in beer tax revenues are also given therein.  The final 
section summarizes and concludes the chapter. 
 
2.  Unrestricted PO Elasticity Specification and Estimator with logged prices 
 In the previous section I point out that nearly all of the conceptual and empirical 
treatments of alcohol demand elasticity found in the literature use log-price rather than 
nominal price.  This is also true of TJD et al. in the development of their causally 
interpretable elasticity measure, POηˆ , the MBM model, and most studies using AGG-
LOG models.26  The origin of this practice traces to the convenience it affords via the 
log-log OLS (AGG-LOG) model discussed in the previous section.  There is, however, 
                                                 
26
 TJD et al. specified their model using log price to conform to the extant literature. 
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no substantive reason for using log-price vs. nominal price and imposing this restriction 
on the model may lead to bias.  In Chapter 3, I develop the UPO model that takes explicit  
account of extensive margin, are causally interpretable, uses unrestricted version of two-
part model, and uses nominal prices in the own price elasticity of alcohol demand 
specification and estimation.  In this section, I introduce a version of UPO approach in 
which the prices are cast as logged prices (UPO approach).  I begin by specifying the 
following unrestricted version of the two part model cast in nominal prices given in (1) 
and (2).   
 
 
Extensive Margin 
 
    A > 0 iff EMLOGP1 X1I(Pα Xα e 0)+ + >      (4-1) 
    
where P is logged price, EMLOG(e | P, X)  is a logistically distributed random error term 
and 1 P1 X1α = [α α ]′ ′  is the vector of parameters to be estimated. 
 
Intensive Margin 
 
 
IMLOG
P2 X2(A | A 0) exp(Pα Xα e )> = + +      (4-2) 
 
where 2 P2 X2α = [α α ]′ ′  is the vector of parameters to be estimated and IMLOG(e | P, X)  
is the random error term, with unspecified distribution, defined such that 
 
 [ ] P2 X2E A | P, X, A > 0 exp(Pα Xα )= + .     (4-3) 
 
59 
Consistent estimates of 1α  and 2α  are obtained using the following unrestricted two-part 
protocol. 
 
Part 1:  Estimate 1α  by applying maximum likelihood logistic regression based on (4-1) 
to the full sample, with I(A > 0) as the dependent variable and [P     X] as the vector of 
regressors. 
 
Part 2:  Estimate 2α  by applying NLS to 
 
    
LOG
P2 X2A = exp(Pα Xα ) + e+           (4-4) 
 
using the subsample of observations for whom A  >  0. 
 
Following the logic of TJD et al. in their derivation of the elasticity of alcohol demand in 
terms of log price, based on (4-1) through (4-3), I can express the unrestricted elasticity 
measure and estimator in terms of logged price [henceforth, unrestricted PO with logged 
prices (UPOL)] as: 
 
    [UPOL P1 X1 P2 X 2 P1η E λ(P α Xα ) exp(P α Xα )α= + +     
      ]P1 X1 P2 X2 P2Λ(Pα Xα ) exp(Pα Xα )α+ + +     
       [ ]P1 X1 P2 X2
1
E Λ(Pα Xα ) exp(Pα Xα )× + +     (4-5)  
and 
 
 
    {nUPOL i P1 i X1 i P2 i X2 P1
i 1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆη λ(P  α X α )exp(P  α X α )α
n=
∑= + +
    
      }i P1 i X1 i P2 i X2 P2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆΛ(P  α X α ) exp(P  α X α )α+ + +       
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n
i P1 i X1 i P2 i X2
i 1
1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆΛ(P  α X α ) exp(P  α X α )
n=
∑
 
 
×  
 + +
 
   (4-6)  
  
 
where 1 P1 X1ˆ ˆ ˆα = [α α ]′ ′  and 2 P2 X2ˆ ˆ ˆα = [α α ]′ ′  are the unrestricted two-part estimates 
described above. The correct asymptotic standard error of (4-6) is derived in Appendix H.  
Similar to the UPO elasticity specification and estimator, UPOLη  and UPOLηˆ  are founded 
in a potential outcomes framework that is causally interpretable (see TJD et al. and 
Chapter 3), however, it uses logged prices instead of nominal prices.  Therefore, (4-6) 
produces elasticity estimates that are causally interpretable, but may be subjected to bias, 
hence may not be useful for policy analysis.  In the section 3, I use simulated and real 
data, to compare results obtained using UPOLηˆ  to UPOηˆ  (our preferred estimator obtained 
and discussed in Chapter 3). 
 
3. Bias from using the UPOL method and the UPO 
 In Appendix I, I show that the difference between UPOLη  and UPOη (the bias from 
implementing UPOLηˆ  instead of the UPOηˆ ) can be expressed as: 
 
 
UPOL UPO
P1 P2 1 2
ω u
η η 1 α α 1 a a m
ν v
      
− = − + − − +      
      
P P P      (4-7) 
 
where27 
                                                 
27
 The expected values are with respect to W for nominal prices and W

 for logged 
prices.   
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 1 2ν E[Λ(Wα ) exp(W α )]≡
 
       (4-8) 
 
2
1 2ω E[Λ(W α ) exp(W α )]≡
 
       (4-9) 
 1 2v E[Λ(Wa )exp(Wa )]≡        (4-10) 
 
2
1 2u E[Λ(Wa ) exp(Wa )]≡        (4-11) 
 [ ]W P    X=   
 [ ]W     X= P   
 [ ]m E≡P P             (4-12) 
 
P is the nominal price of alcohol; P is the logged price of alcohol; P1α and P2α  are the 
coefficients of logged prices in the extensive and intensive margins, respectively, in the 
unrestricted two-part model with nominal prices defined in equations (4-1) and (4-2) of 
this chapter; and 1aP and 2aP  are the coefficients of nominal prices in the extensive and 
intensive margins, respectively, in the unrestricted two-part model with nominal prices 
defined in equations (3-5) and (3-6) of Chapter 3.  
 
 
3.1 A Simulation-Based Study of the Bias Between UPOLηˆ  and UPOηˆ  
 
 I focus on the relative influence of nominal price at the extensive margin in my 
simulation study of the divergence of UPOLηˆ  and UPOηˆ  as given in (4-7). To get a sense of 
the range of (4-7) and the extent of the influences of this important factor on it, I 
simulated values of u
 
and v  using the following pseudo population design: 
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 ~ U{.5,  .5}P   
 X [U{.5, .5} 1]=  
 2 2 X2 C2a [a a a ]′= P  
 1 2 X1 C1a [h a a a ]′= × P  
 
IMNOM *
1 X1(A | , X) I( a Xa e 0) A= + + > ×PP P  
 
IMNOMe is logistically distributed 
 
*
2 X2(A | , X) ~ gamma(exp( a Xa ),1)+PP P      (4-13) 
 
where U{m, v} denotes the uniform random variable with mean m and variance v, 
gamma(sh,sc) denotes the gamma random variable with shape parameter sh and scale 
parameter sc, 2aP  is the coefficient of nominal price in the second part of the unrestricted 
two-part model (intensive margin), Xja  and Cja  (j = 1 [extensive], 2 [intensive]) are the 
coefficient of the control variable and the constant term, respectively, for each of the 
parts of the model, and h is a factor representing the relative influence of nominal price 
on the extensive margin vs. the intensive margin (0  ≤  h  ≤  ∞).  A is assumed to be  a 
gamma random variable so that it does not conform to the restrictions imposed by the 
restricted two-part model.  The bigger is h, the greater the relative influence of nominal 
price on the extensive vs. the intensive margin.  The “true” values of v , u  and mP  for 
this simulated population design were obtained by generating a “super sample” of 2 
million values (n* = 2000K) for W and A based on the sampling design in (4-13) and 
then evaluating 
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 { }n* i* 1 i* 2
i* 1
1
v Λ(W a )exp(W a )
n *=
∑≡  
 
 { }n* 2i* 1 i* 2
i* 1
1
u Λ(W a ) exp(W a )
n *=
∑≡  
 
and 
 { }n* i
i* 1
1
m )
n *=
∑≡P P   
 
 
respectively.  To get the true value of ω  and ν , I  apply the two-part protocol discussed 
in (4-4) and obtain values for the unknown parameters 1α  and 2α .  I then evaluate   
 
 { }n* i* 1 i* 2
i* 1
1
ν Λ(W α ) exp(W α )
n *=
∑≡
 
 
 
and 
 
 { }n* 2i* 1 i* 2
i* 1
1
ω Λ(W α ) exp(W α )
n *=
∑≡
 
 
 
 To investigate the nature of the bias, I varied h and with 2aP , X2a  and X1a  all set 
equal to -1; C2a  is set equal to 1; and C1a is set equal to 3.  By increasing h, I increased 
the relative influence of nominal price at the extensive margin (vis-a-vis the intensive 
margin).  The values of the nominal bias (4-7) corresponding to a different values of h are 
given in Table 4.1 along with the bias as a percentage of UPOη  (in parentheses) -- a 
measure of relative bias.  In each cell I also report the fraction of drinkers in the 
population [in brackets].  
 I first note that the nominal values of bias in Table 4.1 are uniformly positive for 
different values of h.  It is also evident from the Table 4.1 that the absolute values of both 
nominal and percentage bias monotonically increases as h increases.  Note that the bias 
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can get quite large even for reasonable levels of h and the population proportion of 
drinkers – e.g. at h=1 and proportion of drinkers=58.53%, the bias is 44.87%.  
 
3.2 Comparison of UPOLηˆ  and  UPOηˆ  with Real Data  
 As a means of demonstrating the potential empirical consequences of ignoring the 
extensive margin, I estimate own price elasticity by applying both the UPOLηˆ  and the 
UPOηˆ
 estimation protocols to the following demand specification  
 A = average daily volume of ethanol consumption from beer in ounces during the  
  past year 
 P = Nominal price of beer in $ per ounce of ethanol 
 X = [gender, marital status, age, race, household income, family size, education,  
  region of residence, and occupation] 
where variables and datasets are defined in section 3.2 of Chapter 2. 
 Our focus here is on the size and statistical significance of UPOLηˆ ,  UPOηˆ  and their 
difference UPOL UPOˆ ˆη η− .  The standard error of UPOηˆ is derived in Appendix H and that 
of the difference statistic for the bias, UPOL UPOˆ ˆη η− , is derived in Appendix J.  Table 4.2 
shows the comparison of the UPOL and UPO elasticity estimators for the price of beer.  
The first column presents the elasticity estimate UPOLηˆ , obtained using the parameter 
estimation protocol in equation (4-4).  The second column of Table 4.2 shows UPOηˆ , the 
elasticity estimate in equation (3-10) of chapter 3 obtained using the two-part protocol 
culminating in equation (3-8) of chapter 3.  I find the UPOL elasticity estimate is -0.4892 
and statistically significant at 5% level. Recall from Chapter 3 that the UPO estimate was 
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-0.5057 and statistically significant at 5% level.  The difference between the UPOL and 
the UPO estimates is 0.0165, but statistically insignificant.  Nevertheless, the absolute 
percentage discrepancy between the UPOL and UPO elasticity estimates is 3.26%.   
 In both the simulation data analyses, I find strong evidence of biased estimates 
from using logged prices instead of nominal prices.  However, in real data settings, with 
the demand specification used in Ruhm et al. (2012), I find suggestive evidence of bias.  
In the following section, I examine how such differences may translate to the assessment 
of potential revenue generation from changes in alcohol taxes. 
 
3.3 Revenue Generation from Tax Changes 
 Combining the Alcohol Justice model (discussed in section 3.3 of chapter 2) with 
the elasticities obtained by applying the UPOL method to the data from Ruhm et al. 
(2012), I forecast the change in revenue that would result from a proposal to increase the 
Federal excise tax on alcohol by Congressional Budget Office (CBO) [See section 3.3 of 
Chapter 2 for details].  Table 4.3 shows the results for the revenue generation forecasts 
based on both the UPOL and the UPO elasticity estimates obtained in section 4.2 (viz.,
UPOηˆ 0.4902= −
 and UPOLηˆ 0.5057= − ).  The difference amount to a $8.4 million per 
year shortfall for the former. Such forecasting mistakes could result in reasonable errors 
in budget appropriation.  In this example, the discrepancy is equal to 2% of the budget for 
the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA) in Fiscal Year 2015. 
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4.  Summary and Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I compare the estimator of the price elasticity of alcohol demand [
UPOηˆ in equation (3-10) of chapter 3] that uses nominal prices of alcohol instead of 
logged price (and is free from other biases discussed in Chapter 3) with an estimator that 
uses logged prices of alcohol in the demand specification  [ UPOLηˆ in equation (4-6) of this 
chapter].  To examine the extent of the bias between the UPOL vs. the UPO method, I 
performed a simulation study, where I varied the relative influence of nominal price at 
the extensive margin.  I found uniformly positive and substantial bias for almost all 
variations.  I also applied both methods to the dataset analyzed by Ruhm et al. (2012) and 
found suggestive evidence of smaller bias in the elasticity estimates (
UPOL UPO
ˆ ˆη η 0.0165− = , but insignificant).  Such differences are reasonable when placed 
in the context of revenue generation.  The difference between the approaches in terms of 
projected revenue for a recently proposed federal excise tax increase for beer was $8.4 
million per year, which is 2% of the yearly budget of the NIAAA. 
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Table 4.1:  Simulation Analysis of the Bias: UPOLηˆ  vs. UPOηˆ  
h 
0.5 1 2 3 5 10 
1.002 
(-45.75%) 
[77.11%] 
1.069 
(-44.87%) 
[58.53%] 
1.512 
(-49.04%) 
[35.20%] 
2.278 
(-54.47%) 
[22.57%] 
4.708 
(-62.04%) 
[9.42%] 
14.51 
(-69.38%) 
[0.79%] 
%-bias in parentheses, % of population for whom I(A > 0)=1 in square brackets. 
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Table 4.2: Comparing  UPOLηˆ  vs. UPOηˆ Method Using Real Data 
 
UPOLηˆ
 
UPOηˆ
 
Difference, 
UPOL UPO
ˆ ˆη η−
 
% Difference 
UPOL UPO
UPO
ˆ ˆη η 100%
ηˆ
−
×
 
-0.4892** 
(-2.1284) 
-0.5057** 
(-2.1309) 
0.0165 
(0.0498) 
-3.26% 
T-statistics in parenthesis. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 4.3: Results of Changes in Tax Revenues from Federal Excise Tax Increase 
Description 
Change in tax 
revenues using 
UPOL
ˆη η=  
(a) 
 
Change in tax 
revenues using 
UPO
ˆη η=  
(b) 
 
Difference 
(a) – (b) 
nominal dollars 
 
Additional revenues 
from “proposed” 
federal excise tax 
increase 
$5.129 billion $5.121 billion $8.41 million 
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Chapter 5.   
Summary and Conclusion 
1. Introduction 
 Several state legislatures in the US have imposed, or are considering increasing, 
sumptuary or Pigouvian taxes (e.g., “sin taxes”) predominantly on alcohol and tobacco.  
Such pricing policies are set so as to reduce the consumption of alcohol abusers so as to 
minimize external costs to those harmed by them.  There also has been growing interest 
in raising alcohol excise taxes to increase government revenues to reduce budget deficits 
or to fund various state and federal programs.  The own-price elasticity of the demand for 
alcohol plays a vital role in determining optimal Pigouvian taxes (to reduce externalities) 
and in projecting revenues generated from proposed tax changes.28  Therefore, accurate 
estimation of alcohol price elasticity is important for policy analysis.   
 
2. Key Aspects of Policy Relevant Alcohol Elasticity Specification and Estimation 
 Many different approaches to specifying and estimating the price elasticity of 
demand for alcohol can be found in the literature.  There are four keys to policy-relevant 
specification and estimation of alcohol price elasticity.  First, the underlying demand 
model should take account of alcohol consumption decisions at the extensive margin – 
i.e., individuals’ decisions to drink or not – because the price of alcohol may impact the 
drinking initiation decision.  This is important because one’s decision to drink is likely to 
be structurally different from how much they drink if they decide to do so (the intensive 
                                                 
28
 See Chapter 1 of dissertation for details on the role of elasticities in the context of 
revenue generation.  
71 
margin).  Secondly, the modeling of alcohol demand elasticity should yield both 
theoretical and empirical results that are causally interpretable and, therefore, useful for 
the analysis of potential changes in alcohol consumption that would result from 
exogenous (and ceteris paribus) changes in the price of alcohol (e.g., a change in tax 
policy).  Thirdly, the extant models that explicitly take extensive margins into account are 
unnecessarily restrictive and are merely imposed as a matter of convenience so that the 
parameters can be estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method.  Finally, 
almost all the conceptual and empirical treatments of alcohol demand elasticity found in 
the literature use log-price rather than nominal price.   
 There currently exists no specification and estimation method for alcohol price 
elasticity that accommodates the extensive margin, is causally interpretable, is less 
restrictive and uses nominal prices of alcohol.  One of the primary goals of this 
dissertation is to detail and evaluate a new approach to the specification and estimation of 
alcohol price elasticity that covers these four key requirements for policy relevance. 
 
2.1. Models that Account for the Extensive Margin 
 The vast majority of extant studies that I surveyed do not accommodate the 
possibility that one’s decision to drink or not [extensive margin] may require special 
attention in model design.  If the relevant population includes a nontrivial proportion of 
non-drinkers and the extensive margin is ignored in modeling then the resultant elasticity 
measure is likely to be biased.  The most widely implemented approach to estimation of 
the own-price elasticity of the demand for alcohol is applying the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method to a linear demand model with log consumption as the dependent variable 
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and log price and other demand determinants as the independent variables [henceforth the 
aggregate LOG method (AGG-LOG)] on aggregate-level (e.g. state-level) models and 
data.  Unfortunately, nearly all of these studies incapable of taking explicit account of 
individual alcohol demand decisions at the extensive margin, therefore, elasticity 
estimates obtained using AGG-LOG is potentially biased for analyzing pricing policies 
aimed at modifying alcohol demand behavior at the individual level.29  The two-part 
model developed by Manning, Blumberg, Moulton (1995) [MBM henceforth] to estimate 
the own price elasticity of alcohol demand is indeed designed to account for the structural 
difference between the extensive and intensive margins.  Of all the alcohol elasticity 
studies I surveyed, only three alcohol elasticity studies take explicit account of the 
extensive margin by implementing the MBM approach (Manning et al., 1995; Farrell et 
al., 2003; Ruhm et al., 2012).   
 
2.2. Models that are Causally Interpretable 
Terza, Jones, Devaraj et al. (2015) [TJD et al. henceforth] show that the two-part 
model elasticity measure suggested by MBM is not causally interpretable.  TJD et al. 
propose an elasticity measure and estimator that follow from a well-defined potential 
outcomes (PO) framework placed in the two-part modeling context and argue, therefore, 
that their approach does indeed produce causally interpretable elasticity estimates. 
 In order to assess whether the lack of causal interpretability of the MBM approach 
has empirical consequences (e.g. potential bias), in Chapter 2 of my dissertation, I 
                                                 
29
 Other models such as Tobit (Kenkel, 1996) and Finite Mixture Models (Ayyagari et al., 
2013) estimate own price elasticity of alcohol demand at an individual-level, however, 
they do not explicitly take extensive margins into account. 
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performed simulation analysis, estimate elasticities on a real world application using the 
TJD et al. method and compare the resultant elasticity estimates to those obtained via the 
MBM method.  In the simulation study, I varied: 1) the level of the relative price 
influence at the extensive vs. intensive margins; and 2) the fraction of the population who 
are drinkers.  I found that the former has a positive and monotonic effect on the bias, 
while the influence of the latter peaks when the fraction of drinkers is in the low to mid-
level range.  As a complement to the simulation study, I applied both methods to one of 
the models considered by Ruhm et al. (2012) using the same dataset as was analyzed by 
them.  I found the elasticity estimates to be statistically significant from zero and from 
each other ( MBM POˆ ˆη η 0.089− = − ; p-value = .0286).  These differences in the raw 
elasticity estimates could become even more evident when placed in the policy making 
context of revenue generation.  Drawing from a proposed change in federal excise tax on 
alcohol, I found the difference in tax revenue projections to be substantial; amounting to 
more than 10% of yearly budget of the NIAAA.30 
 
 
2.3. Models that Do Not Impose Unnecessary Modeling Restrictions  
 The two-part model underlying the MBM and TJD et al. is unnecessarily 
restrictive.  In the intensive margin of the two-part model, MBM and TJD et al. explicitly 
include an error term and also make conditional mean assumptions, neither of them are 
necessary.  The restrictions are imposed merely as a matter of convenience – so that the 
regression parameters can be estimated via OLS.  In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I 
develop a new specification and estimation of alcohol price elasticity [henceforth UPO 
                                                 
30
 See Chapter 2 for more details 
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method], which is an unrestricted version of two-part model, causally interpretable, and 
uses nominal prices of alcohol in their models.  To examine the extent of the bias 
between the widely used AGG-LOG method vs. the UPO method, in Chapter 3, I 
performed a simulation study, where I varied the relative influence of nominal price at 
the extensive margin and the fraction of drinkers in the population.  I found uniformly 
positive and substantial bias for almost all combinations and. for a given level of former, 
as latter increases the bias monotonically increases.  I also applied both methods to the 
dataset analyzed by Ruhm et al. (2012) and found the elasticity estimates to be 
statistically different from each other ( AL UPOˆ ˆη η 0.4064− = − ; p-value=0.0277) for a 
particular demand specification.  This difference when placed in the context of revenue 
forecast from a proposed federal excise tax increase for beer was $207.1 million per year 
(46.7% of the yearly budget of NIAAA).31  
 
 
2.4. Models that are Cast in terms of Nominal vs. Log Price  
 The existing studies using aggregate-level models/data and those studies applying 
the two-part model cast elasticity specifications and estimators in terms of log of prices 
instead of nominal prices.  Apart from the need to adhere to the extant literature, there 
appears to be no valid reasons to use log prices for specifying and estimating the own 
price elasticity of alcohol demand.  In Chapter 4, I investigate the empirical consequences 
of modeling alcohol demand in terms of log vs. nominal prices.  In that chapter, I 
developed a version of the UPO method for elasticity specification and estimation 
(detailed in Chapter 3) that is cast in terms of logged prices [henceforth UPOL method].  
                                                 
31
 See Chapter 3 for more details. 
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I performed simulation and real data analysis by applying the UPOL method and 
comparing the results with the corresponding elasticity estimates obtained using the UPO 
method.  In the simulation study, I varied the relative influence of nominal price at the 
extensive margin and found uniformly positive and substantial bias.  However, using a 
dataset analyzed by Ruhm et al. (2012), I applied both methods and found suggestive 
evidence of smaller bias in the elasticity estimates ( UPOL UPOˆ ˆη η 0.0165− = , but 
insignificant).  This difference when placed in the context of revenue forecast from a 
proposed federal excise tax increases for beer was $8.4 million (a 2% yearly budget of 
NIAAA).32  
 
3. Future Research 
 My dissertation points to interesting avenues for future research.  The conceptual, 
empirical and policy differences in elasticity estimates between the newly introduced 
unbiased UPO method in my dissertation with other infrequently used alcohol demand 
models designed for individual-level data (such as Tobit models and Finite Mixture 
Models) is left for future research.  In my dissertation, I focused on just one context of 
the many policy relevant implications (viz., revenue generation) on using accurate 
elasticities.  I would like to investigate the policy implication of differences in elasticities 
obtained using the UPO vs. extant methods in the context of optimal alcohol taxation and 
use of fines as a means of modifying behavior.     
Further, alcohol prices can be increased in ‘chunks,’ and alcohol is also purchased 
in ‘chunks’.  Yet, almost all existing literature on own price elasticity of alcohol demand 
                                                 
32
 See Chapter 4 for more details. 
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uses only point-instantaneous elasticity measure to estimate the response of 
infinitesimally small change in price of alcohol to change in alcohol consumption.  This 
point-instantaneous elasticity measure may not be able to identify the effects of specific 
incremental change in alcohol price (through excise taxes) on alcohol consumption.  
Other two forms of alcohol elasticity measures such as point-incremental elasticity and 
arc elasticity using nominal price of alcohol could be helpful for policy purposes.  
Specifying and estimating elasticity that is policy relevant with specific incremental 
change in alcohol price on consumption of alcohol (point-incremental elasticity) or 
demand response to change in price between two points (arc elasticity) in an unrestricted 
causally interpretable two-part modeling context using nominal prices is left for future 
research.   
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Appendix A:  
Asymptotic Distribution (and Standard Error) of MBMηˆ  in Eqn (2-5) 
We may write MBMηˆ  as 
 
 
MBM
P1 P2
ˆ ˆ ˆηˆ (1 ζ)β β= − +  
 
where 
 
n
1 i
i 1
1
ˆ ˆζ = (β , W )
n=
∑ Z  
 1(β, W) Λ(Wβ )=Z  
 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆβ [β β ]'′ ′=  (with 1 P1 X1ˆ ˆ ˆβ = [β β ]′ ′  and 2 P2 X2ˆ ˆ ˆβ = [β β ]′ ′ ) is the consistent  
  estimate of the parameter vector 1 2β [β β ]'′ ′=  (with 1 P1 X1β = [β β ]′ ′  and  
 2 P2 X2β = [β β ])′ ′ )  [the parameters of equations (2-1) and (2-2)] obtained via the  
  two-part protocol culminating in (2-3) 
 
and  
 i i iW [P X ]=  denotes the observation on W [P X]=  for the ith individual in  
  the sample (i = 1, ..., n).  Let P1 P2ˆ ˆ ˆτˆ = [β β ζ]′  and P1 P2τ = [β β ζ]′ ,  
  where ˆplim[τ] = τ .   
If we could show that 
 
 
1 d
2
ˆ ˆAVAR(τ) n (τ τ) N(0, I)− − →  
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where the formulation of ˆAVAR(τ)  is known, then we could apply the δ-method to 
obtain the asymptotic variance of MBMηˆ  as 
 
 
MBM MBM
ˆ ˆavar(η η ) c(τ) AVAR(τ) c(τ) '− =  
 
where P1c(τ) [(1 ζ) 1 β ]= − − .  Moreover, if we have a consistent estimator for 
ˆAVAR(τ) , say ˆAVAR(τ)  [i.e. ˆ ˆp lim AVAR(τ) AVAR(τ)  =
 
],  then we could 
consistently estimate MBMˆavar(η ) as 
 
 
 MBM
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆavar(η ) c(τ) AVAR(τ) c(τ) '= .      (A-1) 
 
We focus, therefore, on finding the asymptotic distribution of τˆ  and, in particular, the 
formulation of its asymptotic covariance matrix. 
 First note that we can write τ as  
 
 τ Ξ θ=           (A-2) 
 
where θ = [δ γ]′ ′ , 1 2δ [β β ]'′ ′= , γ ζ=  (recall, 1 P1 X1β = [β β ]′ ′  and 2 P2 X2β = [β β ]′ ′ ) 
 
 
P1
P2
β
β
ζ
Ξ
 
 
− − − − − − − − 
 
=
 
 
− − − − − − − −
 
  



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and a is the unit row vector with the value “1” in the element position corresponding to 
the element position of a in the vector θ.  Clearly then  
 
  
ˆ
ˆAVAR(τ) Ξ AVAR(θ) Ξ′=        (A-3) 
 
where ˆθ  is the estimator of θ obtained from the following two-stage protocol. 
 
First Stage 
Consistently estimate δ =β  via the following optimization estimator 
 
 
n
1 i
i 1
δ
q (δ, S )
ˆδ = arg max
n
=
∑


       (A-4) 
where  
 1 i 11 1 i 12 2 iq (δ, S ) q (β , S ) q (β , S )= +    
 11 1 i i i 1 i i 1q (β , S ) I(A 0) ln[Λ(W β )] [1 I(A 0)] ln[1 Λ(W β )]= > + − > −    
 
2
12 2 i i i i 2q (β , S ) I(A 0)(ln(A ) W β )= − > −   
 i i i iS [A X P ]=
 
 
 
1 2δ [β β ]'′ ′=   , 1 P1 X1β = [β β ]′ ′   and 2 P2 X2β = [β β ]′ ′    and  1 2ˆ ˆ ˆδ [β β ]'′ ′= . 
 
Second Stage 
Consistently estimate γ via the following optimization estimator 
 
 
n
i
i 1
γ
ˆq(δ, γ,  S )
γˆ = arg max
n
=
∑


       (A-5) 
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where 
 
2
i i
ˆ ˆq(δ, γ,  S ) ( (β, W ) ζ)= − −  Z  
  
1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆδ [β β ] '′ ′=  is the first stage estimator of β, 1 P1 X1ˆ ˆ ˆβ = [β β ]′ ′  and 2 P2 X2ˆ ˆ ˆβ = [β β ]′ ′ .  Use 
1q  as shorthand notation for 
  
 1 11 1 12 2q (δ, S) q (β , S) q (β , S)= +  
 
with 
 
 11 1 1 1q (β , S) I(A 0) ln[Λ(Wβ )] [1 I(A 0)]ln[1 Λ(Wβ )]= > + − > −  
 
2
12 2 2q (β , S) I(A 0)(ln(A) W β )= − > −  
 S [A X P]=  
 
and use q as shorthand notation for  
 
 
2
2q(δ, γ,  S) ( (β , W) ζ)= − − Z  
 
and let ˆAVAR(δ)  denote the asymptotic covariance matrix of the first stage estimator.33  
Using well known results from asymptotic theory for two-stage estimators, we can show 
that34 
1 d
2ˆ ˆAVAR(θ) n (θ θ) N(0, I)− − →       (A-6) 
                                                 
33
 Note that a consistent estimate ˆAVAR(δ)  can be obtained from the packaged output 
for the first stage estimator because the first stage estimator is unaffected by the fact that 
it is a component of a two-stage estimator.  
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where ˆˆ ˆθ = [δ γ]′ ′ ,  ˆplim(θ) = θ  
 
 
11 12
12 22
D D
D D
ˆAVAR(θ)  =  
′ 
       (A-7) 
 
 11
ˆAVAD R(δ)=         (A-8) 
  2K×2K 
 [ ]12 δδ 1 δ 1 γ γγ 11E ED q q ' q E q −−= ∇ ∇ ∇      ∇  
  
[ ] [ ] [ ]δδ 1 δ 1 δ 1 δδ 1 γ1 γ1 δ 1γE q q ' q q q qE E E E −− −∇ ∇ ′   − ∇ ∇   ∇ ∇  (A-9) 
and 
 
 22 γγ γδ γ
1
δ
ˆ
ˆAVAR (γ) E E AVD q q qAR(β)E '−   =   =     ∇ ∇ ∇
 
  [ ]γ δ 1 δδ 1 γδ1q q qE E E q−∇ ∇ ′  −   ∇  ∇  
   [ ]γδ δδ 1 δ 1γ γγ1 1q qE E E ' Eq q q −−∇ ∇ ∇ ∇      −   ∇       
    
21
γγ γγ
1
γE E qEq q
− −
    +   ∇ ∇  ∇    (A-10) 
 
Fortunately, (A-9) and (A-10) can be simplified in a number of ways.  First note that we 
can write 
 
 γ δ 1 γ δ 1q q qE[ W]E |E q   =∇ ∇ ∇   ∇   
but 
                                                                                                                                                 
34Discussions of asymptotic theory for two-stage optimization estimators can be found in 
Newey & McFadden (1994), White (1994, Chapter 6), and Wooldridge (2010, Chapter 
12).    
82 
 δ 1 δ 11 δ 12q = q q∇ ∇ +∇  
with 
 
1δ 11 βq [ ln f (I(A 0) | W) 0 0]∇ = ∇ >  
 
 ( )2δ 12q 0 2 ln(A)I(A 0) W β W 0= −>∇     
where 
 
I(A 0) [1 I(A 0)]
1 1Λ(W β ) [1 Λ(W β )f (I( | W ]A 0) ) > − >= −>  . 
 
Therefore 
 
 
( )
11 β 2δE[ q | W] E[ ln f (I(A 0) | W)] 2E ln(A)I(A 0) Wβ | W W ∇ = ∇ > −   >   
 
   = [ 0     0] 
 
because 
1β
E[ ln f (I(A 0) | W )] 0∇ > =  [see (13.20) on p. 477 of Wooldridge (2010)] and,  
( )2E ln(A)I( 0 0A ) W β | W− =  >  by design.  Finally, then we get 
 
 γ δ 1E 0q q∇  = ∇  
 
so 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ]12 δδ 1 δ 1 δ 1 δδ 1 γδ γγ 11 1E E E ED q q ' q q q qE −− − ′   −   = ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇  (A-11) 
      2K×2K           2K×2K        2K×2K    2K×1   1×1 
      
and 
 
 22 γγ γδ γδ γγ
1 1
ˆ
ˆAVAR(γ) E E AVAR(β) E 'ED q q q q− −       =      ∇ ∇ ∇ = ∇  
                           1×1        1×2K      2K×2K     2K×1        1×1 
 
    
21
γγ γγ
1
γE E qEq q
− −
    +   ∇ ∇  ∇ .   (A-12) 
             1×1            1×1          1×1 
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so 
 
11 1
(2K 1) (2K
2
12 21) 2
D D
2K 2K 2K 1
D D
1 2K
ˆAVAR(
1 1
θ)
+ × +
 
 × × 
=
 ′
 
× × 
. 
 
Let’s consider each of the individual components of (A-11) and (A-12) in turn. 
δ
1
δ 1qE[ ]−∇  
 2K×2K 
 Written out explicitly we have 
 
1 1
2 2
1
β β 11
ββ 1 1
β 12
1
β
E[ q ] 0
q ]
0 E
[
[
E
q ]−
−
−
 ∇
 ∇ =
 ∇ 
.    (A-13) 
Now 
 
1 1
1
1 1β β 1E ˆAV[ ] )q AR(β− = −∇         (A-14) 
  =  the negative of the asymptotic covariance matrix for first   
   stage, first part, logit estimation in the two-stage estimation  
   protocol for θ.  We get an estimate of this directly from the Stata  
   output. 
 
A consistent estimator of 
1 1β β 11
1E[ q ]−∇  is 
 
 

1 1
1
β 1 1β 1
ˆ ˆnAVAR *(βE q ] )[ − = −∇
      (A-15) 
 
where  1ˆAVAR * (β )  is the estimated variance-covariance matrix output by the Stata logit 
procedure.  Also 
 
 
2β 12 2I(A 0) Aq 2 )ln( β )W( W> −∇ =  
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and 
 
 
2 2β β 12q 2 I(A 0)W W′>∇ = − . 
 
Therefore 
 [ ]
2 2β β 12E[ q ] I( )2E A 0 W W∇ = − ′> . 
A consistent estimator of 
2 2
1
β β 12E[ q ]−∇  is 
 
 { }
2 2 i
1
n1
β β 12 1
i 1
i i
ˆE[ q ] n 2 I(A 0)W W
−
−
=
∑ ′> ∇ = −  
    (A-17) 
 
where 1n  is the size of the subsample for whom I(A 0) 1> = , so 
 
 
1 1
2 2
β β 11
δδ 1 ββ 1 1
β
1
1
β
1
12
[ qˆE
ˆ ˆE[ E[
ˆE
] 0
q ] q ]
0 [ q ]−
−
− −
 ∇
 ∇ = ∇ =
 ∇ 
. (A-18) 
   
δ 1 δ 1q ' qE ∇ ∇    
        2K×2K 
 
 Written out explicitly we have 
 
 
1 1 1 2
2 1 2 2
β 11 β 11 β 11 β 12
β 1 β 1
β 12 β 11 β 12 β 12
E[ q ' q ] E[ q ' q ]
q ' q
E[ q ' q ] E[ q 'E q ]
  =
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ 
∇ ∇  ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇  
.   (A-19) 
Because the first stage, first part, estimator of 1β  is MLE we can write 
 
 
1 1 1 1β 11 β 11 β β 11
1
1E[ q ' q ] E[ q ˆA (] VAR β )
−
∇  = ∇ = ∇ −  
   =  the inverse of the asymptotic covariance matrix for first stage,  
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first part, logit estimation in the two-stage estimation 
 protocol for θ.  We get an estimate of this directly from the Stata  
output. 
 
A consistent estimator of 
1 1β 11 β 11E[ q ' q ]∇ ∇  is 
 
 

1 1β 11 β 1
1
1 1
1
ˆAVARˆE[ q ' *(β )
n
q ]
−
 =
 
∇ ∇      (A-20) 
where  1ˆAVAR * (β )  is the estimated variance-covariance matrix output by the Stata logit 
procedure.  The remaining block elements follow from 
 
 
[ ]
1 1β 11 β 1 1q ln f (I(A 0) | W) I(A 0) W β )] [1[1 Λ( I(A 0)] W β ) WΛ(−∇ = ∇ > = > − − >  
           (A-21) 
 
 ( )
2 2β 12q 2 ln(A |I A(A 0) W β W0)∇ = > −> .    (A-22) 
 
where the formulation of 
1β 11q∇  comes from equation (16.4.8) on p. 350 of Fomby et al. 
(1984) and Λ(  ) denotes the logistic cdf.  The remaining required consistent matrix 
estimators are 
 
 
1 2 1 2
n
β 11 β 12 β 11i β 12i
i 11
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇      (A-23) 
 
 
2 2 2 2
n
β 12 β 12 β 12i β 12i
i 11
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇      (A-24) 
 
where 
 
 
1β 11i i i 1 1i i i
ˆ ˆW β )]qˆ I(A 0)[1 Λ( I(A 0)]Λ([1 W β ) W∇ = > − > − −    (A-25) 
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and 
 
 ( )2β 12i i i i i i2qˆ 2 A ln(A | A 0 ˆI( 0) W β) W> −>∇ =     (A-26) 
so 
 [ ] 1 1 1 2
2 1 2 2
β 11 β 11 β 11 β 12
δ 1 δ 1 β 1 β 1
β 12 β 11 β 12 β 12
ˆ ˆE E
ˆ ˆE E
ˆ
[ q ' q ] [ q ' q ]
q ' q q ' q
[ q ˆE ' q ] [ q ' q ]E
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
 ∇ ∇
 = =
∇


 ∇
 .(A-27) 
 
 
 
γδqE ∇    
   1×2K 
 
 Written out explicitly we have 
 
 
 ( )γ ζ cq = q 2 (β, S) ζ=∇ ∇ −Z       (A-28) 
 
and 
 
1γδ ζβ
E[ q] = E[ q] 0 ∇ ∇    
  
1β
= 2 E[ ] 0 ∇ Z        (A-29) 
where 
 
 
1 1β λ(Wβ ) W∇ =Z .        (A-30) 
 
The requisite consistent matrix estimator is 
 
 

1 1
n
β β ii 1
ˆE[ ] =
=
∑∇ ∇Z Z         (A-31) 
 
where  
 

1β i ii 1
ˆλ(W β W= )∇ Z
        (A-32) 
87 
so 
 
1γδ β
ˆ ˆE[ q] = 2 E[ ] 0 ∇ ∇ Z .       (A-33) 
 
 
γγ
1E[ q]−∇   
    1×1 
 γγ ζζ
1 1
cq q
1E E
2
− −
  ∇ ∇ = = −    .       (A-34) 
 
2
γE q∇    
        1×1 
 Given that 
 
 ( )γ 2 (β, W ζq )∇ = −Z .       (A-35) 
we have 
 
 
2 2
γE 4E[( (β, Sq ) ζ) ]  = − ∇ Z       (A-36) 
 
The corresponding consistent estimator is 
 
 
n 2
1
γ iγ
i
1
ˆ ˆˆE 4 ( ζ) .
n
q ' q
=
∑∇  − ∇ = Z       (A-37) 
 
Based on (A-8), (A-11) and (A-12) and using the two-stage estimator ˆθ  we can 
consistently estimate (A-7) as 
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 11 12
12 22
ˆ ˆD D
ˆ ˆD D
ˆAVAR(θ)
 
=  
′  
 
where 
 
 


1
2
11
1
ˆnAVAR * 0(β )
ˆ ˆAVAR(δ) AVAR(β)
ˆn AVA
ˆD
R *(β )0
 
= 

=

= 

 
 [ ]12 γγ δ 1 δ 1 γγ γδ γ1 1 γ 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆE E E E ED q q ' q q q q− − −′   = ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇   −          
 
 
 
22 γγ γδ
1 1
γδ γγ
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆAVAR(γ) E E AVAR(β) E 'D q Eq q q− −       =       ∇ ∇ ∇ = ∇  
     
2
γ γγ
1
γ γ
1
q q qˆ ˆ ˆE E E
− −
    +     ∇ ∇ ∇  
 
and using well known results from asymptotic theory for two-stage estimators, we can 
show that35  
 
 

1 11
d
2
1 2 2
ˆn(β β )
ˆ ˆˆAVAR(θ) n (β β ) N(0, I)
ˆn (ζ ζ)
−
 
−
 
− → 
 
−  
.      (A-38) 
 
************************************************************************ 
ASIDE: 
                                                 
35Discussions of asymptotic theory for two-stage optimization estimators can be found in 
Newey & McFadden (1994), White (1994, Chapter 6), and Wooldridge (2010, Chapter 
12).    
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Notice that the “ n  blow up” is a bit tricky here.  It implements n  for 1ˆβ  and ˆζ ; but 
uses 1n  for 2ˆβ .  We had to do this because we had to use the correct sample size (viz., 
1n ) for a number of the components of ˆAVAR(θ)  [viz., those that pertained to the 
estimation of 2ˆβ ]; in particular (A-17), (A-23) and (A-24).  For this reason we had to be 
explicit about the denominators in all of the averages for the components of ˆAVAR(θ) .  
This meant that in the construction of the requisite asymptotic t-stats we had to explicitly 
include the “blow-up” in the numerator (i.e., we had to multiply by the square-root of the 
appropriate sample size).  I refer to this as “tricky” because one typically does not have to 
do this.  In the usual asymptotic t-stat construction the denominators of the averages (“n”) 
need not be included in the construction of the asymptotic covariance matrix because it 
typically manifests as a multiplicative factor and, after pulling the diagonal and taking the 
square root to get the standard errors, this multiplicative n  cancels with the “blow-up” 
factor in the numerator.  For example, the asymptotic t-stat of the OLS estimator is 
 
 
 ( ) ( )
k k k k k k k k
1 1 12 2
2 kk kk
kk
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆn (ρ ρ ) n (ρ ρ ) n (ρ ρ ) (ρ ρ )
ˆAVAR(ρ) ˆ ˆn σ σ1
σˆ
n
− − −
− − − −
= = =
′ ′ 
′ 
 
XX XX
XX
  
where 
 n is the sample size 
 kρ  is the coefficient of the kth regressor in the linear regression 
 kρˆ  is its OLS estimator 
 
2
σ
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 X is the matrix of regressors 
 
and kk′XX  is the kth diagonal element of ′XX .  Note how the “ n s” simply cancel. 
Note also that what we typically refer to as the “asymptotic standard error” can actually 
be written as the square root of the diagonal element of the consistent estimator of the 
asymptotic covariance matrix divided by n; in other words 
 asy std err =   
ˆAVAR(ρ)
n
.  
************************************************************************   
Now back to the issue at hand.  Moreover 
 
 

P1 P11 d
2
1 P2 P2
ˆn(β β )
ˆ ˆ
ˆAVAR(τ) n n (β β ) N(0, I)
ˆn (ζ ζ)
−
 
−
 
− → 
 
−  
.     (A-39)  
 
where 
 
 
 ˆ
ˆAVAR(τ) ΞAVAR(θ) Ξ '=         (A-40) 
 
and τ and Ξ are defined as in (A-2).  Now combining (A-1) with (A-38) and (A-39) we 
get 
 
 

1 d
MBM MBM MBM2
ˆ ˆavar(η ) n (η η ) N(0, I)
−
− →     (A-41) 
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where 
 
 
 MBM
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆavar(η ) c(τ) AVAR(τ) c(τ) '=   
and 
 P1c(τ) [(1 ζ) 1 β ]= − − . 
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Appendix B:  
Asymptotic Distribution (and Standard Error) of POηˆ in Eqn (2-7) 
We may write POηˆ  as 
 
 
PO κˆηˆ
νˆ
=  
where 
 
n
i
i 1
1
ˆκˆ (β, W )
n=
∑= K  
 
n
i
i 1
1
ˆνˆ = (β, W )
n=
∑ V  
 1 2 P1 1 2 P2(β, W) λ(Wβ )exp(Wβ )β Λ(Wβ )exp(Wβ )β+=K  
 1 2(β, W) Λ(W β ) exp(W β )=V   
 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆβ [β β ]'′ ′=  (with 1 P1 X1ˆ ˆ ˆβ = [β β ]′ ′  and 2 P2 X2ˆ ˆ ˆβ = [β β ]′ ′ ) is the consistent  
  estimate of the parameter vector 1 2β [β β ]'′ ′=  (with 1 P1 X1β = [β β ]′ ′  and  
  2 P2 X2β = [β β ])′ ′ )  [the parameters of equations (2-1) and (2-2)] obtained  
  via the two-part protocol culminating in (2-3) 
 
and  
 i i iW [P X ]=  denotes the observation on W [P X]=  for the ith individual in  
 the sample (i = 1, ..., n).  Let ˆ ˆγˆ = [κ ν]′  and γ = [κ ν]′ , where ˆplim[γ] = γ .   
If we could show that 
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1 d
2
ˆ ˆAVAR(γ) n (γ γ) N(0, I)− − →  
 
where the formulation of ˆAVAR(γ)  is known, then we could apply the δ-method to 
obtain the asymptotic variance of POηˆ  as 
 
 
PO
ˆ ˆavar(η ) c(γ) AVAR(γ) c(γ) '=  
 
where 2c(τ) [1/ ν κ / ν ]= − .  Moreover, if we have a consistent estimator for ˆAVAR(γ)
, say ˆAVAR(γ)  [i.e. ˆ ˆp lim AVAR(γ) AVAR(γ)  =
 
],  then we could consistently 
estimate POˆavar(η ) as 
 
 
 PO
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆavar(η ) c(γ) AVAR(γ) c(γ) '= .      (B-1) 
 
We focus, therefore, on finding the asymptotic distribution of γˆ  and, in particular, the 
formulation of its asymptotic covariance matrix. 
 First, let θ = [δ γ ]′ ′ ′  where 1 2δ [β β ]'′ ′= , γ [κ ν]′ =  (recall, 1 P1 X1β = [β β ]′ ′  
and 2 P2 X2β = [β β ]′ ′ ), and note that γˆ  can be viewed as the second stage estimator in the 
following two-stage protocol  
 
First Stage 
Consistently estimate δ via the following optimization estimator 
 
 
n
1 i
i 1
δ
q (δ, S )
ˆδ = arg max
n
=
∑


       (B-2) 
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where  
 1 i 11 1 i 12 2 iq (δ, S ) q (β , S ) q (β , S )= +    
 11 1 i i i 1 i i 1q (β , S ) I(A 0) ln[Λ(W β )] [1 I(A 0)] ln[1 Λ(W β )]= > + − > −    
 
2
12 2 i i i i 2q (β , S ) I(A 0)(ln(A ) W β )= − > −   
 i i i iS [A X P ]=
 
 
 
1 2δ [β β ]'′ ′=   , 1 P1 X1β = [β β ]′ ′   and 2 P2 X2β = [β β ]′ ′    and  1 2ˆ ˆ ˆδ [β β ]'′ ′=  
 
Second Stage 
Consistently estimate γ via the following optimization estimator 
 
 
n
i
i 1
γ
ˆq(δ, γ,  S )
γˆ = arg max
n
=
∑


       (B-3) 
where 
 i a i b i
ˆ ˆ ˆq(δ, γ,  S ) q (δ, κ,  S ) q (δ, ν,  S )= +   
 
2
a i i
ˆ ˆq (δ, κ,  S ) ( (β, W ) κ)= − − K  
 
2
b i i
ˆ ˆq (δ, ν,  S ) ( (β, W ) ν)= − − V  
  
1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆδ [β β ] '′ ′=  is the first stage estimator of δ, 1 P1 X1ˆ ˆ ˆβ = [β β ]′ ′  and 2 P2 X2ˆ ˆ ˆβ = [β β ]′ ′ .  Use 
1q  as shorthand notation for 
  
 1 11 1 12 2q (δ, S) q (β , S) q (β , S)= +  
 
with 
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 11 1 1 1q (β , S) I(A 0) ln[Λ(Wβ )] [1 I(A 0)]ln[1 Λ(Wβ )]= > + − > −  
 
2
12 2 2q (β , S) I(A 0)(ln(A) W β )= − > −  
 S [A X P]=  
 
and use q as shorthand notation for  
 
 a bq(δ, γ,  S) q (δ, κ,  S) q (δ, ν,  S)= +  
with 
 
2
aq (δ, κ,  S) ( (β, W) κ)= − −K  
 
2
bq (δ, ν,  S) ( (β, W) ν)= − −V  
  
and let ˆAVAR(δ)  denote the asymptotic covariance matrix of the first stage estimator.36  
Using well known results from asymptotic theory for two-stage estimators, we can show 
that37 
 
1 d
2
ˆ ˆAVAR(γ) n (γ γ) N(0, I)− − →       (B-4) 
 
where,  ˆplim(γ) = γ  
 
 
γ γδ γδ
1
γq q ˆˆAVAR (γ) E E AVAR (β)E q '
−∇ ∇ ∇     =      
 
                                                 
36
 Note that a consistent estimate ˆAVAR(δ)  can be obtained from the packaged output 
for the first stage estimator because the first stage estimator is unaffected by the fact that 
it is a component of a two-stage estimator.  
37Discussions of asymptotic theory for two-stage optimization estimators can be found in 
Newey & McFadden (1994), White (1994, Chapter 6), and Wooldridge (2010, Chapter 
12).    
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  [ ]γ δ 1 δδ 1 γδ1q ' q qE E E q−∇ ∇ ′  −   ∇  ∇  
   [ ]γδ δδ 1 γ δ 1 γ 1γ1q q q ' q qE E E ' E −−      −    ∇ ∇∇ ∇ ∇    
    
1 1
γγ γ γ γγq q ' q qE E E
− −∇ ∇ ∇     +      ∇   (B-5) 
 
Fortunately, (B-5) can be simplified in a number of ways.  Note that we can write 
 
 γ δ 1 γ δ 1q ' q q 'E E[ q | W]E∇ ∇ ∇ ∇   =     
but 
 δ 1 δ 11 δ 12q = q q∇ ∇ +∇  
with 
 
1δ 11 βq [ ln f (I(A 0) | W) 0 0]∇ = ∇ >  
 
 ( )2δ 12q 0 2 ln(A)I(A 0) W β W 0= −>∇     
where 
 
I(A 0) [1 I(A 0)]
1 1Λ(W β ) [1 Λ(W β )f (I( | W ]A 0) ) > − >= −>  . 
 
Therefore 
 
( )
11 β 2δE[ q | W] E[ ln f (I(A 0) | W)] 2E ln(A)I(A 0) Wβ | W W ∇ = ∇ > −   >   
 
   = [ 0     0] 
 
because 
1β
E[ ln f (I(A 0) | W )] 0∇ > =  [see (13.20) on p. 477 of Wooldridge (2010)] and,  
( )2E ln(A)I( 0 0A ) W β | W− =  >  by design.  Finally, then we get 
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 γ δ 1q ' qE 0  = ∇ ∇  
 
so 
 
 γγ γδ γδ γγ
1 1
ˆ
ˆAVAR(γ) E E AVAR(β) E 'Eq q q q− −∇ ∇ ∇ ∇      =          
                 2×2        2×2K      2K×2K     2K×2        2×2 
 
    
1 1
γγ γ γ γγq q ' q qE E E
− −∇ ∇ ∇     +      ∇ .  (B-6) 
             2×2            2×2          2×2 
 
 
Let’s consider each of the individual components of (B-6) in turn. 
 
δ
1
δ 1qE[ ]−∇  
 2K×2K 
 Written out explicitly we have 
 
1 1
2 2
1
β β 11
ββ 1 1
β 12
1
β
E[ q ] 0
q ]
0 E
[
[
E
q ]−
−
−
 ∇
 ∇ =
 ∇ 
.    (B-7) 
Now 
 
1 1
1
1 1β β 1E ˆAV[ ] )q AR(β− = −∇         (B-8) 
  =  the negative of the asymptotic covariance matrix for first   
   stage, first part, logit estimation in the two-stage estimation  
    protocol for θ.  We get an estimate of this directly from the 
Stata      output. 
 
A consistent estimator of 
1 1β β 11
1E[ q ]−∇  is 
 
 

1 1
1
β 1 1β 1
ˆ ˆnAVAR *(βE q ] )[ − = −∇
      (B-9) 
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where  1ˆAVAR * (β )  is the estimated variance-covariance matrix output by the Stata logit 
procedure.  Also 
 
 
2β 12 2I(A 0) Aq 2 )ln( β )W( W> −∇ =  
 
and 
 
 
2 2β β 12q 2 I(A 0)W W′>∇ = − . 
 
Therefore 
 
 [ ]
2 2β β 12E[ q ] I( )2E A 0 W W∇ = − ′> .      (B-10) 
 
A consistent estimator of 
2 2
1
β β 12E[ q ]−∇  is 
 
 { }
2 2 i
1
n1
β β 12 1
i 1
i i
ˆE[ q ] n 2 I(A 0)W W
−
−
=
∑ ′> ∇ = −  
    (B-11) 
 
where 1n  is the size of the subsample for whom I(A 0) 1> = , so 
 
 
1 1
2 2
β β 11
δδ 1 ββ 1 1
β
1
1
β
1
12
[ qˆE
ˆ ˆE[ E[
ˆE
] 0
q ] q ]
0 [ q ]−
−
− −
 ∇
 ∇ = ∇ =
 ∇ 
. (B-12) 
   
δ 1 δ 1q ' qE ∇ ∇    
        2K×2K 
 
 Written out explicitly we have 
 
 
1 1 1 2
2 1 2 2
β 11 β 11 β 11 β 12
β 1 β 1
β 12 β 11 β 12 β 12
E[ q ' q ] E[ q ' q ]
q ' q
E[ q ' q ] E[ q 'E q ]
  =
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ 
∇ ∇  ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇  
.   (B-13) 
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Because the first stage, first part, estimator of 1β  is MLE we can write 
 
 
1 1 1 1β 11 β 11 β β 11
1
1E[ q ' q ] E[ q ˆA (] VAR β )
−
∇  = ∇ = ∇ −  
   =  the inverse of the asymptotic covariance matrix for first stage,  
first part, logit estimation in the two-stage estimation 
 protocol for θ.  We get an estimate of this directly from the  
Stata output. 
 
A consistent estimator of 
1 1β 11 β 11E[ q ' q ]∇ ∇  is 
 
 

1 1β 11 β 1
1
1 1
1
ˆAVARˆE[ q ' *(β )
n
q ]
−
 =
 
∇ ∇      (B-14) 
 
where  1ˆAVAR * (β )  is the estimated variance-covariance matrix output by the Stata logit 
procedure.  The remainder of the block elements follow from 
 
 
1 1β 11 βq ln f (I(A 0) | W)∇ = ∇ >   
 
[ ]1 1Wβ )I( ] [1 Wβ )A 0)[1 Λ( I W(A 0)]Λ(− >−= > −   
        (B-15) 
         
  
 ( )
2 2β 12q 2 ln(A |I A(A 0) W β W0)∇ = > −> .    (B-16) 
 
where the formulation of 
1β 11q∇  comes from equation (16.4.8) on p. 350 of Fomby et al. 
(1984) and Λ(  ) denotes the logistic cdf.  The remaining required consistent matrix 
estimators are: 
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1 2 1 2
n
β 11 β 12 β 11i β 12i
i 11
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇      (B-17) 
 
2 2 2 2
n
β 12 β 12 β 12i β 12i
i 11
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇      (B-18) 
 
where 
 
 
1β 11i i i 1 1i i i
ˆ ˆW β )]qˆ I(A 0)[1 Λ( I(A 0)]Λ([1 W β ) W∇ = > − > − −    (B-19) 
 
and 
 
 ( )2β 12i i i i i i2qˆ 2 A ln(A | A 0 ˆI( 0) W β) W> −>∇ =     (B-20) 
so 
 [ ] 1 1 1 2
2 1 2 2
β 11 β 11 β 11 β 12
δ 1 δ 1 β 1 β 1
β 12 β 11 β 12 β 12
ˆ ˆE E
ˆ ˆE E
ˆ
[ q ' q ] [ q ' q ]
q ' q q ' q
[ q ˆE ' q ] [ q ' q ]E
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
 ∇ ∇
 = =
∇


 ∇
 .(B-21) 
 
γδqE ∇    
   2×2K 
 
 Written out explicitly we have 
 
 
 γ κ a ν bq = [( q 0) (0 q )]∇ ∇ + +∇   
 
  κ a ν b[ q q ] ∇ ∇=       
 
  ( ) ( )2 (β, S) κ  (β, S) ν = − − K V      (B-22) 
 
and 
 
 
1 2
1 2
κβ a κβ a
γδ
νβ b νβ b
E[ q ] E[ q ]
E[ q] =
E[ q ] E[ q ]
∇ ∇ 
∇  ∇ ∇  
  
  
1 2
1 2
β β
β β
E[ ] E[ ]
= 2
E[ ] E[ ]
∇ ∇ 
 ∇ ∇  
K K
V V
      (B-23) 
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where 
 
1 1 1 P1 1 2β {λ(Wβ )[1 2Λ(Wβ )]β W λ(Wβ )[1 0 ... 0]}exp(Wβ )− +∇ =K  
        1 2 P2λ(Wβ )exp(Wβ )β W+  
  [ ]1 2 1 P1 P2λ(Wβ ) exp(Wβ ) {[1 2Λ(Wβ )]β + β }W [1 0 ... 0]= − +  (B-24) 
 
2 1 2 P1 1 2 P 2β 2λ(Wβ ) exp(Wβ )β W+ Λ(Wβ ){exp(Wβ )β W exp(Wβ )[1 0 ... 0]}=∇ +K  
  [ ]2 1 P1 1 P2 1exp(Wβ ) {λ(Wβ )β + Λ(Wβ )β }W Λ(Wβ )[1 0 ... 0]= + . (B-25) 
 
1 1β 2λ(W β ) exp(W β ) W∇ =V       (B-26)  
and 
 
2 1β 2Λ(W β ) exp(W β ) W∇ =V .      (B-27) 
 
The following equalities were used in deriving the above results 
 
 aΛ(a) λ(a) Λ(a)[1 Λ(a)]∇ = = −  
 aλ(a) λ(a)[1 2Λ(a)]∇ = − . 
 
The requisite consistent matrix estimators are 
 
 

1 1
n
β β ii 1
ˆE[ ] =
=
∑∇ ∇K K        (B-28) 
 

2 2
n
β β ii 1
ˆE[ ] =
=
∑∇ ∇K K        (B-29) 
 

1 1
n
β β ii 1
ˆE[ ] =
=
∑∇ ∇V V         (B-30) 
and 
 
 

2 2
n
β β ii 1
ˆE[ ] =
=
∑∇ ∇V V         (B-31) 
 
where  
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
1 1 2 1 P1 P2β i i i ii
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆλ(W β ) exp(W β ) {[1 2Λ(W β )]β + β }W [1 0 ... 0] = − + ∇ K  (B-32) 
 

2β i i i i ii 2 1 P1 1 P2 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆexp(W β ) {λ(W β )β + Λ(W β )β }W Λ(W β )[1 0 ... 0]∇  = + K (B-33) 
 

1 1 2β i i ii
ˆ ˆλ(W β ) exp(W β W= )∇ V       (B-34) 
and 
 

1 1 2β i i ii
ˆ ˆΛ(W β ) exp(W β W= )∇ V .      (B-35) 
so 
 
 
1 2
1 2
β β
γδ
β β
ˆ ˆE[ ] E[ ]
ˆE[ q] = 2
ˆ ˆE[ ] E[ ]
 ∇ ∇
 ∇
 ∇ ∇ 
K K
V V
.      (B-37) 
 
 
 
γγ
1E[ q]−∇   
    2×2 
 
[ ]
[ ]
1
κκ a
γγ
νν
1
b
1 E 0
E
q
q
q0 E
−
−
−
 
 
∇
∇
∇
 =   
 
      (B-38) 
because κν a νκ bq q 0∇ = ∇ = .  Now 
 
 κκ a νν bq q 2∇ = ∇ = −   
 
therefore 
 
1
γγ
1 0
2E
10
q
2
−
 
− 
  =   

 
∇

−

.       (B-39) 
 
 
γ γq' qE ∇ ∇    
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        2×2 
 Given that 
 
 ( ) ( )γ 2 (β, W) κ  (β, W) νq  = − − ∇  K V .     (B-40) 
 
we have 
 
γ 2γ
2E[( (β, S) κ) ] E[( (β, S) κ)( (β, S) ν)]
E 4
E[( (β, S) κ)( (β, S) ν)] E[( (β, S) ν)
' q
]
q
 
− − −
  =   
− − −  
∇ ∇ K K V
K V V
. 
           (B-41) 
 
The corresponding consistent estimator is 
 
 
n n2
i i i
i 1 i 1
n n 2
i i i
i
γ
1
γ
i 1
1 1
ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ( κ) ( κ)( ν)
n n
ˆE 4
1 1
ˆ ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ( κ)( ν
q ' q
) ( ν)
n n
= =
= =
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 
− − − 
  =   
 
− − −
  
∇ ∇
K K V
K V V
.  (B-42) 
 
 
Based on the above results, we can consistently estimate (B-5) as 
 
 
 
 
γγ γδ δ γγ
1 1
γ
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆAVAR(γ) E E Aq q qVAR(β) E q'E− −    ∇   =     ∇ ∇ ∇   
     γγ γ γ γγ
1 1
q q ' q qˆ ˆ ˆE E E
− −∇ ∇ ∇     +      ∇  
 
and using well known results from asymptotic theory for two-stage estimators, we can 
show that38 
 
                                                 
38Discussions of asymptotic theory for two-stage optimization estimators can be found in 
Newey & McFadden (1994), White (1994, Chapter 6), and Wooldridge (2010, Chapter 
12).    
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
1 d
2
ˆ ˆAVAR(γ) n (γ γ) N(0, I)− − → .       (B-43) 
 
Combining (B-43) with (B-1) we also have that 
 
 

1 d
PO PO PO2
ˆ ˆavar(η ) n (η η ) N(0, I)
−
− →      (B-44) 
 
where POˆavar(η )  is given in (B-1). 
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Appendix C.   
Bias from Using MBMηˆ Instead of POηˆ  in a Two-Part Model 
 
If we define 
 
 1 2ν E[Λ(Wβ )exp(Wβ )]≡  
 1ζ E[Λ(Wβ )]≡  
and 
 
2
1 2ω E[Λ(Wβ ) exp(Wβ )]≡  
 
we can write the bias from using the MBM approach vs. the correct PO method as the 
following rendition of the difference between (2-5) and (2-7) 
 
 
MBM PO P1 1 2 P2
P1 P2
β E[λ(Wβ ) exp(Wβ )] β ν
η η [ (1 ζ)β β ]
ν
+ 
− = − + −  
 
 
  
[P1 1 1 2 P2
P1 P2
β E Λ(Wβ )[1 Λ(Wβ )]exp(Wβ ) β ν[ (1 ζ)β β ]
ν
 − +
= − + −  
 
 
   
2
P1 P1 1 2 P2
P1 P2
β ν β E[Λ(Wβ ) exp(Wβ )] β ν[ (1 ζ)β β ]
νˆ
 
− +
= − + −  
 
 
    P1 P1 P2 P1 P1 P2
ω
β ζβ β  β β β
ν
= − + − + −    
     P1 P1
ω
ˆβ β ζ
ν
= −  
  P1
ω
β ζ
ν
 
= − 
 
.  
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Appendix D.   
Asymptotic Distribution (and Standard Error) of MBM POˆ ˆη η−  
 
In Appendix C we showed that 
 
 
MBM PO
P1
ω
η η β ζ
ν
 
− = − 
 
 
where 
 1 2ν E[Λ(Wβ )exp(Wβ )]≡  
 1ζ E[Λ(Wβ )]≡  
and 
 
2
1 2ω E[Λ(Wβ ) exp(Wβ )]≡ . 
 
Using the corresponding consistent estimators for ω, ν and ζ we can write 
 
 
MBM PO
P1
ωˆ
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆη η β ζ
νˆ
 
− = − 
 
 
where 
 
n
i
i 1
1
ˆωˆ Ω(β, W )
n=
∑=  
 
n
i
i 1
1
ˆνˆ = (β, W )
n=
∑ V  
 
n
1 i
i 1
1
ˆ ˆζ = (β , W )
n=
∑ Z  
 
2
1 2Ω(β, W) Λ(Wβ ) exp(Wβ )=  
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 1 2(β, W) Λ(W β ) exp(W β )=V   
 1(β, W) Λ(Wβ )=Z  
 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆβ [β β ]'′ ′=  (with 1 P1 X1ˆ ˆ ˆβ = [β β ]′ ′  and 2 P2 X2ˆ ˆ ˆβ = [β β ]′ ′ ) is the consistent  
  estimate of the parameter vector 1 2β [β β ]'′ ′=  (with 1 P1 X1β = [β β ]′ ′  and  
  2 P2 X2β = [β β ])′ ′ )  [the parameters of equations (2-1) and (2-2)] obtained  
  via the two-part protocol culminating in (2-3) 
 
and  
  i i iW [P X ]=  denotes the observation on W [P X]=  for the ith  
  individual in the sample (i = 1, ..., n).   
Let P1ˆ ˆˆ ˆτˆ = [β ω ν ζ]′  and P1τ = [β ω ν ζ]′ , where ˆplim[τ] = τ .  If we could 
show that 
 
 
1 d
2
ˆ ˆAVAR(τ) n (τ τ) N(0, I)− − →  
 
where the formulation of ˆAVAR(τ)  is known, then we could apply the δ-method to 
obtain the asymptotic variance of MBM POˆ ˆη η−  as 
 
 
MBM PO
ˆ ˆ ˆavar(η η ) c(τ) AVAR(τ) c(τ) '− =  
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where 2 P1
ω
c(τ) ζ 1/ ν ω / ν β
ν
  
= − − −  
  
.  Moreover, if we have a consistent 
estimator for ˆAVAR(τ) , say ˆAVAR(τ)  [i.e. ˆ ˆp lim AVAR(τ) AVAR(τ)  =
 
],  then we 
could consistently estimate MBM POˆ ˆavar(η η )− as 
 
 
 MBM PO
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆavar(η η ) c(τ) AVAR(τ) c(τ) '− = .     (D-1) 
 
We focus, therefore, on finding the asymptotic distribution of τˆ  and, in particular, the 
formulation of its asymptotic covariance matrix. 
 First note that we can write τ as  
 
 τ Ξ θ=           (D-2) 
 
where θ = [δ γ ]′ ′ ′ , 1 2δ [β β ]'′ ′= , γ [ω ν ζ]′ =  (recall, 1 P1 X1β = [β β ]′ ′  and 
2 P2 X2β = [β β ]′ ′ ) 
 
 
P1β
3,2K 3
Ξ
0 I
 
 
= − − − − − − − − 
 
 

  
 
a is the unit row vector with the value “1” in the element position corresponding to the 
element position of a in the vector θ, b,c0  is the matrix of zeros whose row and column 
dimensions are b and c, respectively, dI  is the identity matrix of order d, and K is the 
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column dimension of W.  For future reference, let’s set the following vector/matrix 
dimensions: 
 
 1β is K×1 
 2β is K×1 
 W is 1×K 
 τ is 4×1 
 c(τ) is 1×4 
 δ is 2K×1 
 γ is 3×1 
 θ is (2K+3)×1 
 Ξ  is 4×(2K+3) 
 
P1β
 is 1×(2K+3) 
   
Clearly then  
 
  
ˆ
ˆAVAR(τ) Ξ AVAR(θ) Ξ′=        (D-3) 
 
where ˆθ  is the estimator of θ obtained from the following two-stage protocol. 
 
First Stage 
Consistently estimate β  via the following optimization estimator 
 
 
n
1 i
i 1
δ
q (δ, S )
ˆδ = arg max
n
=
∑


       (D-4) 
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where  
 1 i 11 1 i 12 2 iq (δ, S ) q (β , S ) q (β , S )= +    
 11 1 i i i 1 i i 1q (β , S ) I(A 0) ln[Λ(W β )] [1 I(A 0)] ln[1 Λ(W β )]= > + − > −    
 
2
12 2 i i i i 2q (β , S ) I(A 0)(ln(A ) W β )= − > −   
 i i i iS [A X P ]=
 
 
 
1 2δ [β β ]'′ ′=   , 1 P1 X1β = [β β ]′ ′   and 2 P2 X2β = [β β ]′ ′    and  1 2ˆ ˆ ˆδ [β β ]'′ ′=  
 
Second Stage 
Consistently estimate γ via the following optimization estimator 
 
 
n
i
i 1
γ
ˆq(δ, γ,  S )
γˆ = arg max
n
=
∑


       (D-5) 
where 
 i a i b i c i
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆq(δ, γ,  S ) q (δ, ω,  S ) q (δ, ν,  S ) q (δ, ζ,  S )= + +    
 
2
a i i
ˆ ˆq (δ, ω,  S ) (Ω(β, W ) ω)= − −   
 
2
b i i
ˆ ˆq (δ, ν,  S ) ( (β, W ) ν)= − − V  
 
2
c i i
ˆ ˆq (δ, ζ,  S ) ( (β, W ) ζ)= − − Z  
  
1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆδ [β β ] '′ ′=  is the first stage estimator of β, 1 P1 X1ˆ ˆ ˆβ = [β β ]′ ′  and 2 P2 X2ˆ ˆ ˆβ = [β β ]′ ′ .  Use 
1q  as shorthand notation for 
  
 1 11 1 12 2q (δ, S) q (β , S) q (β , S)= +  
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with 
 
 11 1 1 1q (β , S) I(A 0) ln[Λ(Wβ )] [1 I(A 0)]ln[1 Λ(Wβ )]= > + − > −  
 
2
12 2 2q (β , S) I(A 0)(ln(A) W β )= − > −  
 S [A X P]=  
 
and use q as shorthand notation for  
 
 a b cq(δ,γ,  S) q (δ, ω,  S) q (δ, ν,  S) q (δ, ζ,  S)= + +  
with 
 
2
aq (δ, ω,  S) (Ω(β, W) ω)= − −  
 
2
bq (δ, ν,  S) ( (β, W) ν)= − −V  
 
2
c 2q (δ, ζ,  S) ( (β , W) ζ)= − −Z  
 
and let ˆAVAR(δ)  denote the asymptotic covariance matrix of the first stage estimator.39  
Using well known results from asymptotic theory for two-stage estimators, we can show 
that40 
 
 
1 d
2ˆ ˆAVAR(θ) n (θ θ) N(0, I)− − →       (D-6) 
 
where ˆˆ ˆθ = [δ γ ]′ ′ ′ ,  ˆplim(θ) = θ  
                                                 
39
 Note that a consistent estimate ˆAVAR(δ)  can be obtained from the packaged output 
for the first stage estimator because the first stage estimator is unaffected by the fact that 
it is a component of a two-stage estimator.  
40Discussions of asymptotic theory for two-stage optimization estimators can be found in 
Newey & McFadden (1994), White (1994, Chapter 6), and Wooldridge (2010, Chapter 
12).    
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11 12
12 22
D D
D D
ˆAVAR(θ)  =  
′ 
       (D-7) 
 
 11
ˆAVAD R(δ)=         (D-8) 
  2K×2K 
 [ ]12 δδ 1 δ 1 γ γγ 11E ED q q ' q E q −−= ∇ ∇ ∇      ∇  
  
[ ] [ ] [ ]δδ 1 δ 1 δ 1 δδ 1 γ1 γ1 δ 1γE q q ' q q q qE E E E −− −∇ ∇ ′   − ∇ ∇   ∇ ∇  (D-9) 
 
 22 γγ γδ γ
1
δ
ˆ
ˆAVAR (γ) E E AVD q q qAR (β)E '−   =   =     ∇ ∇ ∇
 
  [ ]γ δ 1 δδ 1 γδ1q ' q qE E E q−∇ ∇ ′  −   ∇  ∇  
   [ ]γδ δδ 1 γ δ 1 γ 1γ1q q q ' q qE E E ' E −−      −    ∇ ∇∇ ∇ ∇    
    
1 1
γγ γ γ γγq q ' q qE E E
− −∇ ∇ ∇     +      ∇ .  (D-10) 
 
Fortunately, (D-9) and (D-10) can be simplified in a number of ways.  First note that we 
can write 
 
 γ δ 1 γ δ 1q ' q q 'E E[ q | W]E∇ ∇ ∇ ∇   =     
but 
 δ 1 δ 11 δ 12q = q q∇ ∇ +∇  
with 
 
1δ 11 βq [ ln f (I(A 0) | W) 0 0]∇ = ∇ >  
 
 [ ]δ 2 21 I(A 0)q 0 2 ln(A( W β) )W 0∇ = −>  
where 
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I(A 0) [1 I(A 0)]
1 1Λ(W β ) [1 Λ(W β )f (I( | W ]A 0) ) > − >= −>  . 
 
Therefore 
 [ ]
11 β 2δE[ q | W] E[ ln f (I(A 0) | W)] 2E ln(AI(A 0)( Wβ ) | W) W ∇ = ∇ > − >   
 
   = [ 0     0] 
 
because 
1β
E[ ln f (I(A 0) | W )] 0∇ > =  [see (13.20) on p. 477 of Wooldridge (2010)] and,  
[ ]2E ln(AI(A 0)( W β )) W 0|> − =  by design.  Finally, then we get 
 
 γ δ 1q ' qE 0  = ∇ ∇  
 
so 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ]12 δδ 1 δ 1 δ 1 δδ 1 γδ γγ 11 1E E E ED q q ' q q q qE −− − ′   −   = ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇  (D-11) 
      2K×2K           2K×2K        2K×2K    2K×3   3×3 
     2K×3 
 
and 
 
 22 γγ γδ γδ γγ
1 1
ˆ
ˆAVAR(γ) E E AVAR(β) E 'ED q q q q− −       =      ∇ ∇ ∇ = ∇  
                           3×3        3×2K      2K×2K     2K×3        3×3 
 
    
1 1
γγ γ γ γγq q ' q qE E E
− −∇ ∇ ∇     +      ∇ .  (D-12) 
             3×3            3×3          3×3 
           3×3 
so 
 
11 1
(2K 3) (2K
2
12 23) 2
D D
2K 2K 2K 3
D D
3 2K
ˆAVAR(
3 3
θ)
+ × +
 
 × × 
=
 ′
 
× × 
. 
Let’s consider each of the individual components of (D-6) and (D-7) in turn. 
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δ
1
δ 1qE[ ]−∇  
 2K×2K 
 Written out explicitly we have 
 
1 1
2 2
1
β β 11
ββ 1 1
β 12
1
β
E[ q ] 0
q ]
0 E
[
[
E
q ]−
−
−
 ∇
 ∇ =
 ∇ 
.    (D-13) 
Now 
 
1 1
1
1 1β β 1E ˆAV[ ] )q AR(β− = −∇         (D-14) 
  =  the negative of the asymptotic covariance matrix for first   
   stage, first part, logit estimation in the two-stage estimation  
   protocol for θ.  We get an estimate of this directly from the Stata  
   output. 
 
A consistent estimator of 
1 1β β 11
1E[ q ]−∇  is 
 
 

1 1
1
β 1 1β 1
ˆ ˆnAVAR *(βE q ] )[ − = −∇
      (D-15) 
 
where  1ˆAVAR * (β )  is the estimated variance-covariance matrix output by the Stata logit 
procedure.  Also 
 
 
2β 1 22 I(A 0)q 2 ln(A( W W) β )∇ = −>  
 
and 
 
 
2 2β β 12q 2 I(A 0)W W′>∇ = − . 
 
Therefore 
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 [ ]
2 2β β 12E[ q ] I( )2E A 0 W W∇ = − ′> .      (D-16) 
 
A consistent estimator of 
2 2
1
β β 12E[ q ]−∇  is 
 
 { }
2 2
1
n1
β β 12
i1
i i
1
iI(A
1
ˆE[ q ] 0)W W2
n
−
−
=
∑
 ∇ −

>= 

′
 
   { }i
1
n
1
1
i
i
iI(A 0)W Wn 2
−
=
∑
 
= −  
′> .    (D-17) 
 
where 2ˆβ  is the first stage, second part, estimator of 2β  and 1n  is the size of the 
subsample for whom I(A 0) 1> = , so 
 
 
1 1
2 2
β β 11
δδ 1 ββ 1 1
β
1
1
β
1
12
[ qˆE
ˆ ˆE[ E[
ˆE
] 0
q ] q ]
0 [ q ]−
−
− −
 ∇
 ∇ = ∇ =
 ∇ 
. (D-18) 
 
δ 1 δ 1q ' qE ∇ ∇    
        2K×2K 
 
 Written out explicitly we have 
 
 
 
1 1 1 2
2 1 2 2
β 11 β 11 β 11 β 12
β 1 β 1
β 12 β 11 β 12 β 12
E[ q ' q ] E[ q ' q ]
q ' q
E[ q ' q ] E[ q 'E q ]
  =
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ 
∇ ∇  ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇  
.   (D-19) 
 
Because the first stage, first part, estimator of 1β  is MLE we can write 
 
 
1 1 1 1β 11 β 11 β β 11
1
1E[ q ' q ] E[ q ˆA (] VAR β )
−
∇  = ∇ = ∇ −  
   =  the inverse of the asymptotic covariance matrix for first stage,  
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first part, logit estimation in the two-stage estimation 
 protocol for θ.  We get an estimate of this directly from the  
Stata output. 
 
A consistent estimator of 
1 1β 11 β 11E[ q ' q ]∇ ∇  is 
 
 

1 1β 11 β 1
1
1 1
1
ˆAVARˆE[ q ' *(β )
n
q ]
−
 =
 
∇ ∇      (D-20) 
 
where  1ˆAVAR * (β )  is the estimated variance-covariance matrix output by the Stata logit 
procedure.  The remainder of the block elements follow from 
 
 
[ ]
1 1β 11 β 1 1q ln f (I(A 0) | W) I(A 0) W β )] [1[1 Λ( I(A 0)] W β ) WΛ(−∇ = ∇ > = > − − >  
           (D-21) 
 
 
2β 1 22 I(A 0)q 2 ln(A( W W) β )∇ = −> .     (D-22) 
where the formulation of 
1β 11q∇  comes from equation (16.4.8) on p. 350 of Fomby et al. 
(1984) and Λ(  ) denotes the logistic cdf.  The remaining required consistent matrix 
estimators are 
 
 
1 2 1 2
n
β 11 β 12 β 11i β 12i
i 11
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇      (D-23) 
 
 
2 2 2 2
n
β 12 β 12 β 12i β 12i
i 11
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇      (D-24) 
 
where 
 
 
1β 11i i i 1 1i i i
ˆ ˆW β )]qˆ I(A 0)[1 Λ( I(A 0)]Λ([1 W β ) W∇ = > − > − −    (D-25) 
 
117 
and 
 
 
2β 12i i i i i2
ˆI( 0)qˆ 2 A ln(A )( W β ) W∇ = −>      (D-26) 
so 
 [ ] 1 1 1 2
2 1 2 2
β 11 β 11 β 11 β 12
δ 1 δ 1 β 1 β 1
β 12 β 11 β 12 β 12
ˆ ˆE E
ˆ ˆE E
ˆ
[ q ' q ] [ q ' q ]
q ' q q ' q
[ q ˆE ' q ] [ q ' q ]E
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
 ∇ ∇
 = =
∇


 ∇
 . 
           (D-27) 
 
γδqE ∇    
   3×2K 
 
 Written out explicitly we have 
 
 
 γ ω a ν b ζ cq = [( q 0 0) (0 q +0)    (0 0 q )]∇ ∇ + + +∇ + +∇   
 
  ω a ν b ζ c[ q q q ] = ∇ ∇ ∇       
 
  ( ) ( ) ( )2 Ω(β, W) ω  (β, W) ν  (β, W) ζ = − − − V Z   (D-28) 
 
and 
 
1 2
1 2
1
ωβ a ωβ a
γδ νβ b νβ b
ζβ c
E[ q ] E[ q ]
E[ q] = E[ q ] E[ q ]
E[ q ] 0
 ∇ ∇
 
∇ ∇ ∇ 
 ∇  
  
  
1 2
1 2
1
β β
β β
β
E[ Ω] E[ Ω]
= 2 E[ ] E[ ]
E[ ] 0
 ∇ ∇
 
∇ ∇ 
 ∇  
V V
Z
      (D-29) 
 
where 
 
1 1β 1 22Λ(Wβ )λ(Wβ ) exp(Wβ ) WΩ =∇      (D-30) 
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2
2
β 1 2Λ(Wβ ) exp(Wβ )WΩ=∇       (D-31) 
 
1 1β 2λ(W β ) exp(W β ) W∇ =V       (D-32)  
 
2 1β 2Λ(W β ) exp(W β ) W∇ =V       (D-33) 
and  
 
1 1β λ(Wβ ) W∇ =Z .        (D-34) 
Note that 
 aΛ(a) λ(a) Λ(a)[1 Λ(a)]∇ = = −  
 aλ(a) λ(a)[1 2Λ(a)]∇ = − . 
 
The requisite consistent matrix estimators are 
 
 

1 1
n
β β ii 1
ˆE[ Ω] = Ω
=
∑∇ ∇         (D-35) 
 
 

2 2
n
β β ii 1
ˆE[ Ω] = Ω
=
∑∇ ∇         (D-36) 
 
 

1 1
n
β β ii 1
ˆE[ ] =
=
∑∇ ∇V V         (D-37) 
 
 

2 2
n
β β ii 1
ˆE[ ] =
=
∑∇ ∇V V         (D-38) 
 
and 
 
 

1 1
n
β β ii 1
ˆE[ ] =
=
∑∇ ∇Z Z         (D-39) 
 
where  
 

1β i 1 1 2i i ii
ˆ ˆ ˆ2Λ(W β )λ(W β ) exp(W β ) WΩ∇ =
     (D-40) 
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
2β i ii
2
1 2
ˆ ˆΛ(W β ) exp(W β ) WΩ∇ =
      (D-41) 
 

1 1 2β i i ii
ˆ ˆλ(W β ) exp(W β W= )∇ V       (D-42) 
 

1 1 2β i i ii
ˆ ˆΛ(W β ) exp(W β W= )∇ V       (D-43) 
and 
 

1β i ii 1
ˆλ(W β W= )∇ Z
        (D-44) 
so 
 
1 2
1 2
1
β β
γδ β β
β
ˆ ˆE[ Ω] E[ Ω]
ˆ ˆ ˆE[ q] = 2 E[ ] E[ ]
ˆE[ ] 0
 ∇ ∇
 
 ∇ ∇ ∇
 
 ∇ 
V V
Z
.      (D-45) 
 
 
 
γγ
1E[ q]−∇   
    3×3 
 
[ ]
[ ]
ωω a
γγ νν b
ζζ
1
c
1
1
1
qE 0 0
E 0 Eq 0
0 0 E
q
q
−
−
−
−
∇
∇
 
 
   =   
    
∇
∇
    (D-46) 
because ων a ωζ a νω b νζ b ζω c ζν cq q q q q q 0∇ = ∇ = ∇ = ∇ = ∇ = ∇ = .  Now 
 ωω a νν b ζζ cq q q 2∇ = ∇ = ∇ = −  
  
therefore 
  
1
γγ
1 0 0
2
1E 0 0
2
10
q
0
2
−
 
− 
 
   = −   

∇

 
−
  
.     (D-47) 
120 
 
γ γq' qE ∇ ∇    
        3×3 
 Given that 
 ( ) ( ) ( )γ 2 Ω(β, W) ω  (β, W) ν  (β, W) ζq  = − − ∇ − V Z .   (D-48) 
we have 
 
γ γq ' qE ∇ ∇  =   
 
2
2
2
E[(Ω(β, W) ω) E[(Ω(β, W) ω)
E[(Ω(β, W) ω) ] ( (β, S) ζ)]( (β, S) ν)]
E[(Ω(β, W) ω) E[( (β, S) ν)
4 E[( (β, S) ν) ]( (β, S) ν)] ( (β, S) ζ)]
E[(Ω(β, W) ω) E[( (β, S) ν)
E[( (β, S) ζ) ]( (β, S) ζ)] ( (β, S) ζ)]
− − 
− 
−− 
 
−
−
− 
− − 
 
− −
 
−
− − 
ZV
V
V
V Z
V
Z
Z Z
.

  (D-49) 
 
The corresponding consistent estimator is 
 
 
n n n2
i i i i i
i 1 i 1 i 1
n n n2
i i i i i
i 1 i 1 i 1
n n n
i i i i i
i 1 i 1
γ γ
i 1
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(Ω ω) (Ω ω)( ν) (Ω ω)( ζ)
n n n
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆE 4 (Ω ω)( ν) ( ν) ( ν)( ζ)
n n n
1 1 1
ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ(Ω ω)( ζ) ( ν)( ζ) ( ζ)
q ' q
n n n
= = =
= = =
= = =
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∇ ∇
− − − − −
  = − − − − − 
− − − − −
V Z
V V V Z
Z V Z Z
2
.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
            
           (D-50) 
 
Based on (D-8), (D-11) and (D-12) and using the two-stage estimator ˆθ  we can 
consistently estimate (D-7) as 
 
 
 11 12
12 22
ˆ ˆD D
ˆ ˆD D
ˆAVAR(θ)
 
=  
′  
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where 
 
 


1
2
11
1
ˆnAVAR * 0(β )
ˆ ˆAVAR(δ) AVAR(β)
ˆn AVA
ˆD
R *(β )0
 
= 

=

= 

 
 [ ]12 γγ δ 1 δ 1 γγ γδ γ1 1 γ 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆE E E E ED q q ' q q q q− − −′   = ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇   −          
 
 
 
22 γγ γδ
1 1
γδ γγ
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆAVAR(γ) E E AVAR(β) E 'D q Eq q q− −       =       ∇ ∇ ∇ = ∇  
     γγ γ γ γγ
1 1
q q ' q qˆ ˆ ˆE E E
− −∇ ∇ ∇     +      ∇  
 
and using well known results from asymptotic theory for two-stage estimators, we can 
show that41 
 
 

1 1
1 1 2 2 d
2
ˆn (β β )
ˆ ˆn (β β )
ˆAVAR(θ) N(0, I)ˆn (ω ω)
ˆn (ν ν)
ˆn (ζ ζ)
−
 
−
 
− 
 
→
− 
 
− 
 
− 
.      (D-51) 
 
 
************************************************************************ 
ASIDE: 
Notice that the “ n  blow up” is a bit tricky here.  It implements n  for 1ˆβ , ωˆ , νˆ  and ˆζ
; but uses 1n  for 2ˆβ .  We had to do this because we had to use the correct sample size 
                                                 
41Discussions of asymptotic theory for two-stage optimization estimators can be found in 
Newey & McFadden (1994), White (1994, Chapter 6), and Wooldridge (2010, Chapter 
12).    
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(viz., 1n ) for a number of the components of ˆAVAR(θ)  [viz., those that pertained to the 
estimation of 2ˆβ ]; in particular (D-17), (D-23) and (D-24).  For this reason we had to be 
explicit about the denominators in all of the averages for the components of ˆAVAR(θ) .  
This meant that in the construction of the requisite asymptotic t-stats we had to explicitly 
include the “blow-up” in the numerator (i.e., we had to multiply by the square-root of the 
appropriate sample size).  I refer to this as “tricky” because one typically does not have to 
do this.  In the usual asymptotic t-stat construction the denominators of the averages (“n”) 
need not be included in the construction of the asymptotic covariance matrix because it 
typically manifests as a multiplicative factor and, after pulling the diagonal and taking the 
square root to get the standard errors, this multiplicative n  cancels with the “blow-up” 
factor in the numerator.  For example, the asymptotic t-stat of the OLS estimator is 
 
 
 ( ) ( )
k k k k k k k k
1 1 12 2
2 kk kk
kk
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆn (ρ ρ ) n (ρ ρ ) n (ρ ρ ) (ρ ρ )
ˆAVAR(ρ) ˆ ˆn σ σ1
σˆ
n
− − −
− − − −
= = =
′ ′ 
′ 
 
XX X X
X X
  
where 
 n is the sample size 
 kρ  is the coefficient of the kth regressor in the linear regression 
 kρˆ  is its OLS estimator 
 
2
σ
 is the regression error variance estimator 
 X is the matrix of regressors 
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and kk′XX  is the kth diagonal element of ′XX .  Note how the “ n s” simply cancel. 
Note also that what we typically refer to as the “asymptotic standard error” can actually 
be written as the square root of the diagonal element of the consistent estimator of the 
asymptotic covariance matrix divided by n; in other words 
 asy std err =   
ˆAVAR(ρ)
n
.  
************************************************************************   
Now back to the issue at hand.  Moreover 
 
 

P1 P1
1 P2 P21 d
2
ˆn (β β )
ˆ ˆn (β β )
ˆAVAR(τ) n N(0, I)ˆn(ω ω)
ˆn(ν ν)
ˆn (ζ ζ)
−
 
−
 
− 
 
→
− 
 
− 
 
− 
.     (D-52)  
 
where 
 
 
 ˆ
ˆAVAR(τ) ΞAVAR(θ) Ξ '=         (D-53) 
 
and τ and Ξ are defined as in (D-2).  Now combining (D-1) with (D-52) and (D-53) we 
get 
 
 
 ( ) ( )
1 d
MBM PO MBM PO MBM PO2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆavar(η η ) n η η η η N(0, I)
−
 
− − − − →
 
 (D-54) 
 
where 
 
 
 MBM PO
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆavar(η η ) c(τ) AVAR(τ) c(τ) '− =   
124 
and 
 
2
P1
ω
c(τ) ζ 1/ ν ω / ν β
ν
  
= − − −  
  
. 
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Appendix E.   
Asymptotic Distribution (and Standard Error) of UPOηˆ in Eqn (3-10) 
 
We may write UPOηˆ  as 
 
 
UPO
ˆk
ˆ ˆη m
vˆ
= × P  
where 
 
n
i
i 1
1
ˆ
ˆk K(a , W )
n=
∑=  
 
n
i
i 1
1
ˆvˆ = V(a , W )
n=
∑  
 
n
i
i 1
1
mˆ
n=
∑=P P  
 
Using the corresponding consistent estimators for k , v  and  mP say 
 
 1 2 1 1 2 2K(a , W) λ(Wa )exp(Wa )a Λ(Wa )exp(Wa )a= +P P  
 1 2V(a , W) Λ(Wa ) exp(Wa )=   
 
[ ]m E=P P
 
 P is the nominal prices of alcohol 
 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆa [a a ]'′ ′=  (with 1 1 X1ˆ ˆ ˆa = [a a ]′ ′P  and 2 2 X2ˆ ˆ ˆa = [a a ]′ ′P ) is the consistent  
  estimate of the parameter vector 1 2a [a a ]'′ ′=  (with 1 1 X1a = [a a ]′ ′P  and  
  2 2 X2a = [a a ])′ ′P )  [the parameters of equation (3-10)] obtained via the  
  two-part protocol culminating in (3-8) using nominal prices of alcohol]  
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and  
 i i iW [ X ]= P  denotes the observation on W [ X]= P  for the ith individual in  
 the sample (i = 1, ..., n).   
Let ˆ ˆˆ ˆγ = [k v   m ]′P  and γ = [k v   m ]′P , where  
 
ˆplim[γ] = γ .  If we could show that 
 
 
1 d
2
ˆ ˆAVAR(γ) n (γ γ) N(0, I)− − →  
 
where the formulation of ˆAVAR(γ)  is known, then we could apply the δ-method to 
obtain the asymptotic variance of UPOηˆ  as 
 
 
UPO
ˆ ˆavar(η ) c(γ) AVAR(γ) c(γ) '=  
 
where 2c(γ) [m / v km / v      k / v  ]= −P P .  Moreover, if we have a consistent 
estimator for ˆAVAR(γ) , say ˆAVAR(γ)  [i.e. ˆ ˆp lim AVAR(γ) AVAR(γ)  =
 
],  then we 
could consistently estimate UPOˆavar(η ) as 
 
 
 UPO
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆavar(η ) c(γ) AVAR(γ) c(γ) '= .      (E-1) 
 
We focus, therefore, on finding the asymptotic distribution of γˆ  and, in particular, the 
formulation of its asymptotic covariance matrix. 
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 First, let θ = [δ γ ]′ ′ ′  where 1 2δ [a a ]'′ ′= , γ [k v    m ]′ = P  (recall, 
1 1 X1a = [a a ]′ ′P  and 2 2 X2a = [a a ]′ ′P ), and note that γˆ  can be viewed as the second 
stage estimator in the following two-stage protocol  
 
First Stage 
Consistently estimate δ  via the following optimization estimator 
 
 
n
1 i
i 1
δ
q (δ, S )
ˆδ = arg max
n
=
∑


       (E-2) 
where  
 1 i 11 1 i 12 2 iq (δ, S ) q (a , S ) q (a , S )= +    
 11 1 i i i 1 i i 1q (a , S ) I(A 0) ln[Λ(W a )] [1 I(A 0)] ln[1 Λ(W a )]= > + − > −    
 ( )( )212 2 i i i i 2q (a , S ) I(A 0) A exp W a= − > −   
 i i i iS [A X ]= P
 
 
 
1 2δ [a a ]'′ ′=   , 1 1 X1δ = [a a ]′ ′  P and 2 2 X2a = [a a ]′ ′  P ,  1 2ˆ ˆ ˆδ [a a ]'′= , 1 1 X1ˆ ˆ ˆa = [a a ]′ ′P  and 
2 2 X2ˆ ˆ ˆa = [a a ]′ ′P . 
 
Second Stage 
Consistently estimate γ   via the following optimization estimator 
 
 
n
i
i 1
γ
ˆq(δ, γ,  S )
γˆ = arg max
n
=
∑


       (E-3) 
where 
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 i a i b i c i
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆq(δ, γ,  S ) q (δ, k,  S ) q (δ, v,  S ) q (δ, m ,  S )= + +   P  
 
2
a i i
ˆ
ˆq (δ, k,  S ) (K(a, W ) k)= − −   
 
2
b i i
ˆ
ˆq (δ, v,  S ) (V(α, W ) v)= − −   
 
2
c i i
ˆq (δ, m ,  S ) ( m )= − − P PP    
 
and ˆδ  is the first stage estimator of δ .  Use 1q  as shorthand notation for 
  
 1 11 1 12 2q (δ, S) q (a , S) q (a , S)= +  
 
with 
 
 11 1 1 1q (a , S) I(A 0) ln[Λ(Wa )] [1 I(A 0)]ln[1 Λ(Wa )]= > + − > −  
 ( )( )212 2 2q (a , S) I(A 0) A exp W a= − > −  
 S [A X ]= P . 
 
Moreover, use q as shorthand notation for  
 
 a b cq(δ,γ,  S) q (δ, k,  S) q (δ, v,  S) q (δ,m ,  S)= + + P  
with 
 
2
aq (δ, k,  S) (K(α, W) k)= − −  
 
2
bq (δ, v,  S) (V(a , W) v)= − −  
 
2
cq (δ, m ,  S) ( m )= − −P PP   
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and let ˆAVAR(δ)  denote the asymptotic covariance matrix of the first stage estimator.42  
Using well known results from asymptotic theory for two-stage estimators, we can show 
that43 
 
1 d
2
ˆ ˆAVAR(γ) n (γ γ) N(0, I)− − →       (E-4) 
 
where,  ˆplim(γ) = γ  
 
 
δ δ
1
γγ γ γq q qˆˆAVAR (γ) E E AVAR (a)E
−  ′     =     ∇ ∇ ∇  
  [ ]δ 1 δδγ 1 δ1 γq ' q qE E E q−∇ ∇ ′  −   ∇  ∇  
   [ ]δ δδ 1 11γ γ 1 γδ γqE E E Eq q ' q q −−∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ′     −       ∇    
    
1 1
γγ γ γ γγq q ' q qE E E
− −∇ ∇ ∇     +      ∇ .  (E-5) 
 
Fortunately, (E-5) can be simplified in a number of ways.  Note that we can write 
 
 δ 1 γγ δ 1q ' q qE E | WE ' [ q ]∇ ∇ ∇ ∇   =     
but 
 δ 1 δ 11 δ 12q = q q∇ ∇ +∇  
with 
                                                 
42
 Note that a consistent estimate ˆAVAR(δ)  can be obtained from the packaged output 
for the first stage estimator because the first stage estimator is unaffected by the fact that 
it is a component of a two-stage estimator.  
43Discussions of asymptotic theory for two-stage optimization estimators can be found in 
Newey & McFadden (1994), White (1994, Chapter 6), and Wooldridge (2010, Chapter 
12).    
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1δ 11 aq [ ln f (I(A 0) | W) 0 ]∇ = ∇ >  
 
 ( )( ) ( )2δ 212 I(A 0) A exp Wa exp Waq W0 2 ∇ = > −   
where 
 
I(A 0) [1 I(A 0)]
1 1Λ(Wa ) [1 Λ(Wa )f (I( | W ]A 0) ) > − >= −>  . 
 
Therefore 
 
( )( ) ( )1a 2 2δ 1 IE[ q | W] E[ ln f (I(A 0) | W) (A 0) A exp Wa exp Wa | W2E W] >  ∇ = ∇ >   − 
 
 
   = [ 0     0] 
 
because 
1a
E[ ln f (I(A 0) | W )] 0∇ > =  [see (13.20) on p. 477 of Wooldridge (2010)] and,  
( )( ) ( )2 2I(A 0) A exp Wa exp Wa | WE 0  = > −  by design.  Finally, then we get 
 
 γ δ 1q ' qE 0  = ∇ ∇  
 
so 
 
 γγ γδ γδ γ
1
γ
1
ˆAVAR( ) E E Aγˆ q VAR(a) Eq q 'E q− −∇ ∇ ∇ ∇       =          
                 3×3        3×2K      2K×2K     2K×3        3×3 
 
    
1 1
γγ γ γ γγq q ' q qE E E
− −∇ ∇ ∇     +      ∇ .  (E-6) 
             3×3            3×3          3×3 
 
 
Let’s consider each of the individual components of (E-6) in turn. 
 
δ
1
δ 1qE[ ]−∇  
 2K×2K 
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 Written out explicitly we have 
 
1 1
2 2
1
a a 11
aa 1 1
a 12
1
a
E[ q ] 0
q ]
0 E
[
[
E
q ]−
−
−
 ∇
 ∇ =
 ∇ 
.    (E-7) 
Now 
 
1 1
1
1 1a a 1E ˆAV[ ] )q AR(a− = −∇         (E-8) 
  =  the negative of the asymptotic covariance matrix for first   
   stage, first part, logit estimation in the two-stage estimation  
   protocol for θ.  We get an estimate of this directly from the Stata  
   output. 
 
A consistent estimator of 
1 1a a 11
1E[ q ]−∇  is 
 
 

1 1
1
a 1 1a 1
ˆ
ˆnAVAR *(aE q ] )[ − = −∇
      (E-9) 
 
where  1ˆAVAR * (a )  is the estimated variance-covariance matrix output by the Stata logit 
procedure.  Also 
 
 ( )( ) ( )2a 12 2 2I(A 0) A exp Wa expq 2 Wa W∇ > −=  
 
and 
 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2a a 212 2I(A 0) A exp Wa exp Wa exp Wa Wq W2   ′> − − ∇ = . 
 
Therefore 
 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )2 2a a 12 2 2 2I(A 0) A exp Wa exp Wa exp Wa W[ 2E WE q ]   ′> − −  ∇ =   .   
           (E-10) 
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A consistent estimator of 
2 2
1
a a 12E[ q ]−∇  is 
 
2 2
1
a a 12
ˆE[ q ]−∇
          
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }i i i 2 i 2 i 2 i i 1n1
i 1
ˆ ˆ ˆI(A 0) A exp W a exp Wn a exp W a W W2
−
=
∑   =  
′
− 
> −    
           (E-11) 
where 1n  is the size of the subsample for whom I(A 0) 1> = , so 
 
 
1 1
2 2
1
a1 1
aa
a
a 11
δδ 1 1 1
a 12
[ qˆE
ˆ ˆE[ E[
ˆE
] 0
q ] q ]
0 [ q ]−
−
− −
 ∇
 ∇ = ∇ =
 ∇ 
.   (E-12) 
  
 δ 1 δ 1q ' qE ∇ ∇    
        2K×2K 
 
 Written out explicitly we have 
 
 
 [ ] 1 1 1 2
2 1 2 2
a 11 a 11 a 11 a 12
a 1 a 1
a 12 a 11 a 1 2a2 1
E[ q ' q ] E[ q ' q ]
q ' q
E[ q ' q ] E[ q ' q ]E =
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ 
∇ ∇  ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇  
.             (E-13) 
 
Because the first stage, first part, estimator of 1α  is MLE we can write 
 
 [ ]
1 1 1 1a 11 a 11 a a
1
111E[ q ' q ] E[ ˆAVARq ] (a ) −∇ ∇ − ∇ ==  
   =  the inverse of the asymptotic covariance matrix for first stage,  
   first part, logit estimation in the two-stage estimation protocol for  
   θ.  We  get an estimate of this directly from the Stata output. 
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A consistent estimator of 
1 1a 11 a 11E[ q ' q ]∇ ∇  is 
 
 

1 1a 11 a 1
1
1 1
1
ˆAVARˆE[ q ' *(a )
n
q ]
−
 =
 
∇ ∇                (E-14) 
 
where  1ˆAVAR * (a )  is the estimated variance-covariance matrix output by the Stata logit 
procedure.  The remainder of the block elements follow from 
 
 
[ ]
1 1a 11 a 1 1q ln f (I(A 0) | W) I(A 0) Wa )] [1[1 Λ( I(A 0)] Wa ) WΛ(−∇ = ∇ > = > − − >  
                       
           (E-15) 
 
 ( )( ) ( )2a 12 2 2I(A 0) A exp Wa expq 2 Wa W∇ > −= .                (E-16) 
 
where the formulation of 
1 1a 1q∇  comes from equation (16.4.8) on p. 350 of Fomby et al. 
(1984) and Λ(  ) denotes the logistic cdf.  The remaining required consistent matrix 
estimators are: 
 
 
1 2 1 2
n
11 12 11i 12i
i 11
a a a a
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇                (E-17) 
 
2 2 2 2
n
12 12 12i 12i
i 11
a a a a
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇                (E-18) 
 
where 
 
 [ ]
1a 1 111i i i i i i
ˆ ˆW a )qˆ I(A 0)[1 Λ( I(A 0)]Λ] [1 W a W( )∇ = > − >−−    (E-19) 
 
and 
 
 ( )( ) ( )2 i i 2a 12i i ii 2ˆ ˆI( 0) Aqˆ 2 exp W a exp W WA a> −∇ =     (E-20) 
so 
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 [ ] [ ] 1 1 1 2
2 1 2 2
a 11 a 11 a 11 a 12
δ 1 δ 1 a 1 a 1
a 12 a 11 a 12 12a
[ q ' q ] [ q ' q ]
q ' q q ' q
[ q ' q ]
ˆ ˆE E
[ q ' q ]
ˆ ˆE E
ˆ ˆE E
=
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
 ∇ ∇
=
∇ ∇ 
. (E-21) 
 
γδqE ∇    
   3×2K 
 
 Written out explicitly we have 
 
 
 γ k a v b m cq = [( q 0 0) (0 q +0) (0 0 q )]∇ ∇ + + +∇ + + ∇ P   
 
  k a v b m c[ q q q ] = ∇ ∇ ∇ P       
 
  ( ) ( ) i2 K(a, W) k   V(a, W) v    ( m )= − − −  PP     (E-22) 
 
and 
 
 
1 2
1 2
1 2
ka a ka a
γδ va b va b
m a c cam
E[ q ] E[ q ]
E[ q] = E[ q ] E[ q ]
E[ q ] E[ q ]
 ∇ ∇
 
∇ ∇ ∇ 
 ∇ ∇  P P
  
  
1 2
1 2
a
a
a
a
E[ K] E[ K]
= 2 E[ V] E[ V]
0 0
∇ ∇ 
 ∇ ∇ 
 
 
                (E-23) 
where 
 
1 1 1 1a 1 2{λ(Wa )[1 2Λ(Wa )]a W λ(Wa )[1 0 ... 0]}exp(WaK )= − +∇ P  
        1 2 2λ(Wa )exp(Wa )a W+ P  
  [ ]1 2 1 1 2λ(Wa )exp(Wa ) {[1 2Λ(Wa )]a + a }W [1 0 ... 0]= − +P P   (E-24) 
 
2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2a λ(Wa ) exp(Wa ) a W + Λ(Wa ){exp(Wa )a W exp(Wa )[1 0 .K .. 0]}= +∇ P P  
  [ ]2 1 1 1 2 1exp(Wa ) {λ(Wa )a + Λ(Wa )a }W Λ(Wa )[1 0 ... 0]= +P P .    (E-25) 
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1 1a 2λ(Wa )exp(Wa ) WV∇ =                   (E-26)  
and 
 
2 1a 2Λ(Wa )exp(Wa ) WV∇ = .                 (E-27) 
 
The following equalities were used in deriving the above results 
 
 aΛ(a) λ(a) Λ(a)[1 Λ(a)]∇ = = −  
 aλ(a) λ(a)[1 2Λ(a)]∇ = − . 
 
The requisite consistent matrix estimators are 
 
 

1 1
n
a a ii 1
ˆE[ K] = K
=
∑∇ ∇            (E-28) 
 

2 2
n
a a ii 1
ˆE[ K] = K
=
∑∇ ∇                   (E-29) 
 

1 1
n
a a ii 1
ˆE[ V] = V
=
∑∇ ∇                   (E-30) 
and 
 
 

2 2
n
a a ii 1
ˆE[ V] = V
=
∑∇ ∇                   (E-31) 
 
where  
 
 [ ]
1 1a i i i i2 1i 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆλ(W a )exp(W a ) {[1 2Λ(W a )]a + a }W [1 0 ...K 0]= +∇ − P P   (E-32) 
 
 [ ]
2 2a i i i i1 1 i1 2 1i
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆexp(W a ) {λ(W a )a + Λ(W a )a }W Λ(W a )[1 0 ... 0]= +∇ P PK (E-33) 
 

1 1 2a i i ii
ˆ ˆλ(W a )exp(WV a= ) W∇
      (E-34) 
and 
 

1 1 2a i i ii
ˆ ˆΛ(W a )exp(WV a= ) W∇
                (E-35) 
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so 
 
 
1 2
1 2
a a
γδ a a
ˆ ˆE[ K] E[ K]
ˆ ˆ ˆE[ q] = 2 E[ V] E[ V]
0 0
 ∇ ∇
 
 ∇ ∇ ∇
 
 
 
.                (E-36) 
 
 
 
γγ
1E[ q]−∇   
    3×3 
 
[ ]
[ ]
1
1 1
kk a
γγ vv b
m m c
1
E 0 0
E 0 E 0
q0
q
q
E
q
0
−
−
−
−
 
 
 
∇
∇ ∇
∇
 =   
  
  P P
             (E-37) 
because kv a vk b km a vm b m k c m v cq q q q q q 0∇ = ∇ = ∇ = ∇ = ∇ = ∇ =P P P P .  Now 
 
 kk a vv b m m cq q q 2∇ = ∇ = ∇ = −P P   
therefore 
 
1
γγ
1 0 0
2
1E 0 0
2
10
q
0
2
−
 
− 
 
   = −   

∇

 
−
  
.                (E-38) 
 
 
γ γq' qE ∇ ∇    
        3×3 
 Given that 
 
 [ ]iγ 2 (K(a, W) k) (V(a, W) v) ( m )q∇ = − − − PP .             (E-39) 
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we have 
γ γq ' qE ∇ ∇  =   
2
2
2
E[(K(a, W) k)E[(K(a, W) k)
E[(K(a, W) k) ] ( m ))](V(a, W) v)]
E[(V(a, W) v)E[(K(a, W) k)
4 E[(V(a, W) v) ] ( m )](V(a, W) v)]
E[(K(a, W) k) E[(V(a, W) ν)
E[( m ) ]( m )] ( m )]
−− 
− 
−− 
 
−−
− 
−− 
 
− −
 −
− −  
P
P
P
P P
P
P
P
P P
.  
                             (E-40) 
 
The corresponding consistent estimator is 
 
 
n n ni2 i
i
i 1 i 1 i 1 ii
n n ni 2 i
γ γ i
i 1 i 1 i 1 ii
n i
i 1 i
ˆˆ ˆˆ(K k) (K k)1 1 1
ˆˆ(K k)
ˆn n n ˆ( m )ˆ(V v)
ˆˆ ˆ(K k) ˆ(V v)1 1 1
ˆ ˆ
ˆE 4 (V vq ' )
ˆn n n ˆ( m )ˆ(V v)
ˆˆ(K k)1
n ˆ( )
q
m
= = =
= = =
=
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑
   
−
−
−      
−
−   
   −
−
  = −       
−
−   
 
−

− 
∇


∇
P
P
P
P
P
P
n n 2i
i
i 1 i 1i
ˆ
ˆ(V v)1 1
ˆ( m )
n nˆ( m )= =∑ ∑
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
− 
−    
−   
P
P
P
P
. 
                       
           (E-41) 
 
 
Based on the above results, we can consistently estimate (E-5) as 
 
 
 
 1 1
γγ γ γ γδ δ γ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆˆAVAR(γ) E E Aq q qVAR(a) qE E− −′    ∇   =     ∇ ∇ ∇   
     
1 1
γγ γ γ γγq q ' q qˆ ˆ ˆE E E
− −∇ ∇ ∇     +      ∇  
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and using well known results from asymptotic theory for two-stage estimators, we can 
show that44 
 
 

1 d
2
ˆ ˆAVAR(γ) n (γ γ) N(0, I)− − → .                 (E-42) 
 
Combining (E-42) with (E-1) we also have that 
 
 

1 d
UPO UPO UPO2
ˆ ˆavar(η ) n (η η ) N(0, I)
−
− →                 (E-43) 
 
where UPOˆavar(η )  is given in (E-1). 
 
 
  
                                                 
44Discussions of asymptotic theory for two-stage optimization estimators can be found in 
Newey & McFadden (1994), White (1994, Chapter 6), and Wooldridge (2010, Chapter 
12).    
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Appendix F.   
Bias from Using ALηˆ Instead of UPOηˆ  in a Model of Alcohol Demand 
 
As we saw in section 2.2 of Chapter 3, in the AGG-LOG framework the elasticity 
measure is defined as AL Pη pi= in equation (3-4) rewritten here for convenience  
  P Xln(A) Ppi Xpi ξ= + +          (F-1) 
where A  is the average per-capita consumption of alcohol from aggregated data, P  is 
log of average price of alcohol from aggregated data and X  is the vector of average 
values of observable confounders.  The corresponding consistent elasticity estimator, Ppˆi , 
is the OLS estimator of Ppi  in (F-1).  Using (3-10), we can then write the difference 
between ALη  and UPOη  as 
    [AL UPO P 1 X1 2 X 2 1η η pi E λ( a Xa ) exp( a Xa ) a− = − + +P P PP P     
      ]1 X1 2 X2 2Λ( a Xa )exp( a Xa )a+ + +P P PP P     
       
[ ]
[ ]1 X1 2 X2
E
E Λ( a Xa ) exp( a Xa )× + +P P
P
P P
 
   
     
 [P 1 X1 1 X1 2 X2 1pi E Λ( a Xa )[1 Λ( a Xa )]exp( a Xa )a= − + − + +P P P PP P P     
       ]1 X1 2 X2 2Λ( a Xa ) exp( a Xa )a+ + +P P PP P     
        
[ ]
[ ]1 X1 2 X2
E
E Λ( a Xa ) exp( a Xa )× + +P P
P
P P
. (F-2) 
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If we define 
 1 2v E[Λ(Wa )exp(Wa )]≡        (F-3) 
 
2
1 2u E[Λ(W a ) exp(W a )]≡        (F-4) 
 [ ]m E=P P  
and 
 [ ]W     X= P   
 
then (F-2) can be written 
   
 
AL UPO 1
P
[(v u) a va ]m
η η pi
v
− +
− = −
P P2 P
    
   P 1
u
pi 1 a a m
v
  
= − − +  
  
P P2 P  .  
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Appendix G.   
Asymptotic Distribution (and Standard Error) of AL UPOˆ ˆη η−   
 
In Appendix F we showed that 
 
 
AL UPO
P 1
u
η η pi 1 a a m
v
  
− = − − +  
  
P P2 P  
 
 1 2v E[Λ(Wa )exp(Wa )]≡  
 
2
1 2u E[Λ(Wa ) exp(Wa )]≡  
 [ ]m E=P P  
and 
 [ ]W     X= P .  
 
Using the corresponding consistent estimators for u ,  v  and  mP  say 
 
n
i
i 1
1
ˆvˆ = V(a , W )
n=
∑  
 
n
i
i 1
1
ˆuˆ U(a , W )
n=
∑=  
and 
 
n
i
i 1
1
mˆ
n=
∑=P P  
where 
 1 2V(a , W) Λ(Wa )exp(Wa )=    
142 
 
2
1 2U(a , W) Λ(Wa ) exp(Wa )=  
 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆa [a a ]'′ ′=  (with 1 1 X1ˆ ˆ ˆa = [a a ]′ ′P  and 2 2 X2ˆ ˆ ˆa = [a a ]′ ′P ) is the consistent  
  estimate of the parameter vector 1 2a [a a ]'′ ′=  (with 1 1 X1a = [a a ]′ ′P  and  
  2 2 X2a = [a a ])′ ′P ) [the parameters of equations (3-6) and (3-7),  
  respectively] obtained via the unrestricted two-part protocol culminating  
  in (3-8) . 
 
 and  
 i i iW [ X ]= P  denotes the observation on W [ X]= P  for the ith individual in  
 the sample (i = 1, ..., n) 
we can write 
 
 
AL UPO
P 1
uˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆη η pi 1 a a m
vˆ
  
− = − − +  
  
P P2 P  
with 
 
ˆ ˆpi [pi ]'′=
 ( P Xˆ ˆ ˆpi = [pi pi ]′ ′ ) is the OLS estimate of the parameter vector    
  
pi [pi ]'′=
 ( P Xpi = [pi pi ]′ ′ ) – the vector of parameters in (3-3)]. 
  
Let P 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆτ = [pi a a u v m ]′P P P  and P 1 2τ = [pi a a u v m ]′P P P , where 
ˆplim[τ] = τ .  If we could show that 
 
 
1 d
2
ˆ ˆAVAR(τ) n (τ τ) N(0, I)− − →  
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where the formulation of ˆAVAR(τ)  is known, then we could apply the δ-method to 
obtain the asymptotic variance of AL UPOˆ ˆη η−  as 
 
 
AL UPO
ˆ ˆ ˆavar(η η ) c(τ) AVAR(τ) c(τ) '− =
 
 
with 
 
2
1 1 1 2
u u
c(τ) 1 m 1 m  m a / v m a u / v    1 a a  
v v
     
= − − − − − − +     
     
P P P P P P P P    .  
Moreover, if we have a consistent estimator for ˆAVAR(τ) , say ˆAVAR(τ)  [i.e. 
ˆ
ˆp lim AVAR(τ) AVAR(τ)  =
 
],  then we could consistently estimate AL UPOˆ ˆavar(η η )− as 
 
 
 AL UPO
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆavar(η η ) c(τ) AVAR(τ) c(τ) '− = .     (G-1) 
 
We focus, therefore, on finding the asymptotic distribution of τˆ  and, in particular, the 
formulation of its asymptotic covariance matrix. 
 First note that we can write τ as  
 
 
τ Ξ θ=
          (G-2) 
 
where θ = [δ γ ]′ ′ ′ , 1 2δ [pi    a a ]'′ ′ ′= , γ [u v   m ]′ = P  (recall, P Xpi = [pi pi ]′ ′ , 
1 1 X1a = [a a ],′ ′P   and  2 2 X2a = [a a ]′ ′P .  
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P
1
2
pi
a
a
3,3K 3
Ξ
0 I
 
 
− − − − − − − − 
 
 
 = − − − − − − − −
 
 
 
− − − − − − − −
 
  



P
P
  
 
a is the unit row vector with the value “1” in the element position corresponding to the 
element position of a in the vector θ, b,c0  is the matrix of zeros whose row and column 
dimensions are b and c, respectively, dI  is the identity matrix of order d, and K is the 
column dimension of W.  For future reference, let’s set the following vector/matrix 
dimensions: 
 
 1a is K×1 
 2a is K×1 
 pi is K×1 
 W  is 1×K 
 τ is 6×1 
 c(τ) is 1×6 
 δ  is 3K×1 
 γ is 3×1 
 θ is (3K+3)×1 
 Ξ  is 6×(3K+3) 
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1a

P
is 1×(3K+3) 
   
Clearly then  
 
  
ˆ
ˆAVAR(τ) Ξ AVAR(θ) Ξ′=
       (G-3) 
 
where ˆθ  is the estimator of θ obtained from the following two-stage protocol. 
 
First Stage 
Consistently estimate δ via the following optimization estimator 
 
 
n
1 i
i 1
δ
q (δ, S )
ˆδ = arg max
n
=
∑


       (G-4) 
where  
 1 i 11 i 12 1 i 13 2 iq (δ, S ) q (pi, S ) q (a , S ) q (a , S )= + +
 
  
 
 
2
11 i i iq (pi, S ) (ln(A ) W pi)= − −     
 
 12 1 i i i 1 i i 1q (a , S ) I(A 0) ln[Λ(W a )] [1 I(A 0)]ln[1 Λ(W a )]= > + − > −

  
 
 ( )( )213 2 i i i i 2q (a , S ) I(A 0) A exp W a= − > −   
 
 W P    X =       
 
 i i i iS [A X P ]=  for 11q , and i i i iS [A X ]=

P
 for 12q  and 13q   
 
1 2δ [pi    a a ] '′ ′ ′=   , 1 1 X1a = [a a ]′ ′  P , 2 2 X2a = [a a ]′ ′  P  and  
 
 1P Xpi [pi pi ]′=  
 
and 1 2
ˆ
ˆ ˆˆδ [pi    a a ]'′ ′ ′=   .  
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Second Stage 
Consistently estimate γ via the following optimization estimator 
 
 
n
i
i 1
γ
ˆq(δ, γ,  S )
γˆ = arg max
n
=
∑


       (G-5) 
where 
 i a i b i c i
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆq(δ, γ,  S ) q (δ, u,  S ) q (δ, v,  S ) q (δ, m ,  S )= + +    P  
 
2
a i i
ˆ ˆq (δ, u,  S ) (U(δ, W ) u)= − −   
 
2
b i i
ˆ ˆq (δ, v,  S ) (V(δ, W ) v)= − −   
 
2
c i i
ˆq (δ, m ,  S ) ( m )= − − P PP    
1 2
ˆ
ˆ ˆˆδ [pi    a a ]'′ ′ ′=
 is the first stage estimator of δ  , 1 1 X1ˆ ˆ ˆa = [a a ]′ ′P  and 
 2 2 X2ˆ ˆ ˆa = [a a ]′ ′P .  Use 1q  as shorthand notation for 
  
 1 11 12 1 13 2q (δ, S) q (pi, S) q (a , S) q (a , S) = + +
 
 
 
where 
 
 
2
11q (pi, S) (ln(A) Wpi)= − −   
 
 12 1 1 1q (a , S) I(A 0)ln[Λ(Wa )] [1 I(A 0)]ln[1 Λ(Wa )]= > + − > −

 
 ( )( )213 2 2q (a , S) I(A 0) A exp Wa= − > −  
 
S [A X P]=
 for 11q  , and S [A X ]=

P  for 12q  and 13q ,  
 
and use q as shorthand notation for  
 
 a b cq(δ,γ,  S) q (δ, u,  S) q (δ, v,  S) q (δ,m ,  S)= + + P  
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where 
 
2
aq (δ, u,  S) (U(a , W) u)= − −  
 
2
bq (δ, v,  S) (V(a , W) v)= − −  
 
2
cq (δ, m ,  S) ( m )= − −P PP    
 
with ˆAVAR(δ)  being the asymptotic covariance matrix of the first stage estimator.45  
Using well known results from asymptotic theory for two-stage estimators, we can show 
that46 
 
 
1 d
2ˆ ˆAVAR(θ) n (θ θ) N(0, I)− − →       (G-6) 
 
where ˆˆ ˆθ = [δ γ ]′ ′ ′ ,  ˆplim(θ) = θ  
 
 
11 12
12 22
D D
D D
ˆAVAR(θ)  =  
′ 
       (G-7) 
 
 11
ˆAVAD R(δ)=
        (G-8) 
  3K×3K 
 [ ]12 δδ 1 δ 1 γ γγ 11E ED q q ' q E q −−= ∇ ∇ ∇      ∇  
  
[ ] [ ] [ ]δδ 1 δ 1 δ 1 δδ 1 γ1 γ1 δ 1γE q q ' q q q qE E E E −− −∇ ∇ ′   − ∇ ∇   ∇ ∇  (G-9) 
                                                 
45
 Note that a consistent estimate ˆAVAR(δ)  can be obtained from the packaged output 
for the first stage estimator because the first stage estimator is unaffected by the fact that 
it is a component of a two-stage estimator.  
46Discussions of asymptotic theory for two-stage optimization estimators can be found in 
Newey & McFadden (1994), White (1994, Chapter 6), and Wooldridge (2010, Chapter 
12).    
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 22 γγ γδ γ
1
δ
ˆAVAR(γ) E E AVAR( )E 'ˆD q q δ q−   =   =     ∇ ∇ ∇
 
  [ ]γ δ 1 δδ 1 γδ1q ' q qE E E q−∇ ∇ ′  −   ∇  ∇  
   [ ]γδ δδ 1 γ δ 1 γ 1γ1q q q ' q qE E E ' E −−      −    ∇ ∇∇ ∇ ∇    
    
1 1
γγ γ γ γγq q ' q qE E E
− −∇ ∇ ∇     +      ∇ .            (G-10) 
 
Fortunately, (G-9) and (G-10) can be simplified in a number of ways.  First note that we 
can write 
 
 γ δ 1 γ δ 1q ' q q 'E E[ q | W]E∇ ∇ ∇ ∇   =     
but 
 δ 1 δ 11 δ 12 δ 13q = q q q∇ ∇ + ∇ + ∇  
with 
 δ 11 ( W pi)Wq 2 ln(A )      0 0 ∇ = −    
 
1δ 12 aq [0 ln f (I(A 0) | W) 0]∇ = ∇ >  
 
 ( )( ) ( )2δ 213 0 I(A 0) A exp Wa exp Waq W0 2 ∇ = > −   
where 
 
I(A 0) [1 I(A 0)]
1 1Λ(W a ) [1 Λ(Wa )f (I( | W ]A 0) ) > − >= −>  . 
 
Therefore 
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( )( ) ( )
1a
2
δ
2
1
2E ln(A )
E[ q | W,W] E[ ln f (I(A 0) |
( W pi) | W W
I(A 0) A exp Wa exp Wa
W)]
E | W W2
′  −  
 ∇ = ∇ >
 
    > −
 
 
   = [ 0     0     0] 
 
because 
1a
E[ ln f (I(A 0) | W)] 0∇ > =  [see (13.20) on p. 477 of Wooldridge (2010)],  
( )( ) ( )2 2I(A 0) A exp Wa exp Wa | WE 0  = > −  , and ( W pi) | WE ln(A ) 0 − =    by 
design.47  Finally, then we get 
 
 γ δ 1q ' qE 0  = ∇ ∇  
 
so 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ]12 δδ 1 δ 1 δ 1 δδ 1 γδ γγ 11 1E E E ED q q ' q q q qE −− − ′   −   = ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇           (G-11) 
      3K×3K           3K×3K        3K×3K    3K×3          3×3 
     3K×3 
 
and 
 
 22 γγ γδ γδ γγ
1 1
ˆ
ˆAVAR(γ) E E AVAR(δ) E 'ED q q q q− −       =      ∇ ∇ ∇ = ∇  
                           3×3        3×3K      3K×3K     3K×3        3×3 
 
    
1 1
γγ γ γ γγq q ' q qE E E
− −∇ ∇ ∇     +      ∇ .            (G-12) 
             3×3            3×3          3×3 
           3×3 
so 
                                                 
47
 The last result warrants some discussion.  We are assuming here that the correct model 
specification is the unrestricted two-part model detailed in (3-5) through (3-7).  We also 
assume that, although (3-4) is not correctly specified in a causal sense, it can, nonetheless 
be viewed as a “best predictor” model in which the best predictor (the conditional mean 
of (ln(A) | P, X) is assumed to be equal to p XW pi Ppi Xpi= + .  This implies that 
( W pi) | WE ln(A ) 0 − =  . 
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11 1
(3K 3) (3K
2
12 23) 2
D D
3K 3K 3K 3
D D
3 3K
ˆAVAR(
3 3
θ)
+ × +
 
 × × 
=
 ′
 
× × 
. 
Let’s consider each of the individual components of (G-9) and (G-10) in turn. 
 
 
 
 
1
δ 1δ qE[ ]−∇  
 3K×3K 
 Written out explicitly we have 
 
1 1
2 2
1
pipi 11
δδ 1 a 1
1 1
a 2
1
a a 13
E[ q ] 0 0
q ] 0 E[ q ] 0
0 0
[
E[ q ]
E
−
−
− −
 ∇
 
 ∇ = ∇
 
 ∇ 
.            (G-13) 
Now 
 
 pi 11q 2 ln(A)( Wpi)W∇ = −  
 
and 
 
 pipi 11q W2 W∇ = ′− . 
Therefore 
 
 pipi 11E[ q ] E W W2  ∇ = −  ′  .                 (G-14) 
 
 
A consistent estimator of 1pipi 11E[ q ]−∇  is 
 
 { }
1
n1
pipi 11
i 12
i i
1
ˆE[ ] 2
n
Wq W
−
−
=
∑ ′
 ∇ = − 
 
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   { }i
1
n
2
i
i
1
W Wn 2
−
=
∑
 
=   
′
− .               (G-15) 
 
where pˆi  is the OLS estimator of  pi  in the AGG-LOG model and 2n  is the size of the 
aggregated sample.  Similarly, 
  
 
1 1
1
1 1aa 2E ˆAV[ ] )q AR(a− = −∇                   (G-16) 
  =  the negative of the asymptotic covariance matrix for first stage, first  
   part, logit estimation of  1α  in the unrestricted two-part estimation  
   protocol culminating in (14).  We get an estimate of this directly  
   from the Stata output. 
 
A consistent estimator of 
1 1 2a a 1
1E[ q ]−∇  is 
 
 

1 1
1
1a 1a 2
ˆ
ˆnAVAR *(aE q ] )[ − = −∇
                (G-17) 
 
where  1ˆAVAR *(a )  is the estimated variance-covariance matrix output by the Stata logit 
procedure.  Also 
 
 ( )( ) ( )2 13a 2 2I(A 0) A exp Wa expq 2 Wa W∇ > −=  
 
and 
 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )2 2a 2a 213 2I(A 0) A exp Wa exp Wa exp Wa W Wq 2   ′> − − ∇ = −  . 
 
Therefore 
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 ( )( ) ( ) ( )2 2a 13a 2 2 2I(A 0) A exp Wa exp Wa exp Wa W[ 2E WE q ]   ′> − −  ∇ =   .  
           (G-18) 
 
A consistent estimator of 
2 2 3a
1
a 1E[ q ]−∇  is 
 
( )( ) ( )
( )2 2
1
n1
a 13
i 11
i i i 2 i 2
a
i 2 i i
I(A 0) A exp W a exp W a1
ˆE[ q ] 2
exp W a W Wn
−
−
=
∑
    ∇ =  
    
 > − − 
′
 
   
( )( ) ( )
( )
i i i 2 i 2
i 2 i
1
n
1
i 1
i
I(A 0) A exp W a exp W a
exp W a W
n 2
W
−
=
∑
    > − − 
′
 =  
    
.  
           (G-19) 
 
 
where 2aˆ  is the first stage, second part, estimator of 2a  , and 1n  is the size of the 
subsample for whom I(A 0) 1> =   
so 
 
1 1
2 2
1
pipi 11
δδ 1 a a 12
1
a 1
1
3
1
a
[ q ] 0 0
q ] 0 [ q ] 0
0
ˆE
ˆ ˆE[ E
ˆ ]E0 [ q
−
−
−
− ∇
 
 ∇ = ∇
 
 ∇ 
.   (G-20) 
 
 
δ 1 δ 1q ' qE ∇ ∇    
        3K×3K 
 
 Written out explicitly we have 
 
 
 [ ]
1 2
1 1 1 1 2
2 2 1 2 2
pi 11 pi 11 pi 11 a 12 pi 11 a 13
δ 1 δ 1 a 12 pi 11 a 12 a 12 12 13
a 13 pi 11 a 1
a a
a3 a 12 a 13 13
E[ q ' q ] E[ q ' q ] E[ q ' q ]
q ' q E[ q ' q ] E[ q ' q ] E[ q ' q ]
E[ q ' q ] E[ q ' q ] E[ q ' q ]
E
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
 
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ 
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ 
=

.         
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           (G-21) 
 
Because the first stage, first part, estimator of 1a  is MLE we can write 
 
 [ ]
1 1 1 1a 12 12 a
1
a 112aE[ q ' q ] E[ ˆAVARq ] (a ) −∇ ∇ − ∇ ==  
 
where 1ˆAVAR(a )  is defined as in (G-16).  We get an estimate of this directly from the 
Stata output. 
 
A consistent estimator of 
1 1a 12a12E[ q ' q ]∇ ∇  is 
 
 

1 1
1
aa 12 12 1
1
ˆAVARˆE[ q ' *(a )
n
q ]
−
 =
 
∇ ∇                (G-22) 
 
where  1ˆAVAR *(a )  is the estimated variance-covariance matrix output by the Stata logit 
procedure.  The remaining block elements follow from 
 
 pi 11q 2 ln(A)( Wpi)W∇ = − .                 (G-23) 
 
[ ]
1 112a a 1 1q ln f (I(A 0) | W) I(A 0) Wa )] [1[1 Λ( I(A 0)] Wa ) WΛ(−∇ = ∇ > = > − − >  
                       
           (G-24) 
 
and 
 ( )( ) ( )2 13a 2 2I(A 0) A exp Wa expq 2 Wa W∇ > −= .              (G-25) 
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where the formulation of 
1 2a 1q∇  comes from equation (16.4.8) on p. 350 of Fomby et al. 
(1984) and Λ(  ) denotes the logistic cdf.  The remaining required consistent matrix 
estimators are 
 
 
2n
pi 11 pi 11 pi 11j pi 11jj 12
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇                (G-26) 
 
 
1 1
n
* *
pi 11 12 pi 11i
1
a i
i
a 12
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇                (G-27) 
 
 
2 2
n
* *
pi 11 13 pi 11i 13i
i 11
a a
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇                (G-28) 
 
 
1 2 1 2
n
a 12 a 13 12i 13i
i 11
a a
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇                (G-29) 
 
 
2 2 2 2
n
a 13 a 13 a 13i a 13i
i 11
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇                (G-30) 
 
where 
 
 pi 11i i i iqˆ 2 ln( ˆ( W ) WA ) pi∇ = −                   (G-31) 
 [ ]
1 1a 12i i i i i 1 i
ˆ ˆW a )qˆ I(A 0)[1 Λ( I(A 0)]Λ] [1 W a W( )∇ = −> >−−              (G-32) 
 
and 
 ( )( ) ( )2 i i 2a 13i i ii 2ˆ ˆI( 0) Aqˆ 2 exp W a exp W WA a> −∇ =    (G-33) 
The components of equations (G-27) and (G-28) are obtained using  
 
* *
i i
*
pi 11i iq 2 ln(( W piA W) )∇ = − .        
where 
 
*
i i iW [P X ]=  denotes the observation on W [P X]=  that pertains to the ith  
  individual in the sample (i = 1, ..., n) for the relevant aggregation unit  
  (j = 1, ..., 2n )  
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so 
 [ ]
1 2
1 1 1 1 2
2 2 1 2 2
pi 11 pi 11 pi 11 a 12 pi 11 a 13
δ 1 δ 1 a 12 pi 11 a 12 a 12 a 12 a 13
a 13 pi 11 a 13 a 12 a 13 a 13
[ q ' q ] [ q ' q ] [ q ' q ]
q ' q [ q ' q ] [ q ' q ] [ q ' q ]
[ q ' q ] [ q
ˆ ˆ ˆE E E
' q ] [ q ' q ]
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆE E E E
ˆ ˆ ˆE E E
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
 
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
 
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ 
=
∇
.       
           (G-34) 
 
γδqE ∇    
   3×3K 
 
 Written out explicitly we have 
 
 
 γ u a v b m cq = [( q 0 0) (0 q +0)     (0 0 q )]∇ ∇ + + +∇ + +∇ P   
 
  v mu a b c[ q q     q ] ∇ ∇ ∇= P       
 
  ( ) ( ) i2 U(a, W) u V(a, W) v ( m )= − − −  PP               (G-35) 
 
and 
 
1 2
1 2
1 2
uα αupi a a u a
γδ vpi b v b vα α
m
b
pi c cm cα m α
E[ q ] E[ q ] E[ q ]
E[ q] = E[ q ] E[ q ] E[ q ]
E[ q ] E[ q ] E[ q ]
 ∇ ∇ ∇
 
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ 
 ∇ ∇ ∇  P P P
 
  
1 2
1 2
pi a a
pi a a
E[ U] E[ U] E[ U]
= 2 E[ V] E[ V] E[ V]
0 0 0
∇ ∇ ∇ 
 ∇ ∇ ∇ 
 
 
                      (G-36) 
 
where 
 pi pi 0U V∇ = ∇ = .                  (G-37) 
 
1 1a 1 22Λ(Wa )λ(Wa )exp(Wa ) WU =∇                (G-38) 
 
 
2
2
a 1 2Λ(Wa ) exp(Wa )WU =∇      .  (G-39) 
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1a 1 2λ(Wa ) exp(Wa ) WV∇ =                   (G-40) 
and  
 
2a 1 2Λ(Wa )exp(Wa ) WV∇ = .                 (G-41) 
 
Note that 
 
 aΛ(a) λ(a) Λ(a)[1 Λ(a)]∇ = = −  
 aλ(a) λ(a)[1 2Λ(a)]∇ = − . 
 
The requisite consistent matrix estimators are 
 
 pi pi
ˆ ˆE[ U] E[ V] = 0∇ = ∇        (G-42) 
 
 

1 1
n
a
i 1
a i
ˆE[ U] = U
=
∑∇ ∇         (G-43) 
 
 

2 2a
n
i 1
a i
ˆE[ U] = U
=
∑∇ ∇         (G-44) 
 
 

1 1a
n
i 1
a i
ˆE[ V] = V
=
∑∇ ∇         (G-45) 
and 
 

2 2
n
a
i 1
a i
ˆE[ V] = V
=
∑∇ ∇         (G-46) 
 
where  
 
 
pi pii iU V = 0∇ = ∇         (G-47) 
 

1a 1 1 2i i i ii
2Λ(W )λ(W ) exp(ˆ ˆ ˆU a a aW ) W∇ =      (G-48) 
 

2a i ii
2
1 2Λ(W ) exp(Wˆ ˆa ) WU a=∇       (G-49) 
 

1a 1 2i i ii
λ(W )ˆ ˆV = a aexp(W ) W∇       (G-50) 
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and 
 

2a 1 2i i ii
Λ (W )ˆ ˆV = a aexp(W ) W∇       (G-51) 
so 
 
1 2
1 2
a a
γδ a a
ˆ ˆ0 E[ U] E[ U]
ˆ ˆ ˆE[ q] = 2 0 E[ V] E[ V]
0 0 0
 ∇ ∇
 
 ∇ ∇ ∇
 
 
 
.     (G-52) 
 
 
 
 
γγ
1E[ q]−∇
  
    3×3 
 
[ ]
[ ]
1
1 1
uu a
γ
m
γ
cm
vv b
1
E 0 0
E 0 E 0
q0
q
q
E
q
0
−
−
−
−
 
 
 
∇
∇ ∇
∇
 =   
  
  P P
   (G-53) 
because uv a vu b um a vm m u mb c cvq q q q q q 0∇ = ∇ =∇ =∇ =∇ =∇ =P P P P .  Now 
 
 uu a vv b m m cq q q 2∇ = ∇ = ∇ = −P P  
 
therefore 
  
1
γγ
1 0 0
2
1E 0 0
2
10
q
0
2
−
 
− 
 
   = −   

∇

 
−
  
.                (G-54) 
 
γ γq' qE ∇ ∇    
        3×3 
 Given that 
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 ( ) ( ) iγ 2 U(a, W) u V(a,q W) v ( m )= −∇ − −  PP .   (G-55) 
we have 
 
γ γq ' qE ∇ ∇  =   
  
2
2
2
E[(U(a, W) u)E[(U(a, W) u)
E[(U(a, W) u) ] ( m )](V(a, S) v)]
E[(V(a, S) v)E[(U(a, W) u)
4 E[(V(a, S) v) ] .( m )](V(a, S) v)]
E[(U(a, W) u) E[(V(a, S) v)
E[( m ) ]( m )] ( m )]
−− 
− 
−− 
 
−−
− 
−− 
 
− −
 −
− −  
P
P
P
P P
P
P
P
P P
 (G-56) 
 
The corresponding consistent estimator is 
 
 
n n ni2 i
i
i 1 i 1 i 1 ii
n n ni 2 i
i
i 1 i 1 i 1 ii
γ
i
γ
n
i 1 i
ˆ ˆˆ(U u) ˆ(U u)1 1 1
ˆ
ˆ(U u)
ˆn n n ˆ( m )ˆ(V v)
ˆ ˆˆ(U u) ˆ(V v)1 1 1
ˆ ˆ
ˆE 4 (V v)
ˆn n n ˆ( m )ˆ(V v)
ˆ
ˆ(U u)1
n ˆ( m )
q ' q
= = =
= = =
=
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑
   −
−
−      
−
−   
   −
−
  = −       
−
−   
 
−

− 
∇ ∇
P
P
P
P
P
P
n n 2i
i
i 1 i 1i
.
ˆ
ˆ(V v)1 1
ˆ( m )
n nˆ( m )= =∑ ∑
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
− 
−     
−  
P
P
P
P
 
            
           (G-57) 
Based on (G-8), (G-11) and (G-12) and using the two-stage estimator ˆθ  we can 
consistently estimate (G-7) as 
 
 
 11 12
12 22
ˆ ˆD D
ˆ ˆD D
ˆAVAR(θ)
 
=  
′  
 
where 
 




2
111
1 2
ˆn AVAR *(pi)
ˆ
ˆAVAR(δ) nAVAR *(a )
ˆn AVAR *(a )
0 0
ˆD 0 0
0 0
 
 
 =
 
  
=
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 [ ]12 γγ δ 1 δ 1 γγ γδ γ1 1 γ 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆE E E E ED q q ' q q q q− − −′   = ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇   −          
 
 
22 γγ γδ γδ γ
1
γ
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆAVAR(γ) E E AVAR( ) EˆD q q δ q q'E− −       =       ∇ ∇ ∇ = ∇  
 
     γγ γ γ γγ
1 1
q q ' q qˆ ˆ ˆE E E
− −∇ ∇ ∇     +      ∇  
 
and using well known results from asymptotic theory for two-stage estimators, we can 
show that48 
 
 

2
1 1
1
d1 2 22
ˆn (pi pi)
ˆn (a a )
ˆn (a a )
ˆAVAR(θ) N(0, I)
ˆn (u u)
ˆn (v v)
ˆn (m m )
−
 
−
 
− 
 
−  → 
− 
 
−
 
 
− P P
.     (G-58) 
*********************************************************************** 
ASIDE: 
Notice that the “ n  blow up” is a bit tricky here.  It implements n  for 1aˆ , uˆ,  vˆ and 
mˆP ; but uses 1n  for 2aˆ and 2n  for pˆi  .  We had to do this because we had to use the 
correct sample sizes (viz., 2n  and 1n ) for a number of the components of ˆAVAR(θ)  [viz., 
those that pertained to the estimation of pˆi , and 2aˆ , respectively ]; in particular (G-15), 
(G-19) (G-26) through (G-30).  For this reason we had to be explicit about the 
denominators in all of the averages for the components of ˆAVAR(θ) .  This meant that in 
                                                 
48Discussions of asymptotic theory for two-stage optimization estimators can be found in 
Newey & McFadden (1994), White (1994, Chapter 6), and Wooldridge (2010, Chapter 
12).    
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the construction of the requisite asymptotic t-stats we had to explicitly include the “blow-
up” in the numerator (i.e., we had to multiply by the square-root of the appropriate 
sample size).  I refer to this as “tricky” because one typically does not have to do this.  In 
the usual asymptotic t-stat construction the denominators of the averages (“n”) need not 
be included in the construction of the asymptotic covariance matrix because it typically 
manifests as a multiplicative factor and, after pulling the diagonal and taking the square 
root to get the standard errors, this multiplicative n  cancels with the “blow-up” factor in 
the numerator.  For example, the asymptotic t-stat of the OLS estimator is 
 
 
 ( ) ( )
k k k k k k k k
1 1 12 2
2 kk kk
kk
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆn (ρ ρ ) n (ρ ρ ) n (ρ ρ ) (ρ ρ )
ˆAVAR(ρ) ˆ ˆn σ σ1
σˆ
n
− − −
− − − −
= = =
′ ′ 
′ 
 
XX XX
XX
  
where 
 n is the sample size 
 kρ  is the coefficient of the kth regressor in the linear regression 
 kρˆ  is its OLS estimator 
 
2σ  is the regression error variance estimator 
 X is the matrix of regressors 
and kk′XX  is the kth diagonal element of ′XX .  Note how the “ n s” simply cancel. 
Note also that what we typically refer to as the “asymptotic standard error” can actually 
be written as the square root of the diagonal element of the consistent estimator of the 
asymptotic covariance matrix divided by n; in other words 
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 asy std err =   
ˆAVAR(ρ)
n
.  
************************************************************************   
Now back to the issue at hand.  Moreover 
 
 

2 P P
1 1
1 d1 2 22
ˆn (pi pi )
ˆn(a a )
ˆn (a a )
ˆAVAR(τ) N(0, I)
ˆn(u u)
ˆn(v v)
ˆn (m m )
−
 
−
 
− 
 
− → 
− 
 
−
 
 
− 
P P
P P
P P
.                 (G-59)  
 
where 
 
 
 ˆ
ˆAVAR(τ) ΞAVAR(θ) Ξ '=                   (G-60) 
 
and τ and Ξ are defined as in (G-2).  Now combining (G-1) with (G-59) and (G-60) we 
get 
 
 
 ( ) ( )
1 d
AL UPO AL UPO AL UPO2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆavar(η η ) n η η η η N(0, I)
−
 
− − − − →
    (G-61) 
where 
 
 AL UPO
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆavar(η η ) c(τ) AVAR(τ) c(τ) '− =   
and 
 
2
1 1 1 2
ˆ ˆu u
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆc(τ) 1 m 1   m m a / v m a u/ v   1 a a
ˆ ˆv v
     
= − − − − − − +     
     
P P P P P P P P     . 
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Appendix H.   
Asymptotic Distribution (and Standard Error) of UPOLηˆ in Eqn (4-6) 
 
We may write UPOLηˆ  as 
 
 
UPOL κˆηˆ
νˆ
=  
where 
 
n
i
i 1
1
ˆ ˆκ (α, W )
n=
∑=

K  
 
n
i
i 1
1
ˆ ˆν = (α, W )
n=
∑

V  
Using the corresponding consistent estimators for k , and v  say 
 1 2 P1 1 2 P2(α, W) λ(Wα ) exp(Wα )α Λ(Wα ) exp(Wα )α+=
    
K  
 1 2(α, W) Λ(Wα ) exp(Wα )=
  
V   
 P is the logged prices of alcohol 
 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆα [α α ]'′ ′=  (with 1 P1 X1ˆ ˆ ˆα = [α α ]′ ′  and 2 P2 X 2ˆ ˆ ˆα = [α α ]′ ′ ) is the consistent  
  estimate of the parameter vector 1 2α [α α ]'′ ′=  (with 1 P1 X1α = [α α ]′ ′  and  
  2 P2 X2α = [α α ])′ ′ )  [the parameters of equation (4-6)] obtained via the  
  two-part protocol culminating in (4-4) using logged prices of alcohol  
 
and i i iW [P X ]=

 denotes the observation on W [P X]=

 for the ith individual in the 
sample  
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(i = 1, ..., n).  Let ˆ ˆγˆ = [κ ν ]′  and γ = [κ ν ]′ , where ˆplim[γ] = γ .  If we could show 
that 
 
 
1 d
2
ˆ ˆAVAR(γ) n (γ γ) N(0, I)− − →  
 
where the formulation of ˆAVAR(γ)  is known, then we could apply the δ-method to 
obtain the asymptotic variance of UPOLηˆ  as 
 
 
UPOL
ˆ ˆavar(η ) c(γ) AVAR(γ) c(γ) '=  
 
where 2c(γ) [1/ ν κ / ν  ]= − .  Moreover, if we have a consistent estimator for 
ˆAVAR(γ) , say ˆAVAR(γ)  [i.e. ˆ ˆp lim AVAR(γ) AVAR(γ)  =
 
],  then we could 
consistently estimate UPOLˆavar(η ) as 
 
 
 UPOL
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆavar(η ) c(γ) AVAR(γ) c(γ) '= .      (H-1) 
 
We focus, therefore, on finding the asymptotic distribution of γˆ  and, in particular, the 
formulation of its asymptotic covariance matrix. 
 First, let θ = [δ γ ]′ ′ ′  where 1 2δ [α α ]'′ ′= , γ [κ ν ]′ =  (recall, 1 P1 X1α = [α α ]′ ′  
and 2 P2 X2α = [α α ]′ ′ ), and note that γˆ  can be viewed as the second stage estimator in the 
following two-stage protocol  
 
First Stage 
Consistently estimate δ  via the following optimization estimator 
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n
1 i
i 1
δ
q (δ, S )
δ = arg max
n
=
∑



       (H-2) 
where  
 1 i 11 1 i 12 2 iq (δ, S ) q (α , S ) q (α , S )= +    
 11 1 i i i 1 i i 1q (α , S ) I(A 0) ln[Λ(W α )] [1 I(A 0)] ln[1 Λ(W α )]= > + − > −
 
  
 
 ( )( )212 2 i i i i 2q (α , S ) I(A 0) A exp W α= − > −    
 i i iS [A X ]=
 
 
 
1 2δ [α α ]'′ ′=   , 1 P1 X1ρ = [ρ ρ ]′ ′   and 2 P2 X2ρ = [ρ ρ ]′ ′    and  1 2ˆ ˆ ˆδ [ρ ρ ]'′ ′=    
 
Second Stage 
Consistently estimate γ   via the following optimization estimator 
 
 
n
i
i 1
γ
ˆq(δ, γ,  S )
γˆ = arg max
n
=
∑


       (H-3) 
where 
 i a i b i
ˆ ˆ ˆq(δ, γ,  S ) q (δ, κ,  S ) q (δ, ν,  S )= +   
 
2
a i i
ˆ
ˆq (δ, κ,  S ) ( (α, W ) κ)= − −

 K  
 
2
b i i
ˆ
ˆq (δ, ν,  S ) ( (α, W ) ν)= − −

 V  
 
ˆδ
 is the first stage estimator of δ .  Use 1q  as shorthand notation for 
  
 1 11 1 12 2q (δ, S) q (α , S) q (α , S)= +  
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with 
 
 11 1 1 1q (α , S) I(A 0) ln[Λ(W α )] [1 I(A 0)]ln[1 Λ(W α )]= > + − > −
 
 
 ( )( )212 2 2q (α , S) I(A 0) A exp W α= − > −  
 S [A X ]=  
 
and use q as shorthand notation for  
 
 a bq(δ,γ,  S) q (δ, κ,  S) q (δ, ν,  S)= +  
with 
 
2
aq (δ, κ,  S) ( (α, W) κ)= − −

K  
 
2
bq (δ, ν,  S) ( (α, W) ν)= − −

V  
and let ˆAVAR(δ)  denote the asymptotic covariance matrix of the first stage estimator.49  
Using well known results from asymptotic theory for two-stage estimators, we can show 
that50 
 
1 d
2
ˆ ˆAVAR(γ) n (γ γ) N(0, I)− − →       (H-4) 
where,  ˆplim(γ) = γ  
 
                                                 
49
 Note that a consistent estimate ˆAVAR(ρ)  can be obtained from the packaged output 
for the first stage estimator because the first stage estimator is unaffected by the fact that 
it is a component of a two-stage estimator.  
50Discussions of asymptotic theory for two-stage optimization estimators can be found in 
Newey & McFadden (1994), White (1994, Chapter 6), and Wooldridge (2010, Chapter 
12).    
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δ δ
1
γγ γ γq q qˆˆAVAR(γ) E E AVAR(α)E
−  ′     =     ∇ ∇ ∇  
   [ ]δ 1 δδγ 1 δ1 γq ' q qE E E q−∇ ∇ ′  −   ∇  ∇  
    δ δ 1 δ 1
1 1
γ γ γ γγq q qE q qE'E E
− −′       
−       ∇ 
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇    
    
1 1
γγ γ γ γγq q ' q qE E E
− −∇ ∇ ∇     +      ∇   (H-5) 
 
Fortunately, (H-5) can be simplified in a number of ways.  Note that we can write 
 
 γ γδ 1 δ 1q ' q qE 'E[ q | W]E∇ ∇ ∇ ∇   =   

 
but 
 1 11 12δ δ δq = q q∇ ∇ +∇    
with 
 
1δ 11 αq [ ln f (I(A 0) | W) 0 ]∇ = ∇ >

 
 
 ( )( ) ( )2δ 212 I(A 0) A exp W α expq 0 W α2 W ∇ =  > −     
where 
 
I(A 0) [1 I(A 0)]
1 1Λ(W α ) [1 Λ(f (I( W αA ) | W) )]0 > − >> = −
 
 . 
 
Therefore 
 ( )( ) ( )
1α
2
δ
2
1
                 E[ ln f (I(A 0) | W)]
W
I(A 0) A exp Wα ex
E[
p Wα | Wq | ] 2 WE
′ ∇ >
 ∇ =
  
    
> −

   

 
 
   = [ 0     0] 
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because 
1α
E[ ln f (I(A 0) | )] 0W∇ > =  [see (13.20) on p. 477 of Wooldridge (2010)] and,  
( )( ) ( )2 2I(A 0) A exp W α exp W α | WE 0  => −     by design.  Finally, then we get 
 
 γ δ 1q ' qE 0  = ∇ ∇  
 
so 
 
 γγ γδ γδ γ
1
γ
1
ˆAVAR( ) E E Aγˆ q VAR(α) Eq q 'E q− −∇ ∇ ∇ ∇       =          
                 3×3        3×2K      2K×2K     2K×3        3×3 
 
    
1 1
γγ γ γ γγq q ' q qE E E
− −∇ ∇ ∇     +      ∇ .  (H-6) 
             3×3            3×3          3×3 
 
 
Let’s consider each of the individual components of (H-6) in turn. 
 
δ
1
δ 1qE[ ]−∇  
 2K×2K 
 Written out explicitly we have 
 
1 1
2 2
1
1
αα
α α 11
1 1
α 12α
E[ q ] 0
q ]
0 E
[
[
E
q ]−
−
−
 ∇
 ∇ =
 ∇ 
.    (H-7) 
Now 
 
1 1
1
1 1αα 1E ˆAV[ ] )q AR(α− = −∇         (H-8) 
  =  the negative of the asymptotic covariance matrix for first   
   stage, first part, logit estimation in the two-stage estimation  
   protocol for θ.  We get an estimate of this directly from the Stata  
   output. 
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A consistent estimator of 
1 1 1α α 1
1E[ q ]−∇  is 
 
 

1 1
1
1α 1α 1
ˆ
ˆnAVAR *(αE q ] )[ − = −∇
      (H-9) 
 
where  1ˆAVAR * (α )  is the estimated variance-covariance matrix output by the Stata logit 
procedure.  Also 
 
 ( )( ) ( )2 2α 212 I(A 0) A eq xp Wα W W2 exp α∇ = > −     
 
and 
 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )2 2α 2 2 2α 12 I(A 0) A exp Wα exp Wαq exp Wα W W2   ′> − −∇ =        . 
 
Therefore 
 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )2 2α 12α 2 2 2I(A 0) A exp Wα exp WαE[ exp WE αq W2 W]   ′> − −   ∇ =        .   
(H-10) 
 
A consistent estimator of 
2 2 2α
1
α 1E[ q ]−∇  is 
 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }2 2 i i i 2 i 2 1n1α α 12 1 i 1 i 2 i iI(A 0) A exp W α exp W α exp W α WˆE[ q ] n 2 W −− =∑   ′> − −  ∇ =        
           (H-11) 
 
where 1n  is the size of the subsample for whom I(A 0) 1> = , so 
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1 1
2 2
1
α1 1
αα
α
α 11
δδ 1 1 1
α 12
[ qˆE
ˆ ˆE[ E[
ˆE
] 0
q ] q ]
0 [ q ]−
−
− −
 ∇
 ∇ = ∇ =
 ∇ 
.  (H-12) 
  
 
  
δ 1 δ 1q ' qE ∇ ∇    
        2K×2K 
 
 Written out explicitly we have 
 
 [ ] 1 1 1 2
2 1 2 2
α 11 α 11 α 11 α 12
α 1 α 1
α 12 α 11 α 12 α 12
E[ q ' q ] E[ q ' q ]
q ' q
E[ q ' q ] E[ q ' q ]E =
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ 
∇ ∇  ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇  
.             (H-13) 
Because the first stage, first part, estimator of 1ρ  is MLE we can write 
 
 [ ]
1 1 1 1α 11 α 11 α α
1
111E[ q ' q ] E[ ˆAVARq ] (α ) −∇ ∇ − ∇ ==  
   =  the inverse of the asymptotic covariance matrix for first stage,  
first part, logit estimation in the two-stage estimation 
 protocol for θ.  We get an estimate of this directly from the Stata  
output. 
 
A consistent estimator of 
1 1α 11 α 11E[ q ' q ]∇ ∇  is 
 
 

1 1
1
α α11 11 1
1
ˆAVARˆE[ q ' *(α )
n
q ]
−
 =
 
∇ ∇                (H-14) 
 
where  1ˆAVAR * (α )  is the estimated variance-covariance matrix output by the Stata logit 
procedure.  The remainder of the block elements follow from 
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1 111α α 1 1q ln f (I(A 0) | W) I(A W0)[1 Λ( I(A 0α )] [1 Wα ) W)]Λ(∇ = ∇ > = > − − − >
  
 
           (H-15) 
 
 ( )( ) ( )2α 2 212 I(A 0) A eq xp Wα W W2 exp α∇ = > −    .              (H-16) 
 
where the formulation of 
1 1α 1q∇  comes from equation (16.4.8) on p. 350 of Fomby et al. 
(1984) and Λ(  ) denotes the logistic cdf.  The remaining required consistent matrix 
estimators are: 
 
 
1 2 1 2
n
α 11 α 12 α 11i α 12i
i 11
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇                (H-17) 
 
2 2 2 2
n
α 12 α 12 α 12i α 12i
i 11
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇                (H-18) 
 
where 
 
 
1α 11i i i i i 1 i1W )]ˆ ˆ ˆq I(A 0)[1 Λ( α I(A 0[1 W ) W)]Λ( α∇ =  − − > − > 
  
            (H-19) 
 
and 
 
 ( )( ) ( )2 i i 2 iα 12i i i2ˆ ˆI( 0) A exp W α exp Wqˆ 2 α WA > −∇ =                 (H-20) 
so 
 
1 1 1 2
2 1 2 2
11 11 11 12
1 1 1 1δ δ
12 11
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ
ρ 12 1ρ ρ 2ρ
[ q ' q ] [ q ' q ]
q ' q q ' q
[ q ' q ] [ q
ˆ ˆE E
ˆ ˆ
'
E E
ˆ ˆE E q ]
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
   = =



   .    
            (H-21) 
γδqE ∇    
   2×2K 
 
 Written out explicitly we have 
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 γ κ a ν bq = [( q 0) (0 q ) ]∇ ∇ + +∇   
 
  κ a ν b[ q q ] ∇ ∇=       
 
  ( ) ( )2 (α, W) κ   (α, W) ν   = − −  K V               (H-22) 
 
and 
 
 
1 2
1 2
κα a κα a
γδ
να b να b
E[ q ] E[ q ]
E[ q] =
E[ q ] E[ q ]
∇ ∇ 
∇  ∇ ∇  
  
  
1 2
1 2
α α
α α
E[ ] E[ ]
= 2
E[ ] E[ ]
∇ ∇ 
 ∇ ∇  
K K
V V
                (H-23) 
where 
 
1α 1 1 P1 1 2{λ(W α )[1 2Λ(W α )]α W λ(W α )[1 0 ... 0]}exp(W α )∇ = − +
    
K  
        1 2 P2λ(W α ) exp(W α )α W+
  
 
  1 2 1 P1 P2λ(Wα )exp(Wα ) {[1 2Λ(Wα )]α + α }W [1 0 ... 0] = − + 
   
  (H-24) 
 
2α 1 2 P1 1 2 P2 2λ(W α ) exp(W α )α W + Λ(W α ){exp(W α )α W exp(W α )[1 0 ... 0]}=∇ +
      
K  
  2 1 P1 1 P2 1exp(Wα ) {λ(Wα )α + Λ(Wα )α }W Λ(Wα )[1 0 ... 0] = + 
    
.   
           (H-25) 
 
1α 1 2λ(Wα )exp(Wα ) W∇ =
  
V
                (H-26)  
and 
 
2 1α 2Λ(Wα )exp(Wα ) W∇ =
  
V .                (H-27) 
 
The following equalities were used in deriving the above results 
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 aΛ(a) λ(a) Λ(a)[1 Λ(a)]∇ = = −  
 aλ(a) λ(a)[1 2Λ(a)]∇ = − . 
 
The requisite consistent matrix estimators are 
 
 

1 1
n
iα i
α
1
ˆE[ ] =
=
∑∇ ∇K K                        (H-28) 
 
 

2 2
n
iα i
α
1
ˆE[ ] =
=
∑∇ ∇K K                  (H-29) 
 
 

1 1
n
iα i
α
1
ˆE[ ] =
=
∑∇ ∇V V                   (H-30) 
 
and 
 
 

2 2
n
iα i
α
1
ˆE[ ] =
=
∑∇ ∇V V                  (H-31) 
 
where  
 

1 iα 1 2 1 P1 Pi i i2i
ˆ ˆλ(W )exp(W ) {[1 2Λ(W )]α + α }ˆ ˆ ˆα α W [1 0 ...α 0] = − + ∇
   
K
             
           (H-32) 
 

2 2 1 P1 1 Pα i 2i ii 1i i
ˆ ˆexp(W ) {λ(W )α + Λ(W )α }W Λ(W )[1 0 ..ˆ ˆ . 0ˆ ˆα ]α α α =  ∇ +
    
K
          
           (H-33) 
 

1 1 2α i i ii
λ(W )exp(Wˆ ˆ= α α ) W∇
  
V
                (H-34) 
and 
 

1 1 2α i i ii
Λ(W )exp(Wˆ ˆ= α α ) W∇
  
V .                (H-35) 
so 
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1 2
1 2
α α
γδ
α α
ˆ ˆE[ ] E[ ]
ˆE[ q] = 2
ˆ ˆE[ ] E[ ]
 ∇ ∇
 ∇
 ∇ ∇ 
K K
V V
.                (H-36) 
 
 
 
γγ
1E[ q]−∇   
    2×2 
 
[ ]
[ ]
1
κκ a
γγ
νν
1
b
1 E 0
E
q
q
q0 E
−
−
−
 
 
∇
∇
∇
 =   
 
                       (H-37) 
because κν a νκ bq q 0∇ = ∇ = .  Now 
 
 κκ a νν bq q 2∇ = ∇ = −   
 
therefore 
 
1
γγ
1 0
2E
10
q
2
−
 
− 
  =   

 
∇

−

.                  (H-38) 
 
 
γ γq' qE ∇ ∇    
        2×2 
 Given that 
 
 ( ) ( )γ 2 (α, W) κ  (α, Wq ) ν   = − − ∇  K V .                (H-39) 
 
we have 
 
γ 2γ
2E[( (α, W) κ) ] E[( (α, W) κ)( (α, W) ν)]
E 4
E[( (α, W) κ)( (α, W) ν)] E[( (α, W) ν)
q ' q
]
 
− − −
  =   
− − −
∇
 
∇

  
  
K K V
K V V
. 
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           (H-40) 
 
The corresponding consistent estimator is 
 
 
n n2
i i i
i 1 i 1
γ γ
n n 2
i i i
i 1 i 1
1 1
ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ( κ) ( κ)( ν)
n n
ˆE 4
1 1
ˆ ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ( κ)( ν
q ' q
) ( ν)
n n
= =
= =
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 
− − − 
  =   
 
− − −
  
∇ ∇
K K V
K V V
.              (H-41) 
 
 
Based on the above results, we can consistently estimate (H-5) as 
 
 
 
 1 1
γγ γ γ γδ δ γ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆˆAVAR(γ) E E Aq q qVAR(α) qE E− −′    ∇   =     ∇ ∇ ∇   
     
1 1
γγ γ γ γγq q ' q qˆ ˆ ˆE E E
− −∇ ∇ ∇     +      ∇  
 
and using well known results from asymptotic theory for two-stage estimators, we can 
show that51 
 

1 d
2
ˆ ˆAVAR(γ) n (γ γ) N(0, I)− − → .                 (H-42) 
 
Combining (H-42) with (H-1) we also have that 
 
 

1 d
UPOL UPOL UPOL2
ˆ ˆavar(η ) n (η η ) N(0, I)
−
− →               (H-43) 
 
where UPOLˆavar(η )  is given in (H-1). 
  
                                                 
51Discussions of asymptotic theory for two-stage optimization estimators can be found in 
Newey & McFadden (1994), White (1994, Chapter 6), and Wooldridge (2010, Chapter 
12).    
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Appendix I.   
Bias from Using UPOLηˆ Instead of UPOηˆ  in a Model of Alcohol Demand 
From equations (4-6) of chapter 4 and (3-10) of chapter 3, we can write the bias using the 
UPOL approach vs. the UPO method as the following rendition of the difference between 
elasticities obtained from unrestricted PO model with log prices (UPOL), i.e., UPOLηˆ  and 
those obtained from unrestricted PO model with nominal prices (UPO), i.e., UPOηˆ .  
    [UPOL UPO P1 X1 P2 X 2 P1η η {E λ(P α Xα ) exp(P α Xα )α− = + +     
       ]P1 X1 P2 X2 P2Λ(Pα Xα ) exp(Pα Xα )α+ + +     
        [ ]P1 X1 P2 X2
1 }
E Λ(Pα Xα ) exp(Pα Xα )× + +  
 
        [ 1 X1 2 X2 1E λ( a Xa ) exp( a Xa )a− + +P P PP P    
        ]1 X1 2 X2 2Λ( a Xa )exp( a Xa )a+ + +P P PP P     
         
[ ]
[ ]1 X1 2 X2
E
E Λ( a Xa ) exp( a Xa )× + +P P
P
P P
 
   
     
 [ P1 X1 P1 X1 P2 X2 P1{E Λ(Pα Xα )[1 Λ(Pα Xα )]exp(Pα Xα )α= + − + +     
       ]P1 X1 P2 X2 P2Λ(Pα Xα ) exp(Pα Xα )α+ + +     
        [ ]P1 X1 P2 X2
1 }
E Λ(Pα Xα ) exp(Pα Xα )× + +  
 
 
  [ 1 X1 1 X1 2 X2 1E Λ( a Xa )[1 Λ( a Xa )]exp( a Xa )a− + − + +P P P PP P P     
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       ]1 X1 2 X2 2Λ( a Xa ) exp( a Xa )a+ + +P P PP P     
        
[ ]
[ ]1 X1 2 X2
E
E Λ( a Xa ) exp( a Xa )× + +P P
P
P P
. (I-1) 
 
If we define 
 1 2v E[Λ(Wa )exp(Wa )]≡         
 
2
1 2u E[Λ(W a ) exp(W a )]≡         
 [ ]m E=P P  
 1 2ν E[Λ(W α ) exp(W α )]≡
 
 
and 
 
2
1 2ω E[Λ(W α ) exp(W α )]≡
 
 
where i i iW [P X ]=

 denotes the observation on W [P X]=

 for the ith individual in the 
 sample (i = 1, ..., n), with P expressed as log of alcohol price, and     
 i i iW [ X ]= P  denotes the observation on W [ X]= P  for the ith individual in  
 the sample (i = 1, ..., n), P with expressed as nominal price of alcohol.   
  
  
AL UPO 1P1 P2 [(v u) a va ]m[(ν ω)α να ]η η
ν v
− +− +
− = −
P P2 P
    
   P1 P2 1
ω u1 α α 1 a a m
ν v
      
= − + − − +      
      
P P2 P  .   (I-2) 
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Appendix J.   
Asymptotic Distribution (and Standard Error) of UPOL UPOˆ ˆη η−  
 
In Appendix I we showed that 
 
UPOL UPO
P1 P2 1 2
ω u
η η 1 α α 1 a a m
ν v
      
− = − + − − +      
      


P P P       
 
where 
 1 2ν E[Λ(Wα )exp(Wα )]≡           
 
2
1 2ω E[Λ(W α ) exp(W α )]≡           
 1 2v E[Λ(Wa )exp(Wa )]≡
 
        
 
2
1 2u E[Λ(Wa ) exp(Wa )]≡
 
        
 [ ]W P    X=   
 [ ]W     X= P   
and 
 
 [ ]m E≡P P              
 
 
Using the corresponding consistent estimators for ω, ν, v  and ω  say 
 
 
n
i
i 1
1
ˆ
ˆω Ω(α, W )
n=
∑=   
 
n
i
i 1
1
ˆν = (α, W )
n=
∑

 V  
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n
i
i 1
1
ˆvˆ = V(a , W )
n=
∑

 
 
n
i
i 1
1
ˆuˆ U(a , W )
n=
∑=

 
and 
 
n
i
i 1
1
mˆ
n=
∑=P P  
 
2
1 2Ω(α, W) Λ(W α ) exp(W α )=     
 1 2(α, W ) Λ (W α ) exp(W α )=   V   
 1 2V(a , W) Λ(W a )exp(W a )=
  
   
 
2
1 2U(a , W) Λ(Wa ) exp(Wa )=
  
 
 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆα [α α ]'′ ′=  (with 1 1 X1ˆ ˆ ˆα = [α α ]′ ′P  and 2 2 X 2ˆ ˆ ˆα = [α α ]′ ′P ) is the consistent  
  estimate of the parameter vector 1 2α [α α ]'′ ′=  (with 1 1 X1α = [α α ]′ ′P  and 
  2 2 X2α = [α α ]′ ′P )  [the parameters of equation (4-6)] obtained via the  
  two-part protocol culminating in (4-4) using the nominal prices of alcohol 
 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆa [a a ]'′ ′=  (with 1 1 X1ˆ ˆ ˆa = [a a ]′ ′P  and 2 2 X2ˆ ˆ ˆa = [a a ]′ ′P ) is the consistent  
  estimate of the parameter vector 1 2a [a a ]'′ ′=  (with 1 1 X1a = [a a ]′ ′P  and  
  2 2 X2a = [a a ])′ ′P ) [the parameters of equations (3-6) and (3-7),  
  respectively] obtained via the unrestricted two-part protocol culminating  
  in (3-8)  using the log prices of alcohol 
 
and i i iW [P X ]=  denotes the observation on W [P X]=  for the ith individual in the 
sample  
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(i = 1, ..., n), and i i iW [ X ]=

P  denotes the observation on W [ X]=

P
 for the ith 
individual in the sample (i = 1, ..., n). 
 
Let 
P1 P2 1 2
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆτ = [α α  a a  ω ν   u v  m ]′ P P P   
and 
 P1 P2 1 2τ = [α α  a a  ω ν   u v  m ]′ P P P , where ˆplim[τ] = τ .   
If we could show that 
 
 
1 d
2
ˆ ˆAVAR(τ) n (τ τ) N(0, I)− − →  
 
where the formulation of ˆAVAR(τ)  is known, then we could apply the δ-method to 
obtain the asymptotic variance of UPOL UPOˆ ˆη η−  as 
 
 
UPOL UPO
ˆ ˆ ˆavar(η η ) c(τ) AVAR(τ) c(τ) '− =  
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where P1
2
P1
1
2
1
1 2
ω
        1
ν
              1   
u
   m 1   
v
         m
c(τ)        α / ν
        α ω / ν
      m a / ν
  m a u/ ν
u1 a a
v
′  
−  
  
 
 
  
− −   
 
− 
 = −
 
 
 
 
 
−
 
  
− − −  
  
 



 
P
P
P P
P P
P P
.   
Moreover, if we have a consistent estimator for ˆAVAR(τ) , say ˆAVAR(τ)  [i.e. 
ˆ
ˆp lim AVAR (τ) AVAR (τ)  =
 
],  then we could consistently estimate 
UPOL UPO
ˆ ˆavar(η η )− as 
 
 
 UPOL UPO
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆavar(η η ) c(τ) AVAR(τ) c(τ) '− = .     (J-1) 
 
We focus, therefore, on finding the asymptotic distribution of τˆ  and, in particular, the 
formulation of its asymptotic covariance matrix. 
 First note that we can write τ as  
 
 
τ Ξ θ=
          (J-2) 
 
where θ = [δ γ ]′ ′ ′ , 1 2 1 2δ [α α   a a ]'′ ′ ′ ′= , γ [ω ν   u ν  m  ]′ =   P  (recall, 
1 P1 X1α = [α α ]′ ′  , 2 P2 X2α = [α α ]′ ′ , 1 1 X1ˆ ˆ ˆa = [a a ]′ ′P , and 2 2 X2ˆ ˆ ˆa = [a a ]′ ′P ).  
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P1
P2
1
2
α
α
a
a
5,4K 5
Ξ
0 I
 
 
− − − − − − − − 
 
 
 
− − − − − − − −
 
=  
 
− − − − − − − − 
 
 
− − − − − − − − 
 
 




P
P
  
 
a is the unit row vector with the value “1” in the element position corresponding to the 
element position of a in the vector θ, b,c0  is the matrix of zeros whose row and column 
dimensions are b and c, respectively, dI  is the identity matrix of order d, and K is the 
column dimension of W.  For future reference, let’s set the following vector/matrix 
dimensions: 
 
 1α is K×1 
 2α is K×1 
 1a is K×1 
 2a is K×1 
           W  is 1×K 
 W

 is 1×K 
 τ is 9×1 
 c(τ) is 1×9 
 δ is 4K×1 
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 γ is 5×1 
 θ is (4K+5)×1 
 Ξ  is 9×(4K+5) 
 
P1 P2 1 2α α a a
= = = =   
P P
 1×(4K+5) 
   
Clearly then  
 
  
ˆ
ˆAVAR(τ) Ξ AVAR(θ) Ξ′=        (J-3) 
 
where ˆθ  is the estimator of θ obtained from the following two-stage protocol. 
 
First Stage 
Consistently estimate δ via the following optimization estimator 
 
 
n
1 i
i 1
δ
q (δ, S )
ˆδ = arg max
n
=
∑


       (J-4) 
where  
 1 i 11 1 i 12 2 i 13 1 i 14 2 iq (δ, S ) q (α , S ) q (α , S ) q (a , S ) q (a , S )= + + +
 
     
 
 11 1 i i i 1 i i 1q (α , S ) I(A 0) ln[Λ(W α )] [1 I(A 0)] ln[1 Λ(W α )]= > + − > −      
 ( )( )212 2 i i i i 2q (α , S ) I(A 0) A exp W α= − > −     
 13 1 i i i 1 i i 1q (a , S ) I(A 0) ln[Λ(W a )] [1 I(A 0)] ln[1 Λ(W a )]= > + − > −
  
  
 
 ( )( )214 2 i i i i 2q (a , S ) I(A 0) A exp W a= − > −    
 i i i iS [A X P ]=  and i i i iS [A X ]=

P     
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1 2 1 2δ [α α    a    a ]'′ ′ ′ ′=     , 1 P1 X1α = [α α ]′ ′   , 2 P2 X2α = [α α ]′ ′    , 1 1 X1a = [a a ]′ ′  P , 
2 2 X2a = [a a ]′ ′  P and  1 2 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆδ [α α    a a ] '′ ′ ′ ′=  
 
 
 
Second Stage 
Consistently estimate γ via the following optimization estimator 
 
 
n
i
i 1
γ
ˆq(δ, γ,  S )
γˆ = arg max
n
=
∑


       (J-5) 
where 
 
i a i b i c i d i e i
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆq(δ, γ,  S ) q (δ, ω,  S ) q (δ, ν,  S ) q (δ, u,  S ) q (δ, v,  S ) q (δ, m ,  S )= + + + +
  
       
P
 
 
2
a i i
ˆ
ˆq (δ, ω,  S ) (Ω(α, W ) ω)= − −      
 
2
b i i
ˆ
ˆq (δ, ν,  S ) ( (α, W ) ν)= − −   V  
 
2
c i i
ˆ
ˆq (δ, u,  S ) (U(a , W ) u)= − −
 

 
 
2
d i i
ˆ
ˆq (δ, v,  S ) (V(a , W ) v)= − −
 
 
 
 
2
e i i
ˆq (δ, m ,  S ) ( m )= − −

 
P PP   
1 2 1 2
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆδ [α α    a a ] '′ ′ ′ ′=  is the first stage estimator of δ, 
 1 P1 X1ˆ ˆ ˆα = [α α ]′ ′  , 2 P2 X2ˆ ˆ ˆα = [α α ]′ ′  , 1 1 X1ˆ ˆ ˆa = [a a ]′ ′P  and 2 2 X2ˆ ˆ ˆa = [a a ]′ ′P .  
Use 1q  as shorthand notation for 
  1 11 1 12 2 13 1 14 2q (δ, S) q (α , S) q (α , S) + q (a , S) q (a , S) = + +
 
 
 
 
with 
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 11 1 1 1q (α , S) I(A 0) ln[Λ(W α )] [1 I(A 0)]ln[1 Λ(W α )]= > + − > −    
 ( )( )212 2 2q (α , S) I(A 0) A exp W α= − > −   
 13 1 1 1q (a , S) I(A 0) ln[Λ(Wa )] [1 I(A 0)] ln[1 Λ(Wa )]= > + − > −
  
 
 ( )( )214 2 i i 2q (a , S) I(A 0) A exp W a= − > − 
 
 
 S [A X P]=  and S [A X ]=

P .  
 
and use q as shorthand notation for  
 
 a b c d eq(δ,γ,  S) q (δ, ω,  S) q (δ, ν,  S) q (δ, ω,  S) q (δ, ν,  S) q (δ, ,  S)= + + + +
      P
 
with 
 
2
aq (δ, ω,  S) (Ω(α, W) ω)= − −     
 
2
bq (δ, ν,  S) ( (α, W) ν)= − −  V  
 
2
cq (δ, u,  S) (U(a , W) u)= − −
 
 
 
2
dq (δ, v,  S) (V(a , W) v)= − −
 
 
 
2
eq (δ, m ,  S) ( m )= − −

P PP   
and let ˆAVAR(δ)  denote the asymptotic covariance matrix of the first stage estimator.52  
Using well known results from asymptotic theory for two-stage estimators, we can show 
that53 
                                                 
52
 Note that a consistent estimate ˆAVAR(δ)  can be obtained from the packaged output 
for the first stage estimator because the first stage estimator is unaffected by the fact that 
it is a component of a two-stage estimator.  
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1 d
2ˆ ˆAVAR(θ) n (θ θ) N(0, I)− − →       (J-6) 
 
where ˆˆ ˆθ = [δ γ ]′ ′ ′ ,  ˆplim(θ) = θ  
 
 
11 12
12 22
D D
D D
ˆAVAR(θ)  =  
′ 
       (J-7) 
 
 11
ˆAVAD R(δ)=         (J-8) 
  4K×4K 
 [ ]12 δδ 1 δ 1 γ γγ 11E ED q q ' q E q −−= ∇ ∇ ∇      ∇  
  
[ ] [ ] [ ]δδ 1 δ 1 δ 1 δδ 1 γ1 γ1 δ 1γE q q ' q q q qE E E E −− −∇ ∇ ′   − ∇ ∇   ∇ ∇  (J-9) 
 
 22 γγ γδ γ
1
δ
ˆ
ˆAVAR (γ) E E AVD q q qAR (δ)E '−   =   =     ∇ ∇ ∇
 
  [ ]γ δ 1 δδ 1 γδ1q ' q qE E E q−∇ ∇ ′  −   ∇  ∇  
   [ ]γδ δδ 1 γ δ 1 γ 1γ1q q q ' q qE E E ' E −−      −    ∇ ∇∇ ∇ ∇    
    
1 1
γγ γ γ γγq q ' q qE E E
− −∇ ∇ ∇     +      ∇ .   (J-10) 
 
Fortunately, (J-9) and (J-10) can be simplified in a number of ways.  First note that we 
can write 
 
 γ δ 1 γ δ 1q ' q q 'E W]E |E [ q∇    = ∇  ∇  ∇

 
                                                                                                                                                 
53Discussions of asymptotic theory for two-stage optimization estimators can be found in 
Newey & McFadden (1994), White (1994, Chapter 6), and Wooldridge (2010, Chapter 
12).    
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but 
 δ 1 δ 11 δ 12 δ 13 δ 14q = q q q q∇ ∇ + ∇ + ∇ + ∇  
with 
 
1δ 11 αq [ ln f (I(A 0) | W) 0 0 0]∇ = ∇ >   
 
 ( )( ) ( )δ 12 2 2I(A 0) A exp W α exq 0 2 0 0p W α W ∇ =  > −     
 
1δ 13 aq 0 0     ln f (I(A 0) | W)    0 ∇ = ∇ > 

  
 ( )( ) ( )2δ 214 I(A 0) A exq 0 0  p Wa    0     2 exp Wa W> ∇ =   −      
where 
 
I(A 0) [1 I(A 0)]
1 1Λ(W α ) [1f (I( Λ(A 0) W) W α )]| > − >=> −    . 
 
I(A 0) [1 I(A 0)]
1 1Λ(Wa ) [1 Λ(f (I( WaA ) | W) )]0 > − >> = −
 
. 
Therefore 
 
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
1
1
α
δ 1
a
2 2
2 2
E[ ln f (I(A 0) | W)]
2E
E[ q | W]
E[ ln f (I(A 0) | W)]
2E
I(A 0) A exp W α exp W α | W W
I(A 0) A exp Wa exp Wa | W W
′ ∇ >
 
  
  ∇ =  ∇ > 
  
  
> −
 
−
 
>
   
   


 
 
   = [ 0     0     0    0] 
 
because 
1α
E[ ln f (I(A 0) | W )] 0∇ > =  and 
1a
E[ ln f (I(A 0) | W)] 0∇ > =
 [see (13.20) on 
p. 477 of Wooldridge (2010)], ( )( ) ( )2 2I(A 0) A exp W α e W 0WE xp α |>  = −      and 
( )( ) ( )2 2I(A 0) A exp Wa exp Wa | WE 0  => −     , by design.  Finally, then we get 
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 γ δ 1q ' qE 0  = ∇ ∇  
 
so 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ]12 δδ 1 δ 1 δ 1 δδ 1 γδ γγ 11 1E E E ED q q ' q q q qE −− − ′   −   = ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇          (J-11) 
      4K×4K           4K×4K        4K×4K    4K×5          5×5 
     4K×5 
 
and 
 
 22 γγ γδ γδ γγ
1 1
ˆ
ˆAVAR(γ) E E AVAR(δ) E 'ED q q q q− −       =      ∇ ∇ ∇ = ∇  
                           5×5        5×4K      4K×4K     4K×5        5×5 
 
   
    
1 1
γγ γ γ γγq q ' q qE E E
− −∇ ∇ ∇     +      ∇ .         (J-12) 
             5×5            5×5          5×5 
           5×5 
so 
 
11 1
(4K 5) (4K
2
12 25) 2
D D
4K 4K 4K 5
D D
5 4K
ˆAVAR(
5 5
θ)
+ × +
 
 × × 
=
 ′
 
× × 
. 
Let’s consider each of the individual components of (J-6) and (J-7) in turn. 
 
δ
1
δ 1qE[ ]−∇  
 4K×4K 
 Written out explicitly we have 
 
1 1
2 2
1 1
2 2
α α 11
1
α α 12
δδ 1 1
a a 13
a 1
1
1
1
a 4
E[ q ] 0 0 0
0 E[ q ] 0 0
q ]
0 0 E[ q ] 0
0 0 0 E[
[
]
E
q
−
−
−
−
−
 ∇
 
 ∇
 ∇ =
 ∇
 
 ∇ 
.         
(J-13) 
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Now 
 
1 1
1
1 1α α 1E ˆAV[ ] )q AR(α− = −∇                   (J-14) 
  =  the negative of the asymptotic covariance matrix for first   
   stage, first part, logit estimation in the two-stage estimation  
   protocol for θ.  We get an estimate of this directly from the Stata  
   output. 
 
A consistent estimator of 
1 1α α 11
1E[ q ]−∇  is 
 
 

1 1
1
α 1 1α 1
ˆ
ˆnAVAR *(αE q ] )[ − = −∇
                (J-15) 
 
where  1ˆAVAR * (α )  is the estimated variance-covariance matrix output by the Stata logit 
procedure.  Also 
 
 ( )( ) ( )2α 2 212 I(A 0) A exp Wα expq 2 Wα W>∇ = −     
 
and 
 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )2 2α α 2 212 2I(A 0) A exp Wα exp Wα exp Wα W Wq 2   ′> − −∇ =      . 
Therefore 
 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )2 2α 2α 1 2 22 I(A 0) A exp Wα exp Wα expE[ q ] 2E Wα W W  ′> − − ∇ =         . 
                     (J-16) 
 
A consistent estimator of 
2 2
1
α α 12E[ q ]−∇  is 
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( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }2 2 1n1α 12 1α i i i 2 i 2 i 2 i ii 1 I(A 0) A expˆE[ q ] W α exp W α exp W α Wn W2
−
−
=
∑   ′> − −

 ∇ =   
    
                     (J-17) 
 
where 2αˆ  is the first stage, second part, estimator of 2α  , and 1n  is the size of the 
subsample for whom I(A 0) 1> = .  
Similarly,  
 
1 1
1
1 1a a 3E ˆAV[ ] )q AR(a− = −∇                   (J-18) 
  =  the negative of the asymptotic covariance matrix for first   
   stage, first part, logit estimation in the two-stage estimation  
   protocol for θ.  We get an estimate of this directly from the Stata  
   output. 
 
A consistent estimator of 
1 1a a 13
1E[ q ]−∇  is 
 
 

1 1
1
a 1 1a 3
ˆ
ˆnAVAR *(aE q ] )[ − = −∇
                (J-19) 
 
where  1ˆAVAR * (a )  is the estimated variance-covariance matrix output by the Stata logit 
procedure.  Also 
 
 ( )( ) ( )2 2a 213 I(A 0) A eq xp Wa W W2 exp a∇ = > −     
 
and 
 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 2 2a a 14 I(A 0) A exp Wa exp Waq exp Wa W W2   ′> − −∇ =        . 
Therefore 
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 ( )( ) ( ) ( )2 2a a 14 2 2 2I(A 0) A exp Wa exp WaE[ exp WE aq W2 W]   ′> − −   ∇ =        . 
                     (J-20) 
 
A consistent estimator of 
2 2
1
a a 14E[ q ]−∇  is 
 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }2 2 i i i 2 i 2 1n1a a 14 1 i 1 i 2 i iI(A 0) A exp W a exp W a exp W a WˆE[ q ] n 2 W −− =∑   ′> − −  ∇ =        
 
            (J-21) 
 
where 2aˆ  is the first stage, second part, estimator of 2a  , and 1n  is the size of the 
subsample for whom I(A 0) 1> = .  
 
 
 
so 
 
 
1 1
2 2
1 1
2 2
α α 11
1
α α 12
δδ 1 1
a a 13
1
a a
1
1
14
ˆE
ˆE
ˆE[
ˆ
[ q ] 0 0 0
0 [ q ] 0 0
q ]
0 0 [ q ] 0
0 0 0 [
E
qˆE ]
−
−
−
−
−
 ∇
 
 ∇
 ∇ =
 ∇
 
 ∇ 
.         
            (J-22) 
 
δ 1 δ 1q ' qE ∇ ∇    
        4K×4K 
 
 Written out explicitly we have 
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[ ]
1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
1
1
α 11 α 11 α 11 α 11
α 11 α 12 a 13 a 14
α 12 α 12 α 12 α 12
α 11 α 12 a 13 a 14
δ 1 δ 1
a 13
α 1
q ' q ' q ' q '
q q q q
q ' q ' q ' q '
q q q q
q
E E E E
E E E
' q
q
E
'
q
E
E
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
∇
       
       
              
       
       
            
∇ ∇ ∇
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
∇ ∇
∇
∇
 
=
1 1 1
2 1 2
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
a 13 a 13 a 13
1 α 12 a 13 a 14
a 14 a 14 a 14 a 14
α 11 α 12 a 13 a 14
q ' q ' q '
q q q
q ' q ' q ' q '
q q
E E E
E E E
q q
E
       
       
              
       
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ∇ ∇ ∇
 
 ∇ ∇ ∇
 
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
 
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇              
.        
                    (J-23) 
 
Because the first stage, first part, estimator of 1α  is MLE we can write 
 
 [ ]
1 1 1 1α 11 α 11 α α
1
111 ˆE[ q ' q ] E[ AVARq ] )α( −∇ ∇ − ∇ ==  
   =  the inverse of the asymptotic covariance matrix for first stage,  
first part, logit estimation in the two-stage estimation 
protocol for θ.  We get an estimate of this directly from the 
Stata output. 
 
A consistent estimator of 
1 1α 11 α 11E[ q ' q ]∇ ∇  is 
 
 

1 1α 11 α 1
1
1 1
1
ˆAVARˆE[ q ' *(α )
n
q ]
−
 =
 
∇ ∇                (J-24) 
 
where  1ˆAVAR * (α )  is the estimated variance-covariance matrix output by the Stata logit 
procedure.   
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Similarly, because the first stage, first part, estimator of 1a  is also MLE we can write 
 
 [ ]
1 1 1 1a 13 a 13 a a
1
113E[ q ' q ] E[ ˆAVARq ] (a ) −∇ ∇ − ∇ ==  
   =  the inverse of the asymptotic covariance matrix for first stage,  
first part, logit estimation in the two-stage estimation 
protocol for θ.  We get an estimate of this directly from the 
Stata output. 
 
A consistent estimator of 
1 1a 13 a 13E[ q ' q ]∇ ∇  is 
 
 

1 1a 13 a 1
1
3 1
1
ˆAVARˆE[ q ' *(a )
n
q ]
−
 =
 
∇ ∇                (J-25) 
where  1ˆAVAR * (a )  is the estimated variance-covariance matrix output by the Stata logit 
procedure.   
The remainder of the block elements follow from 
 
 
1 1 1 1α 11 αq ln f (I(A 0) | W) I(A 0)[1 Λ( I(W α )] [1 W α ))]Λ( WA 0∇ = ∇ > = > − > − −      
                       
(J-26) 
 
 ( )( ) ( )2 2α 212 I(A 0) A exp Wα expq 2 Wα W>∇ = −    .     (J-27) 
 
1 1a 13 a 1 1q ln f (I(A 0) | W) I(A W0)[1 Λ( I(A 0a )] [1 Wa ) W)]Λ(∇ = ∇ > = > − − − >
  
 
                       
(J-28) 
 
 ( )( ) ( )2 2a 214 I(A 0) A eq xp Wa W W2 exp a∇ = > −    .    (J-29) 
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where the formulation of 
1α 11q∇  and 1a 13q∇  comes from equation (16.4.8) on p. 350 of 
Fomby et al. (1984) and Λ(  ) denotes the logistic cdf.  The remaining required consistent 
matrix estimators are 
 
 
1 2 1 2
n
α 11 α 12 α 11i α 12i
i 11
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇                (J-30) 
 
 
2 2 2 2
n
α 12 α 12 α 12i α 12i
i 11
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇                (J-31) 
 
 
1 1 1 1
n
α 11 a 13 α 11i a 13i
i 11
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇                (J-32) 
 
 
2 1 2 1
n
α 12 a 13 α 12i a 13i
i 11
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇                (J-33) 
 
 
1 2 1 2
n
α 11 a 14 α 11i a 14i
i 11
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇                (J-34) 
 
 
2 2 2 2
n
α 12 a 14 α 12i a 14i
i 11
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇                (J-35) 
 
 
1 2 1 2
n
a 13 a 14 a 13i a 14i
i 11
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇                (J-36) 
 
 
2 2 2 2
n
a 14 a 14 a 14i a 14i
i 11
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆE[ q ' q ] q ' q
n =
∑∇ ∇ = ∇ ∇                (J-37) 
 
where 
 
 
1α 11i i i i i i1 1
ˆW α )] [1 W )ˆ ˆq I(A 0)[1 Λ( I(A 0)]Λ( α W − −∇ = > − >       (J-38) 
 
 
 ( )( ) ( )2α 12i i i 2 i 2i iˆ ˆI( 0) A exp W α exqˆ α2 A p W W∇ > −=        (J-39) 
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1a 13i i i i i 1 i1W )]ˆ ˆ ˆq I(A 0)[1 Λ( a I(A 0[1 W ) W)]Λ( a∇ =  − − > − > 
  
   (J-40) 
 
and 
 
 ( )( ) ( )2 i i 2 ia 14i i i2ˆ ˆI( 0) A exp W a exp Wqˆ 2 a WA > −∇ =                 (J-41) 
so 
 [ ]
1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
α 11 α 11 α 11 α 11
α 11 α 12 a 13 a 14
α 12 α 12 α 12 α 12
α 11 α 12 a 13 a 14
δ 1 δ 1
a
q ' q ' q ' q '
q q q q
q ' q ' q ' q '
q q q q
q ' q
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆE E E E
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆE E E E
ˆE
ˆE
       
       
              
       
       
    
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
∇ ∇ ∇
         
∇
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
=∇ ∇
∇
1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
13 a 13 a 13 a 13
α 11 α 12 a 13 a 14
a 14 a 14 a 14 a 14
α 11 α 12 a 13 a 14
q ' q ' q ' q '
q q q q
q ' q ' q ' q '
q
ˆ ˆ ˆE E E
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆE E E E
q q q
       
       
         
 
 
 
 



 ∇ ∇ ∇

 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇

 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇

∇
    
       
       ∇              ∇ ∇ 










.         
            (J-42) 
 
γδqE ∇    
   5×4K 
 
 Written out explicitly we have 
 
 
 
ω a
ν b
u cγ
v d
m e
( q  0  0  0 0)
(0 q + 0 + 0 + 0)
(0 + 0 q + 0 + 0)q =
(0 + 0 + 0 q + 0)
(0 + 0 + 0 + 0 q )
′∇ + + + + 
 +∇ 
 +∇∇
 
+∇ 
 +∇ 


P
  
 
  ω a ν b u c v d m e[ q q    q q     q ] ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇=   P       
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 Ω(α, W) ω  (α, W) ν    U(a, W) ω  V(a, W) ν     m = − − − − −        PV P  
                               
           (J-43) 
 
and 
 
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1
ωα a ωα a ωa a ωa a
να b να b νa b va b
uα c uα c ua c ua cγδ
vα d vα d va d va d
m α e m α e m a e
E[ q ] E[ q ] E[ q ] E[ q ]
E[ q ] E[ q ] E[ q ] E[ q ]
E[ q ] E[ q ] E[ q ] E[ q ]E[ q] =
E[ q ] E[ q ] E[ q ] E[ q ]
E[ q ] E[ q ] E[ q ] E[
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇∇
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
∇ ∇ ∇
   
   
P P P 2m a e
q ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ∇ P
  
  
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
α α a a
α α a a
α α a a
α α a a
E[ Ω] E[ Ω] E[ Ω] E[ Ω]
E[ ] E[ ] E[ ] E[ ]
= 2 E[ U] E[ U] E[ U] E[ U]
E[ V] E[ V] E[ V] E[ V]
0 0 0 0
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
 
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇
 
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ 
 ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ 
 
 
   
   
V V V V
             (J-44) 
 
where 
 
1 1α 1 22Λ(W )λ(W ) exp(W )Ω α Wα α∇ =                    (J-45) 
 
 
2
2
α 1 2Λ(W α ) exp(W WΩ α )=∇                    (J-46) 
 
1 1α 2λ(W α ) exp(W α ) W∇ =  
 V                 (J-47) 
 
2 1α 2Λ(W α ) exp(W α ) W∇ =  
 V                 (J-48) 
 
1 1a 1 22Λ(Wa )λ(Wa )exp(U Wa ) W=∇
   
               (J-49) 
 
 
2
2
1 2a Λ(Wa ) exp( aU W )W=∇
  
                (J-50) 
 
1 1a 2λ(Wa )exp( aV W ) W∇ =
  
                 (J-51) 
 
2 1a 2Λ(Wa )exp( aV W ) W∇ =
  
                 (J-52) 
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and  
 ωa a ωa b va a va b uα c uα d vα c vα d m δ eq q q q q q q q q 0∇ = ∇ = ∇ = ∇ = ∇ = ∇ = ∇ = ∇ = ∇ =    P . 
                              (J-53) 
Note that 
 aΛ(a) λ(a) Λ(a)[1 Λ(a)]∇ = = −  
 aλ(a) λ(a)[1 2Λ(a)]∇ = − . 
 
The requisite consistent matrix estimators are 
 
 

1 1
n
α α ii 1
ˆE[ Ω] =
=
∑∇ ∇ Ω                    (J-54) 
 
 

2 2
n
α α ii 1
ˆE[ Ω] = Ω
=
∑∇ ∇                    (J-55) 
 
 

1 1
n
α α ii 1
ˆE[ ] =
=
∑∇ ∇ V V                   (J-56) 
 
 

2 2
n
α α ii 1
ˆE[ ] =
=
∑∇ ∇ V V                  (J-57) 
 
 

1 1
n
a a ii 1
ˆE[ U] = U
=
∑∇ ∇                   (J-58) 
 
 

2 2
n
a a ii 1
ˆE[ U] = U
=
∑∇ ∇                   (J-59) 
 
 

1 1
n
a a ii 1
ˆE[ V] = V
=
∑∇ ∇                   (J-60) 
 
and 
 
 

2 2
n
a a ii 1
ˆE[ V] = V
=
∑∇ ∇                        (J-61) 
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where  
 

1 1 1i i 2α i ii
2Λ(W )λˆ ˆ ˆΩ α α(W )exp(W ) Wα=∇                    (J-62) 
 

2
2
α i ii 1 2
Λ(W ) expˆ ( WˆΩ α αW )=∇                     (J-63) 
 

1α i i 2 ii 1
λ(W ) exp(ˆ ˆ= α )αW W∇   V                 (J-64) 
 

2α i i 2 ii 1
Λ(W ) exp(ˆ ˆ= α )αW W∇   V                 (J-65) 
 

1 1 1 2a i i i ii
2Λ(W )λ(W ) exp(W ) Wˆ ˆ ˆU a a a∇ =
   
               (J-66) 
 

2a i ii
2
1 2Λ(W ) exp(Wˆ a Wa )ˆU =∇
  
                (J-67) 
 

1 1 2a i i ii
λ(W ) exp(Wˆ ˆV = a a ) W∇
  
                (J-68) 
and 
 

2 1 2a i i ii
Λ(W ) exp(Wˆ ˆV = a a ) W∇
  
                (J-69) 
so 
 
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
α α
α α
γδ a a
a a
ˆ ˆE[ Ω] E[ Ω] 0 0
ˆ ˆE[ ] E[ ] 0 0
ˆE[ q] = 2 ˆ ˆ0 0 E[ U] E[ U]
ˆ ˆ0 0 E[ V] E[ V]
0 0 0 0
 ∇ ∇
 
 ∇ ∇
 
∇  ∇ ∇
 
 ∇ ∇
 
  
 
 
V V
.             (J-70) 
 
 
 
γγ
1E[ q]−∇   
    5×5 
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[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
1
1
1 1
ωω a
νν b
uu cγγ
vv d
1
1
m m e
E 0 0 0 0
0 E 0 0 0
0 0 E 0 0E
0 0 0 E 0
0 0 0 0 E
q
q
qq
q
q
−
−
−
−
−
−
 
 
 
 
   =   
 
 
  
 
∇
∇
∇∇
∇

∇
 

P P
  
                              (J-71) 
because ij kq 0∇ =  where { } { }i, j ω, v, u, v, ; k= a, b,c,d, e  am nd i j= ≠  P .    
Now 
 ωω a νν b uu c vv d m m eq q q q q 2∇ = ∇ = ∇ = ∇ = ∇ = −   P P  
 
therefore 
  γ
1
γ
1 0 0 0 0
2
10 0 0 0
2
1E 0 0 0 0
2
10 0 0 0
2
10 0 0
q
0
2
−
 
− 
 
 
−
 
 
   = −   
 
− 
 
 
− 
 
∇ .              (J-72) 
 
 
 
 
γ γq ' qE ∇ ∇    
        5×5 
 Given that 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )iγ 2 Ω(α, W) ω  (α, W) ν   U(a, W) u  V(a, W) v     m  q  ∇  = − − − − −       PV P . 
                            (J-73) 
we have 
 
γ γq ' qE ∇ ∇  =   
2
i
(Ω(α, W) (Ω(α, W) (Ω(α, W) (Ω(α, W)
ω) ω) ω)(Ω(α, W) E ω)
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The corresponding consistent estimator is 
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Based on (J-8), (J-11) and (J-12) and using the two-stage estimator ˆθ  we can consistently 
estimate (J-7) as 
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and using well known results from asymptotic theory for two-stage estimators, we can 
show that54 
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************************************************************************ 
ASIDE: 
Notice that the “ n  blow up” is a bit tricky here.  It implements n  for 1αˆ , ωˆ , νˆ  and 1aˆ
; but uses 1n  for 2αˆ and 2aˆ . We had to do this because we had to use the correct 
sample size (viz., 1n ) for a number of the components of ˆAVAR(θ)  [viz., those that 
pertained to the estimation of 2ρˆ , and 2αˆ  ]; in particular (J-17), (J-21), (J-30) through (J-
37).  For this reason we had to be explicit about the denominators in all of the averages 
for the components of ˆAVAR(θ) .  This meant that in the construction of the requisite 
                                                 
54Discussions of asymptotic theory for two-stage optimization estimators can be found in 
Newey & McFadden (1994), White (1994, Chapter 6), and Wooldridge (2010, Chapter 
12).    
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asymptotic t-stats we had to explicitly include the “blow-up” in the numerator (i.e., we 
had to multiply by the square-root of the appropriate sample size).  I refer to this as 
“tricky” because one typically does not have to do this.  In the usual asymptotic t-stat 
construction the denominators of the averages (“n”) need not be included in the 
construction of the asymptotic covariance matrix because it typically manifests as a 
multiplicative factor and, after pulling the diagonal and taking the square root to get the 
standard errors, this multiplicative n  cancels with the “blow-up” factor in the 
numerator.  For example, the asymptotic t-stat of the OLS estimator is 
 
 
 ( ) ( )
k k k k k k k k
1 1 12 2
2 kk kk
kk
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆn (ρ ρ ) n (ρ ρ ) n (ρ ρ ) (ρ ρ )
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− − −
− − − −
= = =
′ ′ 
′ 
 
XX XX
XX
  
where 
 n is the sample size 
 kρ  is the coefficient of the kth regressor in the linear regression 
 kρˆ  is its OLS estimator 
 
2σ  is the regression error variance estimator 
 X is the matrix of regressors 
 
and kk′XX  is the kth diagonal element of ′XX .  Note how the “ n s” simply cancel. 
Note also that what we typically refer to as the “asymptotic standard error” can actually 
be written as the square root of the diagonal element of the consistent estimator of the 
asymptotic covariance matrix divided by n; in other words 
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 asy std err =   
ˆAVAR(ρ)
n
.  
***********************************************************************   
Now back to the issue at hand.  Moreover 
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where 
 
 
 ˆ
ˆAVAR(τ) ΞAVAR(θ) Ξ '=                   (J-78) 
 
and τ and Ξ are defined as in (J-2).  Now combining (J-1) with (J-77) and (J-78) we get 
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where 
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and 
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